



**THE HASKELL LECTURES IN
COMPARATIVE RELIGION**

**MODERN TRENDS IN
WORLD-RELIGIONS**

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK

THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON

THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI

THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LIMITED
SHANGHAI

MODERN TRENDS IN WORLD-RELIGIONS

HASKELL FOUNDATION
INSTITUTE

Edited by

A. EUSTACE HAYDON
"



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO · ILLINOIS

BL 98

.H4

cop. 3

COPYRIGHT 1934 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. PUBLISHED DECEMBER 1934

COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.



Dir.

INTRODUCTION

CHANGE has always been characteristic of living religions. For religion is not an abstraction. It has vital significance only as it is deeply rooted in the moving processes of folk life. Modernism is, therefore, no novelty for the historian of religions. Twenty-five centuries ago Hindu and Chinese conservatives were grumblingly adjusting themselves to "modern movements." But in all past ages the drift of religions into new forms has been relatively slow and dignified. It was a process of modernizing a traditional heritage rather than a radical reorientation. Today the great historic religions are compelled to come to terms with revolutionary forces unknown to any earlier era—desires, hopes, powers, problems startlingly new. Patterns of thought and custom which have remained relatively stable for centuries are now being challenged, neglected, or discarded. It may be that the religions of the world are in this generation passing through the greatest transformation of all time. The age-old search of men for a satisfying life-fulfilment which the historic cultures have embodied in the traditional religious world-views and programs is now assuming a new embodiment so strikingly different from the old as to appear to the shocked eyes of the orthodox, if not an abandonment of religion, at least a betrayal of the fundamentals. However religion may be defined it could not now remain static and still continue to be a vital phase of culture. Only dead religions, safely remote from the turbulent stream of human living, could escape change in this age of altered thought-forms, enlarged desires, new hopes, and novel problems.

— The dominant influences compelling change are two—the new scientific thinking and applied science, the one dis-

integrating old ideologies, the other breaking up the inherited patterns of custom and institution.

The influence of modern scientific thought is far-reaching and the implications profoundly disturbing for traditional religions. The natural sciences give an entirely new picture of the universe, of man's place in it, and of the nature of human nature. The social and religious sciences have clarified the meaning of religion as a function of human life, established the relativity of morality and of social institutions, interpreted the origin and development of custom and cult, and the social origin of gods and religious ideals. More important still, science has deeply engraved into the texture of the modern mind the concept of universal change which is a constant challenge to eternal truths, finalities, ultimates, and absolutes in all realms.

It would be easy, however, to overestimate the importance of this new way of thinking in the transformation of the existing religions. Comparatively few people have fully realized the implications of the findings of the sciences. Even the scientists often fail to carry over the implications of their own scientific thinking into realms outside the field of their specialization. Still rarer are those who have the synoptic view of all the sciences so as to appreciate the total impact of modern scientific thought. This is especially true regarding the findings of the religious sciences. Yet the influence of the new thought enfolds us as an atmosphere and is sufficient to give an uneasy feeling of unreality to ancient cosmologies, theologies, and supernaturalisms. But great changes rarely occur in religions only because of change in the intellectual weather. Thinkers may be affected, modernizing religious philosophies may be formulated, but the inertia of an established religion does not yield easily to an intellectual assault.

Applied science is a much more important factor of religious change, for it has re-made the face of the world,

created radical disturbances in the old ways of living, altered the patterns of community life, emptied ancient institutions of meaning, destroyed the traditional securities, undermined the moral controls of the past, and in making man master of material things has tragically multiplied economic maladjustments. The machine, heralded as the emancipator of humanity from age-old drudgery, strides the continents like a Colossus dragging untold millions as captives and victims of its triumphal march. On the other hand this same science has unlocked the gates to an era of plenty, opened alluring vistas of freedom and opportunity, created desires for values undreamed of in the earlier world. Enmeshed in the tangled problems of a time of transition between two ages the peoples strain toward to-morrow, the sunlight of hope on their faces and fear clutching at their hearts. The condition is world-wide. Lines of communication and transportation have bound all races into one bundle of life. Cultures have been brought into intimate interaction. The whole world wrestles with the same problems, aspires toward the same ideals, and strives to adjust inherited thought-patterns to the same scientific ideas. In such times the prophetic fire of religious aspiration flames anew and religions move into new embodiments. Clothed in the garments of orthodoxy the religions of yesterday seem strangely lost in the new age. But the religions of tomorrow are emerging surrounded by a multitude of modernizations of the old.

Religions differ in their modes of reaction to the forces of change according to the location of the fundamentals. For those whose fundamentals are in the area of belief the greatest challenge comes from the new scientific thinking. If the religion is tolerant, as some are, the all-inclusive philosophic concepts may be interpreted so as to take in scientific ideas without disturbing the system. If the religion is dogmatic, reconciliation may be impossible for some

groups, while others keep the form of the faith with a new content, as in modernism, obscurantism, and mysticism. In either case a religion whose fundamentals are in belief has the privilege of much slower movement since it is always possible to carry a great deal of traditional theological baggage in intellectual compartments without its greatly affecting the routine of living. But when the fundamentals are in the area of behavior, as they are in most religions, there can be no choice as to change when the social structure crumbles and disintegrates. New patterns of behavior must be found for realizing desired values. And the very fact that thought is free may make it possible for these religions to move swiftly into satisfying new forms of religious orientation. This difference of stress with its consequences is, for the observer, one of the most fascinating phases of the drama of modern religious change.

From the beginning the needs of human living have created all the forms of religion. The desires of men are more basic than all the modes of idea, custom, and institution in which they are temporarily channelled. An ideal culture would be an ordered Society in which socially conditioned desires would be led intelligently to their noblest and most joyous fulfilment. An ideal religion would be a moving synthesis of science and idealism, of knowledge and hope pointing the direction toward the realization of the good life for all men. But there is no philosopher or leader of religion yet wise enough to give such guidance in the complexity of the problems of the modern age. Our religious leaders are bewildered. Over all the world the noblest spirits grope fumblingly, as in all the ages past, through an unsatisfying present toward an unknown future. The web of tomorrow must be woven but the threads are tragically tangled in our hands. Consequently in all religions adjustment is being made to the new situation by a process of drifting.

During the summer of 1933 a group of eminent scholars assembled at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Haskell Foundation to interpret the nature of the adjustments of six of the great religions to the crucial factors of change. When the Haskell Foundation was established forty years ago the hope of the founder was that a sympathetic interpretation of religions would yield a spirit of good-will and mutual understanding between peoples of the East and West. Now all cultures are inexorably drawn together by a more tangible bond than an intellectual appreciation of their cultural histories. They are all involved in the same problems, compelled to find cures for the maladjustments created by scientific, social, industrial, technological forces which are world-wide. They are now one in a common task, that of finding a safe path into the new world of fact and idea. It becomes extremely important, therefore, to have a clear vision of their present status. Since it was agreed that the ideal of the Foundation could better be achieved by bringing to light the flowing advance of the living religions than by interpretation of the historical past, the Haskell Lectures during recent years have been devoted to the study of modern movements. The Institute here recorded made report on six of the great religions—Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. The speakers were selected, not because they were adherents of the particular religion whose status they were interpreting, but only because they were recognized as specialists fully qualified to give an authoritative and objective statement of the facts.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CONTENTS

I. WORLD-RELIGIONS AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. ISLAM. <i>Professor Martin Sprengling</i> , University of Chicago	3
II. JUDAISM. <i>Professor Mordécai M. Kaplan</i> , Jewish Theological Seminary of America	15
III. CHRISTIANITY. <i>Professor Edward Scribner Ames</i> , University of Chicago	25
IV. BUDDHISM. <i>Professor James Bissett Pratt</i> , Williams College	34
V. CONFUCIANISM. <i>Professor Hu Shih</i> , National Peking University	46
VI. HINDUISM. <i>Mr. K. Natarajan</i> , Editor, <i>Indian Social Reformer</i> , Bombay, India	52

II. WORLD-RELIGIONS AND MODERN SOCIAL-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

VII. HINDUISM. <i>Mr. K. Natarajan</i>	61
VIII. BUDDHISM. <i>Professor Y. Y. Tsu</i> , St. John's University, Shanghai	71
IX. CONFUCIANISM. <i>Professor Hu Shih</i>	81
X. JUDAISM. <i>Professor Abraham Cronbach</i> , Hebrew Union College	87
XI. ISLAM. <i>Professor Henry E. Allen</i> , Lafayette College	94
XII. CHRISTIANITY. <i>Professor Alva W. Taylor</i> , Vanderbilt University	103

III. WORLD-RELIGIONS AND INTER- CULTURAL CONTACTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
XIII. ISLAM. <i>Professor Henry E. Allen</i>	115
XIV. BUDDHISM. <i>Professor James Bissett Pratt</i>	124
XV. CHRISTIANITY. <i>Professor William Ernest Hocking</i> , Har- vard University	141
XVI. HINDUISM. <i>Professor S. L. Joshi</i> , Dartmouth College	153
XVII. CONFUCIANISM. <i>Professor Lewis Hodous</i> , Hartford Semi- nary Foundation	169
XVIII. JUDAISM. <i>Professor Mordecai M. Kaplan</i>	179

IV. THE TASK OF MODERN RELIGION

XIX. ISLAM. <i>Professor Martin Sprengling</i>	191
XX. BUDDHISM. <i>Professor Hideo Kishimoto</i> , Harvard Uni- versity	200
XXI. JUDAISM. <i>Rabbi Solomon Goldman</i> , Congregation Anshe Emet, Chicago	209
XXII. HINDUISM. <i>Mr. K. Natarajan</i>	221
XXIII. CHRISTIANITY. <i>Bishop Francis J. McConnell</i> , The Meth- odist Episcopal Church	229
XXIV. CONFUCIANISM. <i>Professor Hu Shih</i>	245
INDEX	253

**I. WORLD-RELIGIONS AND MODERN
SCIENTIFIC THINKING**

I

ISLAM AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING

BY MARTIN SPRENGLING

WHAT is the position of Islam when we compare, contrast, or seek some relation of world-religions to modern scientific thinking?

It is difficult, indeed quite impossible, to answer this question in a manner wholly satisfactory to every Moslem and to every Western observer. Most modern Moslems, despite the admitted backwardness of the Moslem world in the scientific advance of this "Century of Progress," would claim a high degree of compatibility between Islam and scientific thinking. Indeed, a fair number of intellectual leaders of the modern world of Islam, both reactionary and progressive, especially in India and in Egypt, have in various ways and in varying degrees given expression to such an estimate.

On the other hand many, indeed, until recent years *most* Western observers have pretty clearly considered Islam nearly or quite incapable of modernization, and not a few of them have given fairly definite expression to this judgment. Being myself a Westerner, it seems to me fairest to inquire first into the reasons for this unfavorable judgment of the West.

It is obvious, though the point need and should not be overstressed, that there is in this judgment some residue of a hostile past. In their origins both Christianity and Islam are medieval Mediterranean monotheisms, claiming to be revealed—chiefly through an inspired book—for the salvation of all men; both thus had to claim universal authority,

had to demand universal acceptance for the benefit of all mankind. The two were neighbors along a considerable front, and a clash was inevitable. Continued for more than 1,000 years this hostile attitude engendered much misunderstanding and misrepresentation of each other on both sides, some conscious, much of it naïvely unconscious. In a somewhat more peaceful manner this view of a great enemy religion was kept alive by the Christian missionary movement of the age just passing. When to the missionary interest there was added a more objective scientific interest, all of this feeling did not immediately subside. At the time when scientific study of Islam began in the West, two further things stood in the way of a just comprehensive judgment: first, the world of Islam was at a low point, almost at the nadir of its existence. We cannot and need not here inquire into the causes of this decline. Let it suffice to point out that the Moslem Near East in Ottoman Turkey, in Persia, and as far as India was weak and decrepit, politically and in military strength. Socially and economically it was in distress and disorder. Education, religion, literature, and science were formalized, classicized, reactionary. Small wonder that the European student shared the sense of contemptuous superiority which the Western politician, soldier, and exploiter felt. Second, in those days religion was largely looked upon as a matter of theology and doctrine. So viewed, Islam fared particularly ill in the eyes of the West. Its theology was in the form of that scholastically rigid systematization of medieval Mediterranean monotheism, out of which Christianity and Judaism were just beginning to pass. Moreover, though it was in its general setting foreign to the West and Asiatic, it did not have about it that utter strangeness, that wholly different view of and approach to life, which give to the religions of the *Far East* much of their fascination for the Western mind. Islam was not only a sister-religion to Judaism and

Christianity, it was a scion, a child of the two. Hence its tenets, its institutions, and its rites, so similar to our own of today and especially of yesteryear, yet torn from the context of our usage and quite differently put together, have a way of appearing to our eyes as distorted caricatures.

We might easily add more, but this will perhaps suffice to explain the low opinion which Western students until quite recently had of Islam's adaptability to a world in which scientific endeavor was coming to hold a high, in some sense a central, position.

This explanation will at the same time suggest to you that I, together with a number of more recent Western students, do not share this wholly pessimistic view. Neither, of course, can I unreservedly share the supreme conviction of Moslems, like Mohammed Ikbāl in India or Mohammed Abduh in Egypt, that Islam is really in itself the ideal religion for the adoption, spread, and development of scientific thinking and practice.

To my mind religion is one attitude toward life, art is another, science still another, business and industry again another, and there are perhaps others still. None of these in itself is incompatible with the others; more than one, rudiments at least of all, exist together in individual human beings. All of them manage to persist beside each other in all sorts of human groups. They are facets of the same crystal; soil, roots, pith, wood, bark, branches, leaves, etc., of the same tree. At this point I would like to register a sense of dissatisfaction with any overemphasis on the "modern" in the subject: "World-Religions and Modern Scientific Thinking." Overemphasized modernity of science as a mode of thinking, especially when linked with overadvertised modern industry and invention, seems to me a concept unnecessarily shallow, too easily inflated or depressed. Over against it the archaeological historian sets

6 MODERN TRENDS IN WORLD-RELIGIONS

the concept of the *New Past*. This is a good, catchy term for the archaeologist; not so good for us, who deal with religion, a phase of life. Life is present, and so I ask you to think of our subject in the terms of a *New Present*. In its width this New Present is illustrated at this meeting: world-wide. But likewise we have learned to see and sense world-history in geological and astronomical depth so remote that the whole human episode, though it is itself tens or hundreds of thousands of years old, is, as has been said, a mere layer of postage-stamp thickness on a base of world history of the size of the Eiffel Tower. To me the New Human Present, modernity in science, art, etc., is not a thing of 10, 50, or 500 years, but anything up to 10,000 or more.

Not that for the case of Islam and its relation to scientific thinking I want here and now to look so far back. I shall content myself with a brief glance at its medieval rise thirteen and a half centuries ago and at its growth and development through those centuries during which it lived in a thoroughly medieval world.

A word or two with regard to its founding and its founder will suffice. Rightly seen, in the very founding of Islam Mohammed was in his day a modernist. That Mediterranean, monotheistic revealed salvation-religion, which now is beginning to appear to many old and outworn, was then the most advanced position that man in that region had reached in his religious thinking. To give his people a share in this greater world, to draw them up to that level, that is at least one of the meanings of Mohammed's reforming or prophetic efforts. And if, in fastening this religious form upon his followers he appeared in the very nature of medieval theology and philosophy to have clamped them into an eternally rigid and unchangeable mold, yet it is worthy of note that the man himself never became so ossified. He remained to the end an opportunist, a learner by the trial-and-error method.

Nor, from the moment when the new religion is cast out into a world greater than Arabia, does the fancied changeless eternity of this new form of revealed monotheism hold true. With some surprise, but not without brave courage and elastic ability, it meets in turn more advanced Christian, Jewish, and other theological thinking, usage, rites, institutions, forms of service, etc., then Roman and Persian and Jewish legal thinking and practice. Presently it encounters the mystical speculation and contemplation of India. In all of these and in more direct ways it takes contact with Greek scientific thinking and philosophy. We cannot go into detail. For this we may refer to George Sarton's great *Introduction to the History of Science*.

Here we are content to point out that this early medieval Moslem world made such good work of meeting and absorbing all this foreign scientific (and sometimes unscientific) thinking that for an appreciable number of centuries it clearly led, in the sciences, as in the arts and in political power, if not the whole world then known, at least its own, the medieval Mediterranean world, which includes Europe. Nor is it true that they merely took over and passed on unchanged thinking and techniques created by others. As they took over and transmitted, so in the crucible of their mind and action they clearly recreated, transmuted, and created anew.

A few examples will make this clear. Let me begin with a science that is now much maligned and in general treated as a stepmother by unhistorically minded and even by narrowly historical modern scientists—Philology. Not so long ago but that a certain hostility between it and more recent sciences still persists, our own universities, following European models, were still largely theological and philological. In philology the great European universities developed first and foremost careful and objective scientific method and procedure. This is not due, as is often said, entirely or

in large part to the fall of Constantinople and the entrance of a Greek stream westward. The modern philological university owes more to the Arabic East than to the remnants of decaying Constantinople. In fact it is scarcely too much to say that modern philology—phonetics, morphology, syntax, lexicography, textual criticism, and a fine interest in other phases of language—is in large measure a creation of the Moslem world, though there, too, not entirely of the Moslem mind. True, here as elsewhere, the Moslems, and with them Christians, Jews, and Manicheans in the Moslem world, start by learning from others, in this case from the Hindus, at least as much as from Greeks and Latins. True it is, also, that the work in this science centers in a medieval interest in the inspired book. Yet within the limitations of the medieval world-picture the Moslem world at this point creates, in competition with Christian and Jewish endeavor, a science whose techniques and labors and results are very near to modern science. The results are excellent, especially if one allows for the fact that they were accomplished before the arrival of modern means of transportation and dissemination of knowledge and the wider spread of scientific attitude.

In philosophy and ethics the Moslems are frequently said to have simply copied the Greeks, their merit being that they transmitted a somewhat emasculated Aristotle to Europe before the Renaissance. This verdict is based almost solely on an imperfect western knowledge of the professed philosophers of the Arabic tongue. Even there the judgment is faulty, for these Moslem philosophers did not merely copy; they used the Greek methods and materials for their medieval problems, and it is they who created scholastic philosophy, which clearly the Christians and Jews learned from them. More important, however, than the professionals in the field of philosophy are the amateurs. The greatest of these is al-Ghazali, who died in 1111

A.D. He is often classed merely as a theologian, and as a theologian and creed writer he is an orthodox Moslem, as indeed, in his time and circumstance, he could scarcely be anything else. This does not prevent him in the general problems of the science and the life of his times from being a clear thinker and, at heart, a true scientist; from the earliest age he can remember, he tells us in an autobiographic confession less rhetorical and more direct than Augustine's, that it was his business in life to search out critically the truth of things. So he threw up an imperial university job, and while the crude Crusaders from Europe were marching on Jerusalem, in that very city, in a cubicle by the Dome of the Rock, he composed two major works. The first he called *The Collapse of the Philosophers*, not the "Destruction," as is often said. In it he sounds the depths of the problem of knowledge in terms and manner that remind one not only of Hume, but of Immanuel Kant; indeed, allowing for the limitations imposed upon him by his time, 700 years before Kant, it is not too much to say that Ghazali there wrote an earlier "Critique of Pure Reason." In his second work, *The Resuscitation of the Sciences of Religion*, he outpasses Kant and his ethics by a considerable margin. It has been said that Europe did not produce such searching ethical analysis until the days of Gagol, Dostoyewsky, and Ibsen; for Americans the combination of keen thinking with the flair for the actual and practical in the scientific revival of scientific religion sought by Ghazali may well be compared with the work of William James and John Dewey.

As we approach the world, which we call modern, in contrast with what is commonly designated as the Middle Age, it is still not true, as is often smugly assumed, that now Europe definitely takes the lead. On the very threshold of the modern age, as it is commonly defined, the impulse toward a new science, a scientifically realistic atti-

tude to life and the world, is at least as strong in the Moslem Near East.

Ibn Khaldun, born in Tunis in 1332, died in Cairo 1406, is a North African Arab. The farthest west which he reached in an active life was Spain; the farthest east Mecca and Damascus. What he saw and did, as well as what he read of previous Arabic scientific and other literature, led him to the discovery of a new science. To him it is a new science of history, a science which seeks to understand the course of events by noting everything from pins and poems to kings and queens. We would call much of what he sought and strove for "sociology." It is not too much to say, that he, and not a European of the past century, is the world's first pragmatic sociologist. This, in North Africa, a century before Columbus discovered America, is a remarkable feat. It cannot be developed further here; readers of English may consult our own Nathaniel Schmidt's little but weighty book *Ibn Khaldun, Historian, Sociologist and Philosopher*, published by Columbia University Press in 1930. There are other very important recent studies of Ibn Khaldun in French and German, the most important of the latter by a young and very modern North African Arab.

Ibn Khaldun, as well as al-Ghazali, was, of course, a *rara avis*, not only in the Moslem Arab world, but in any society anywhere. His work was not thoroughly understood nor appraised at its true worth in his own world and time. It is noteworthy that, though bulky, it was sufficiently prized to be frequently copied. It is further noteworthy that beside North Africa and Egypt the only copies of it known to exist in the Near East are in Constantinople. The first translation of it is not into a northern European but into the Ottoman Turkish tongue.

Turkey, Ottoman Turkey, until recently meant to the mind of Europe and the modern scientific West disrespect

and decrepitude, that general, disparaging attitude expressed by the contemptuous Gladstonian phrase, "the sick man of Europe." It was not always so. From before the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, and for more than a century thereafter, the Sultan of Ottoman Turkey was in the eyes of Europe the "Grande Turk." There was good reason for this, a reason which even present-day Europe quickly and thoroughly understands. He was stronger than they. He was beating at the very heart of Europe, the gates of Vienna. He had the strongest and best organized military machine in the world at that time. The greatest modern arm, artillery, was early appreciated and highly developed in his arsenals and in his tactics. In the efficient use of well-trained and elastically organized cavalry, artillery, and infantry, he gave lessons to Napoleon. The Ottoman supply train was the wonder of their world. In connection with this it is well to note that the civil, military, and religious administration centered in a palace school surprisingly modern in methods and subjects, so modern that many of its features seem to foreshadow our own New or Newest Plan at Chicago. For further details the reader of English must be referred to Albert Howe Lybyer's *Sulaiman the Magnificent* and to Barnette Miller's more recent books.

Historical data of the past do not confirm an evidently hasty Western judgment of an age just passing, which deemed that Islam was completely lacking in adaptability to "modern scientific thinking." There follow, indeed, some two or three short centuries, during which Europe and the West along some lines of scientific, industrial, and economic endeavor surge ahead and abroad, while the Near East along with the Far East, old mother Asia, falls in some ways far behind. We cannot stop here to inquire into the reasons for this temporary lag. We need merely state the fact. But in the same breath with this statement be-

longs another. Europe's exploiting activity, not altogether displeased with the Orient's backwardness, presently makes the Orient itself aware of this fact.

For more than a century now the Moslem world has shown signs of an awakening and a reaction to this fact. We cannot trace the history in detail; we must content ourselves with pointing out a few characteristic instances.

At the outset of the nineteenth century Mahmud the Reformer at Constantinople (1808-39) and Mehemet Ali at Cairo (1805-49) are typical examples of men of administrative power, who recognize European superiority and seek to remedy the situation by the introduction of European technique and instruction, in so far as they could grasp its significance and were able to carry out their aims. This has at first appearance little to do with Mohammedan religion, unless one counts the introduction of printing as a step in this direction. Lest we of the West become too proud of the fact that we had to learn the art of printing from China by jumping over the Moslem world, which then learned the craft from us, it may be well to note here the fact that on the one hand we received the art of paper-making from China and our "Arabic" numerals from India only through the Moslem world, and that on the other hand India and China and we altogether learned the art of fine bookmaking and binding from the Moslems.

In any case, presently the awakening of the Moslem world broke the bounds of religious reaction and set sail on a modern course with ever increasing speed and direction. Again we can point out only a few characteristic examples. In India Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-88) founded Aligarh College on the ground that "modern science and oriental learning are not mutually exclusive, and Muslims must make an effort to combine them." In Egypt the Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) and his most effective pupil, Mohammed Abduh (1849-1905), set the ball rolling,

as we now may read in the wholly reliable work of C. C. Adams, begun as a doctoral dissertation at Chicago, now published in expanded book form under the title *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (Oxford, 1933).

For Turkey, Irak, Persia, Afghanistan mere mention must suffice to call to mind happenings there which even our inland newsprint here in America had to note. For Syria and North Africa French and Italian tutelage is more chary of uncontrolled publicity, but signs of advance to a modern estate are apparent just the same.

With a reference to three outstanding men of the present we may come to a fair conclusion. In Angora Mustapha Kemal, the Turko-Hittite Ghazi, is at heart almost certainly neither Moslem nor Jew nor Christian, but most probably a Tom Paine type of free-thinker and agnostic; he is making a tremendous drive to introduce into his country and to instil in his people what he conceives to be modern civilization and its scientific spirit. Ibn Saoud in the heart of Arabia is an avowed orthodox Moslem; his tireless energy and judicious wisdom is introducing at a hitherto unheard of pace automobiles, tanks, wireless, airplanes, modern quarantine and hygienic methods, artesian wells for irrigation, modern negotiations and treaties in due form, with boundaries fixed as never before, a modern press and press methods, etc. At Cairo, Taha Husain, the greatest blind man of these times, avers stoutly that he is a Moslem; yet he fights as stoutly for fearless and objective method in all historical research, in religious as well as in profane problems.

In the last analysis it would seem, therefore, that Islam, concretely many forms and not one, in the abstract can hardly be adjudged either favorable or adverse to modern scientific thinking. Not Islam as such, but its men and women under varying circumstances and conditions are either one or the other.

At present the Moslem world's adoption of modern scientific thinking and the absorption of the Moslem world in the world of modern science is in full swing. We of the West will do well to recognize this fact now; else, perhaps, its recognition will be forced upon us later with a shock of surprise that may not be wholly agreeable.

II

JUDAISM AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING

BY MORDECAI M. KAPLAN

IN CONTRAST with the vague and conflicting notions which prevail at present, both among Jews and non-Jews, concerning Judaism, there was a time—and that not so long ago—when there was no such uncertainty about it. It was then easy to describe the nature of Judaism because it could be formulated in terms of the world-outlook which in its main outlines was accepted by all the nations, both Christian and Mohammedan, among whom the Jews lived. That world-outlook was based upon the following three presuppositions: (1) the Old Testament account of the creation of the world and of the beginnings of the human race is not only authentic but constitutes the premise of all that man should know and strive for; (2) the destiny of man cannot possibly be fulfilled in this present life, which is as a fleeting shadow, but in the life eternal, in the perfect world which God will bring into being, and (3) the only way man can prove worthy of salvation is by living in accordance with the supernaturally revealed will of God. Jewry, Christendom, and Islam accepted these three assumptions in principle. The only question was: What constitutes the final authoritative revelation of God's will, obedience to which is essential to salvation? Is it the Torah, Christ, or the Koran?

The reason there are many Judaisms today in place of the one which existed in the past is that there is no longer any one pattern of thought uniformly accepted by civilized mankind. The breakdown of the traditional ideology of

other-worldly salvation has by no means meant the substitution of a generally accepted ideology of this worldly salvation. In a little book entitled *The Contemporary and His Soul*, the author enumerates ten different conceptions of this-worldly salvation. In addition, the greater part of mankind is subject to what has been described as cultural lag, which among the more intellectually advanced takes the form of failure of nerve. This confusion of tongues in the non-Jewish world is reproduced with utmost fidelity in the Jewish world. Jews profess all kinds of religion, from rigid traditionalism to thoroughgoing secularism.

In illustrating the extent to which Judaism has adjusted itself to modernism, I shall limit myself to a summary of the philosophies of the two most recent outstanding Jewish thinkers, and to a brief survey of the ideologies of the three main groups in contemporary Jewish life.

The most thoroughgoing and advanced reinterpretation of the Jewish religion has been formulated by Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) who was the head of the neo-Kantian school at Marburg. That reinterpretation is carried out in elaborate architectonic form in the style of the philosophic idealism of the Marburg School. Having disposed of Kant's *Ding-an-sich* as logically superfluous, all reality becomes idea, and the highest degree of reality belongs to that idea whereby all thought can be carried on rationally and conduct ethically. That idea is therefore none other than that of God. God is not a metaphysical entity but the hypostasis of the threefold fact: (1) that the external world of nature can be reckoned with as one and interrelated and as subject to inherent law, (2) that in the world of human relationships there is operative a moral purposiveness, and (3) that the two worlds are inherently one. This *oneness* of the two worlds renders the God idea transcendental and negates the pantheistic conception of God as immanent. It is in that sense also that God may be spoken of as the

creator of the world. This teaching which is brought to a focus in the Messianic vision of the prophets and which is expressed variously in the Jewish sacred writings is Judaism's contribution to the religious life of mankind. But since we can no longer look forward to a personal messiah and a definitely achieved millennium, we should interpret that teaching as the morally progressive goal which is impliedly present in every ethical act.

Religion in its historical manifestations represents the various ways in which the God idea has served as ground of the moral life. In the pagan religions the God idea was so obscured by its mythical context that the ethical purpose implied in it was almost nullified. Only the prophets of Israel freed the God idea of its mythical wrappings and brought to light its relation to the moral life of mankind. Even Plato, the greatest ethical genius of the pagan world, did not attain the notion of mankind as a whole as constituting the kingdom of moral purposiveness. This spiritual height only the prophets of Israel succeeded in achieving.

Hermann Cohen expressed the hope that the historical religions would ultimately eliminate everything extraneous to their ethical function. In the meantime their task is to counteract the materialistic interpretation of nature and history and to reinterpret their own mythical content into terms which have a significance for man's moral life. In his last years he carried out that task for the religion of Judaism. Among some of the most fruitful of these reinterpretations are the concepts of sin, repentance, God's love for man, and man's love for God.

Nothing could be more antipodal to the interpretation of Judaism advanced by Hermann Cohen than that given by Ahad Ha'am (1856-1927). Judaism is to him not a religion at all, but the spirit of the Jewish people. During the thirty centuries of its existence the Jewish spirit has evolved a cultural life which has passed through various stages of

civilization. In the course of its career it has produced religion, law, ethics, and philosophy which have become integrated in the institutional and cultural life of Christendom and Islam. Under the brunt of unprecedented attack, ideological, political, social, and economic, the spirit of the Jewish people is at present being threatened with disintegration. To give it a new lease on life the Jews should (1) reconstruct the social structure of their national life by re-establishing their homeland in Palestine where they could develop their own culture freely without having to subordinate it to other dominant civilizations, and (2) re-articulate the content of the Jewish heritage in terms of the highest social and spiritual needs of the day.

The spirit of a people, being the outcome of unique social and intellectual forces and of an unrepeatable combination of historical circumstances, develops qualities which differentiate it from the spirit of every other people. That difference expresses itself in the ethical aspect of a people's life and thought to a greater degree than in any other. So marked was this aspect in the case of the Jewish people that it gave rise to a type of religion which gained ascendancy over a large part of mankind because of its ethical appeal. The individual persons in whom that national trait shone brightest were the prophets. They were so obsessed with a passion for righteousness that they ultimately succeeded in getting the Jews to revise their God idea so that it would measure up with the highest ethical conception of human life. This ethical impulse which the prophets sent through the soul of the Jewish people has never died down. At the present time the Jews could do nothing better than to obey it by making the cultivation of ethical culture their religion.

After this brief summary of the systematic versions given to Judaism by two of the most outstanding Jewish thinkers, it is well to scan the differences in the reaction of

the Jews along popular lines to the modern world-outlook. One cannot expect to find in the various groupings in Jewish life a carefully worked out ideology as one finds in individual thinkers, but what the popular versions lack in thoroughness they make up in the extent of Jewish life over which they prevail.

The Orthodox version meets the challenge of modernism by reaffirming the traditional belief in the supernatural origin of both the written and the oral Torah. It rejects as unfounded the claim that man's mind is the only possible source of knowledge and intelligence the only dependable guide. On the contrary, it re-emphasizes the impotence of the human mind as evidence that man is totally helpless without some transcendent revelation of the truth. Such revelation has been vouchsafed to Israel. The Jews have been and must continue to be the witness to the truth that obedience to God's law alone, and not the inventions and devices that go to make up material progress, can give stability and security to human existence. The frustration of the hopes reposed in human intelligence and good will is interpreted as proof of the correctness of Orthodoxy's contention. The only way, therefore, for the Jew to achieve salvation is to live in accordance with the regimen of conduct prescribed by the Torah and expounded in detail in the Oral Law. Those details are given in the code known as *Shulhan Aruk*.

In spite of Orthodoxy's claim that it is nothing but a restatement of the traditional Judaism from which it has not departed by an iota, there can be no doubt that in the process of restatement there has been a change of emphasis in doctrine and in practice. None of the old mental furniture has been destroyed; it has only been put up in the attic. The other-world consciousness which was characteristic of pre-Enlightenment days has given way to the consideration of man's duty in this world. The interest in

other-worldly salvation has become desiccated. The belief in the coming of the Messiah is retained in the prayer book as though nothing has been learned to qualify it, but seems not to make the slightest difference in the conduct or outlook of those who profess it.

According to the Reformist version, Jews should accept modernism not grudgingly but gratefully, as marking a spiritual advance and as necessitating the readjustment of Jewish life and practice. Such readjustment is necessary in order to qualify the Jews to render in the world of today a service analogous to that which they rendered in the past, that of being the upholders of the saving truth about God. That truth is indispensable to the realization of the kingdom of God which is founded upon the brotherhood of mankind. The Jews should rededicate themselves to the mission with which God has entrusted them, that of being a light unto the nations. To that end they must lead exemplary lives. As for the heritage of practices identified as part of traditional Judaism, there is no point in conserving any of them except those which can stimulate the Jew to live up to his mission. For that purpose only the Jewish form of worship, the traditional liturgy after it is purged of all national messianism, and the Sabbaths and festivals need be retained.

Reformism has achieved a systematic theology whereby it has been able to hold on to the Jewish past at the same time that it has assimilated the spirit of modernism. The key idea of that theology is that the traditional belief in supernatural revelation derives from the objective reality of religious genius. Human genius, in whatever form it manifests itself, is the interpenetration of the divine into the human. It is all the more so when the object of that genius is a vivid and compelling realization of the nature of God and of his relation to mankind.

The designation "Conservative Judaism" is applied to

two versions, one of which is the left wing of Orthodoxy and another which is the right wing of Reformism. Both versions are necessarily more nebulous and less consistent than those of which they are respectively variations; but their very lack of consistency constitutes a virtue with a goodly number of people who find in half-measures and compromises the path of least resistance, which they rationalize as being desirable on the ground that life is never logical or consistent and that we must obey the heart as well as the head.

From this point we pass to the large mass of Jews who want to remain Jews, but for other reasons than those advanced by any of the groups thus far described. In the main there are two such popular versions: one is the religious culturist, and the other is the secularist. I shall not describe the secularist version because it frankly abrogates religion as part of collective Jewish life in the future.

The religious cultural version is the most recent to be evolved; it is, therefore, as yet in an inchoate state. It is subscribed to by all those who accept the spirit of modernism, but who disagree both with the Orthodox and the Reformists, to whom Judaism is a religion only. According to that version Judaism, or the Jewish heritage, is the civilization of the Jewish people. The term "civilization" connotes the totality of social and spiritual manifestations of Jewish life, both in the past and in the present, and the achievement of the Jewish people not only in the realm of ideas and literature but also in the realm of social life. Judaism thus regarded includes specifically the social framework of national unity, a continuing history, a living language and literature, folkways, mores, laws, religion, and art. All these elements are so organically related and interdependent that each draws vitality and derives its significance from the rest, and contributes both vitality and significance to the rest.

22 MODERN TRENDS IN WORLD-RELIGIONS

To be in a position to reckon with the cultural, social, and economic changes which have taken place in the world, the Jews should reconstruct their social heritage on the following lines:

1. They should find their common denominator in the work of upbuilding Palestine. Judaism cannot maintain its character as a civilization without a Jewish homeland in Palestine. There a center can develop in which Jewish creativeness will find expression in Hebraic forms not so easily developed in other countries. The continued interest of world-Jewry in such a central homeland, as well as the cultural association and interchange of achievements with those who will live in it, should prove a unifying bond stimulating creativeness among Jews everywhere.

2. True to their historic tradition, Jews should continue to identify themselves with all activities and movements which aim to abolish poverty, to socialize wealth, to equalize opportunity, to further security, and to establish universal peace.

3. Religion should continue to be the central identifying interest of Jewish civilization. Like all other phases of human life, religion is subject to the process of evolution. Jewish religion should, therefore, ally itself with the modernist conception of religion as the spiritual reaction of man to the vicissitudes of life, and as the expression of the highest needs of his being.

The Jewish religion has undergone various metamorphoses in the course of its existence, corresponding on the whole to the transformations which have taken place in the social structure and in the distribution of the Jewish people. A survey of the past enables us to distinguish three stages in the evolution of the Jewish religion, and insight into the present points to the emergence of a fourth stage. This last stage is to be different from all of the preceding stages, both in ideology and social expression, yet

connected with them by the same life-thread of the Jewish people which rendered the three past stages continuous with one another.

The next stage in the Jewish religion was, in a sense, anticipated by the various expressions of rationalism, however limited, which date back as far as the ninth century. The medieval Jewish philosophers, by recognizing the authority of reason, even though they subordinated it to the authority of tradition, prepared the way for the time when reason, in the most inclusive sense of that term, was to become the sole arbiter of human life in all its relationships, both social and cosmic. With the ascendancy of reason, the God idea will come to mean the affirmation of the unity, the creativity and the worth-whileness of life, not so much as actually realized, but as potential, progressive, and ultimately realizable. As such, the God idea cannot be the privileged possession of any group or church which is constituted of people who belong to it by accident of birth. It must be the common possession of all who have arrived at it through first-hand experience.

This does not mean that all people will express the God idea in one uniform fashion, any more than the universal appreciation of music is to mean that all people will find one type of music congenial to them. There will continue to be particular religions of people united by historical memories and present interests. This will give rise to folk religions, which will continue to function in human life alongside personal religion, which will be "what a man does with his solitariness." But the particularity of a folk religion will not be due to the profession of some truth or teaching that is negated by the religion of some other group. It will be due to the fact that the experiences upon which the particular religion is based, and in terms of which its liturgical forms are expressed, are peculiar to the group professing that religion. In a folk religion a people

can rise to that level of introspection, judgment, and self-criticism which in the individual makes for moral and spiritual growth. Folk religion will thus be tantamount to a people's self-consciousness and conscience. The momentum of intensive interest in religion in the past should impel the Jews to readjust religion to the needs of ever advancing civilization by making of it in the lives of men and nations a force for righteousness and a factor for increasing the scope of life's worth-whileness.

III

CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING

BY EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES

SCIENTIFIC thinking is a definite, conscious method of examining facts in a given field in the most objective and impartial manner possible, interpreting them in the light of the hypotheses which these facts themselves suggest, and seeking further relevant facts and more adequate hypotheses. The development of this method has been a long and tortuous achievement since the days of Francis Bacon, and its results have been revolutionary in every realm of human interest.

It was the impact of this method and its attitude of questioning doubt which divided the Christian world into two camps, those who accepted the method and were designated as liberals or heretics, and those who rejected the method and were known as fundamentalists. Perhaps all Christians might be said to have been fundamentalists until science arose; but if so, they were not conscious of it, for it was necessary to have the diverging view arise before the old could be conscious of itself and get a name for itself.

When the general nature of scientific inquiry began to be apparent as that of the application of the natural reason to the problems of physical reality, there was a disposition on both sides to say that science and religion worked in separate realms and that there could be no conflict; but when Newtonian science projected the conception of the uniformity of nature and ruled out the conception of miracles as invasions or transgressions of natural law the first sharp issue was drawn. This brought to a focus also the question

of the creation of the world, whether in six days or six millenniums, and made the idea of an original divine fiat an unscientific idea. Religionists tended to hold to the literal biblical account, and there was developed a more rigid doctrine of the authority of revelation over against merely human reasoning. Two world views were thus initiated, science holding to the conception of geological processes and epochs, and religion, to the idea of the action at every stage of supernatural power. It is important to realize that the idea of the supernatural was born with the scientific conception of the natural, and it is this dualism which sets the frame for the contrasting views. To science, as such, there was no felt need for a reconciliation. It was of the very nature of science to go its own way and to do all it could to achieve an understanding of the world in its own terms. Religion was on the defensive and undertook by various interpretations to maintain its claim of the working of a supernatural power, though constantly forced to take account of new discoveries and hypotheses of science. Scientific men were often led beyond the purely empirical and hypothetical positions proper to their method and formulated mechanistic and materialistic philosophies in the name of science, thus widening and deepening the gulf between the natural and the supernatural world views.

A still more difficult situation developed for religion when scholars chiefly within the fold of religion itself ventured to apply scientific method to the Scriptures themselves and were able to present an overwhelming array of literary and historical facts setting forth inaccuracies, discrepancies, contradictions, and abundant evidence of the human limitations of the authors of the biblical writings. These authors were found to be subject to social environment, to individual temperament, and to the influence of widely different conditions and institutions of the national life. With the collapse of the doctrine of verbal inspiration,

the authority of the Bible became untenable in the traditional sense, though many ingenious theories were advanced to save it in principle if not in the letter.

Then came Darwin's suggestion of evolution, published in 1859. In the end evolution presented the conception of man descending from animal forms through a process of selection and variation which showed a correlation of bodily and nervous structure with increasing intelligence and the attainment of language and social organization. Studies in anthropology and early cultures traced the rise of social institutions in terms of the influence of physical and social environment and the leadership of significant individuals. Religion itself was discovered to be involved with the total culture, rather than being something distinct or superimposed from outside the human scene. Every people, including the Hebrews, had their cosmologies and myths, their inviolable taboos and commandments, their heroes and sacred ceremonials. In all cultures there were tribal gods, inspired sages, miracle workers, mysterious medicine men, and marvelous magicians.

The final realm of scientific study has been the inquiry into the psychology of religion, a searching quest into human nature itself to discover, if possible, the inner sources of religious attitudes and behavior. The result has been the conclusion that man has no original religious endowment, such as a religious instinct or religious sense or faculty. Psychology has shown that the native equipment of the human infant consists of impulses and reflexes and a relatively large brain and complex nervous system by which the individual is able to respond to the human and physical environment and to develop habits and skills through which he comes to participate in the culture of his group. Language is the greatest single instrument making for distinctly human modes of life. The infant's capacity for speech is developed through his mother tongue, and in

similar fashion all the forms of his behavior tend to take on the patterns already existing in the group into which he is born. Religion is no exception. It is found to be as universal as language and as diverse in its forms. Religion belongs to the whole life of a people. Low cultures have low religions and high cultures have high religions, using the terms low and high to refer to degrees of complexity, refinement, and self-criticism. Religion is comparable to art in this respect, in that it moves with the character and levels of culture.

I have given a very rough and hasty sketch of the course of scientific thinking, concerning the problems pertinent to religion, down to the problem of the nature of religion itself. It turns out that science, on its own method and in its own terms, discovers the reality of religion as a vital and universal aspect of human life. It finds that religion is concerned with the celebration, dramatization, and artistic representation of the felt values of any given society, as a means of enjoying and realizing these values in the common life. Thus science is able to give an account of the nature and function of religion and to explain its ceremonials its beliefs, and its significance, including the character of its deities.

It is able to give some explanation of how the feeling of sacredness comes to attach to various objects through the wonder and awe which they arouse; to show the relation of deities to the life histories of peoples; and to see in the ceremonials the celebration, and effort to control, the recurring crises of life in connection with birth, puberty, marriage, illness, death, hospitality, war, and the events in nature such as seedtime and harvest, storms and pestilence. Meantime, science has freed itself from purely mechanistic and materialistic assumptions concerning the order of nature and no longer sets man over against a hostile or alien physical universe. It rather tends to adopt the view that

man is a part of nature at home in her processes of change and growth, and sharing in an emergent and creative life of novelty, to some degree subject to intelligent control.

It would not be difficult, were there time, to elaborate each of these phases of the application of science to the religious problems, and to document them with abundant references to the extensive literature on these subjects. But it is more pertinent to the task of this paper to consider to what extent the scientific method and its results have entered into and affected the Christian religion itself. Before doing so, however, I wish to call attention to the fact that science has far more deeply affected Christianity indirectly, through its influence on the general life and culture of society, than directly, through the conscious modification of religious beliefs. I refer to the fact that the industrial revolution to which modern science has led has produced profound and widespread changes in modes and habits of living, and that these have transformed the conditions, customs, and beliefs of the traditional religion in numerous ways. The industrial changes of the nineteenth century due to science, great as those changes were, now appear to have been very slight among the masses of people, as compared with the practical effects of the new industrial and social habits of the twentieth century. We designate this as the Machine Age, and this machine age has changed the basic patterns of human life by shifting populations into the new industrial, urban centers and by removing the dominant social influences from agricultural life in which biblical religion gained its chief symbols and its vocabulary. The parables of Jesus are largely about the sowing of seed, the care of animals, and the grass of the field. The light of the sun and the rain from heaven were the direct and visible expressions of divine providence. For thousands of years our religious traditions were formed in that type of life, and the Sabbath day was observed within

that setting. The motor car, and the radio, and the culture which they are producing have changed the Sabbath day and to a large extent all the doctrines that were taught on that day. I was recently taken home from a Friday evening service in an orthodox Jewish temple by one of the members in his automobile. As we got into it, he explained that orthodox Jews were supposed to walk and not ride on the Sabbath, but he had concluded that the law was to prevent making the beast work that day, and, since his car was not a beast, he thought it no sin to ride in it. I cite this as an example of the surrender of old customs in the new age and also as an indication of the rationalization used.

It would greatly simplify the problem of determining the extent of the influence of science in Christianity, if there were a census report available which would give statistics regarding the number of fundamentalists, modernists, and humanists. But since no figures are at hand we shall have to be content with some characterization of the different groups and generalize cautiously upon the extent of their influence. There is no doubt but that the fundamentalists have a vast majority, for they would include the Roman Catholic and the great body of Protestants. (I once heard William Jennings Bryan in a lecture on the subject say that he represented the position of ninety per cent of the church people, but we know that Mr. Bryan was often mistaken about the number of people who were with him.)

Modernism has come to be the name largely used for those who have more or less consciously accepted the scientific attitude in reference to some of the principal doctrines of traditional Christianity. They accept to some extent the higher criticism, and evolution, but hold to theistic ideas of God and to some form of the divinity of Christ, and to the authority of the Bible.

The leading theological schools of America are certainly modernist in this sense, and there has been a noticeable

change in the last two or three decades in the direction of more scientific methods in every department of study. Within the last five years, books have been published by theologians treating of the idea of God which would not have been tolerated in any Protestant seminary twenty years ago. A study of the views of five hundred ministers in and around Chicago, and of two hundred theological students, indicates a drift toward more radical thought among the younger men. Seventy-seven per cent of the ministers accepted the New Testament as an absolute and infallible standard of religious belief, but only thirty-three per cent of the students agreed. Half of the ministers believed in the story of the Creation in Genesis, but only five per cent of the students did so. One-third of the ministers and three-fourths of the students held that the Bible has no unique inspiration and did not believe in the occurrence of miracles. Half of the ministers and nine-tenths of the students held that, in order to be a Christian, it was not necessary to participate in any sacraments, believe in the virgin birth, or hold membership in any church.

Many popular preachers and writers among the modernists shrink from the thoroughgoing application of scientific method to all religious ideas and practices. They seem to have relinquished old beliefs piecemeal and in reference to special doctrines, rather than having dealt with religion itself scientifically and then worked constructively with what science could sanction. The same seems to be true of the religious views of a number of the great scientists, particularly physicists. Men of the highest standing in their specialty, they do not always apply to religion the same consistent thinking, but assert their faith in the existence of God, or in the immortality of the soul, in a manner and by reasoning which they would not employ in physics or chemistry. Undoubtedly, these modernist religionists in scientific circles have given great encouragement to the minis

terial modernists, since the name of science is so potent on every hand. Religious modernism considers itself thoroughly in accord with both science and religion, but is subject to criticism from the extremes of both fundamentalism and the most thorough scientists.

There are two other groups which stand closely related to the modernists, which may be designated as the mystics and the institutionalists. They have in common a greater interest in the experience and practice of religion than in its doctrines. The institutionalists constitute a very large class. They are ministers and laymen who are concerned with making the churches successful. Efficiency may be said to be their standard of excellence. As ministers they avoid problems which are not congenial to their congregations, and they are willing to compromise with prospective members on matters of belief and the observance of forms. Denominational officials, organizational promoters and other practical agents of religion are likely to be of this institutional type.

The mystics have always been lenient about doctrines and have found the significance of religion more in the realm of emotional satisfaction.

At the opposite extreme from the fundamentalists are the humanists, and they are represented by two extremes—those who are theists and those who have completely discarded any form of supernaturalism. Humanism has proved attractive to many intellectuals who have reacted from the old orthodox traditions and see no place for any of the familiar doctrines. They have emphasized humanitarian religion as based simply upon the need and value of human life. Science for them is the great instrument by which to free men's minds from the burden of old superstitions and outworn customs, and to provide for all members of society some adequate measure of social justice and the goods of life. Humanism has inherited much from the older rationalism and would be suspected by some of stress-

ing too much the place of the intellectual life in human experience. Some of the humanists have difficulty in identifying themselves with Christianity in any definite way and sometimes seem perplexed to know whether they wish even to use the word religion.

Some scientific students of religion have suggested that, when once the natural history of religion in human experience is understood, it will be seen to be compatible with science in the same way as art.

Religion might then consciously develop ideologies in place of creeds, social values and ideals in place of supernatural commands, dramatic ceremonials in place of ordinances and sacraments, history in place of myth, and reasonably-planned social institutions instead of apocalyptic visions, and the recognition of order, intelligence, and beauty as marks of the sacred and divine qualities of the world at its best.

In the application of this point of view to Christianity there results an interpretation of it in terms of the natural processes of man's spiritual life, with the possibility of understanding even the place and significance of its supernatural elements in their historical setting and function.

There results also the possibility of developing the use and enlargement of some forms and symbols of the past freely, with sufficient historical continuity to legitimately claim that Christianity is thereby more fully realized and lived.

The same, however, might also be said of the other great faiths in relation to their cultures, for the scientific view of religion already justifies the common character of the various faiths, as springing from the same deep impulses of human nature but flowing in different cultures. And just as different languages and literatures may be translated into one another, so these great faiths, when scientifically understood, not only become intelligible to one another but become co-operative forces in the spiritual life of mankind.

IV

BUDDHISM AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING

BY JAMES BISSETT PRATT

THE question set for our discussion I take to be this: What is the relation between the Buddhism of our day and contemporary scientific thinking? This is a straightforward question, and if one is to give a straightforward answer, that answer must be: there is very little relation indeed. An indirect relation doubtless there is, and a negative relation in the sense that Buddhism is in no wise hostile to or inconsistent with modern science. But as to direct relations between Buddhism and the methods or achievements of contemporary science, of these there are very few. Two or three of the more advanced sects of Japanese Buddhism make use of a few of the principles of recent educational psychology; but with contemporary scientific thinking, in the usual sense of that word, Buddhism has very little to do.

Nor need this confession be taken as in any way a reflection upon Buddhism. What relation have mysticism in religion and monistic absolutism in philosophy, what relation have moral living, discipline, self-control, helpfulness, kindness, unselfish devotion, love for one's neighbor and one's enemy—what relation have these with modern scientific thinking other than the negative and very general one which Buddhism also bears? Scientific thought is a great and valuable thing; but it is not the only great and valuable thing in man's possession.

In a very real sense, then, I feel that I have answered the question set me by the committee which arranged these

lectures; and having done so, if I had sufficient grace and sufficient sense I should sit down and let you all enjoy a recess. But having come eight hundred miles to speak for two half-hours on Buddhism, and having before me an audience which will probably feel itself bound by courtesy to listen, no matter what I say, I confess that I have neither the grace nor the sense to surrender this opportunity to keep on talking for the rest of my allotted minutes; and there are various more or less irrelevant things concerning Buddhism which I might, more or less inappropriately, bring before you at this time.

For one thing I might say a word or two of a more specific sort in explanation of the negative attitude of Buddhism toward modern scientific thinking. Southern Buddhism, as found in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia, centers its interest, as the Founder centered his, upon the practical and moral questions of the conduct of life. The Buddha taught his disciples not to speculate on matters that profit not, that do not tend to absence of passion, to quiescence, supreme wisdom, Nirvana. Following in the footsteps of his Master, the Southern Buddhist as a Buddhist has very little interest in modern scientific thinking.

The sects of Japanese and Chinese Buddhism may be roughly divided into three groups: the metaphysical, the mystical, the evangelical. The first of these share a common philosophy which is the center of their intellectual life. It is a philosophy of absolute and monistic Idealism. Ultimately understood, Reality is experience and Reality is one. The Buddha nature is in all things: in the last analysis, the Buddha nature *is* all things. The world of multiplicity which natural science studies is real in its way, but its reality is of a secondary and relative sort, and this does not interest the Buddhist. Nothing that science can discover will have any bearing on the Absolute Truth: the Buddhist world-formula has room for every conceivable

kind of purely empirical fact. Hence Buddhism takes a rather patronizing tone toward science. It is true in its way, but its way is not a very important one. T'ai Hsu, the great Chinese Buddhist, says:

Science is always open-minded, but scientists have one obstinate superstition, and that is that the scientific method is the only method for arriving at the truth. They fail to realize that the reality of this universe cannot be penetrated by it. . . . When scientists insist that their method is the only method of arriving at the truth of things they remind one of blind men trying to understand an elephant by the sense of touch. They will get partial impressions of the different parts of the animal, and what strange impressions as compared with the view of a living elephant that a man of normal sight has. . . . Buddhism denies the reality of all things or selves. Science can never let go of this phenomenal existence whereas Buddhism carries one beyond it. So Buddhism is non-scientific.

Possibly I should suggest one slight modification of the general position of Mahayana philosophy here expressed. The small Kegon sect, and the large sect of Shingon (which draws most of its philosophy from Kegon), while asserting with other Buddhist thinkers the ultimate identity of the Many and the One, lay their emphasis upon multiplicity rather than unity. And a few members of both sects—we might call them the radical left—carry this tendency to the extent of something very like what we know as Naturalism. I suspect that the influence of Western thought has been here at work. I hasten to add, however, that the number of these radical thinkers is very small and their influence limited; and I would point out, furthermore, that so far as Western influence is here responsible, it is the influence of a certain school of philosophy rather than of science.

The mystical group of Buddhists—including the Ch'an sects in China, the Zen sects in Japan, and, in addition, a large portion of those Buddhists whom I have called metaphysical—take the same negative attitude toward scientific thinking as the monistic absolutists. To quote T'ai Hsu once more, for he belongs in both schools, "the central

core of Buddhism science can not reach, for Buddhism has to do with inward illumination, the direct insight into the reality of the universe, an intuitive experience only acquired by one himself, where all logic, analogy, or scientific method or hypothesis are of no avail." The Reverend Sokei-ann Sasaki, a Japanese Buddhist missionary who is the head of the First Zen Buddhism Institute in New York, writes me thus:

The correlation of science and Buddhism is a task of the Buddhist which belongs to the future. We occasionally illustrate to our students this possibility by comparing our thoughts with what we can see in the demonstration of the science of physics, the law of optics, et cetera; but no Buddhist plans such systematically and no Buddhist has ever started such phases of the work. . . . As we teach the student, many times we borrow from science, as for instance, when we explain that all phenomena are transitory and the uttermost Reality is indemonstrable, by using any method relating to our five senses; but to conceive Reality as Noumenon, that invisible side of existence, is not so easily explained. We must understand that Buddhism speaks truth by ancient method. Today in this age we certainly must use modern methods to disclose the truth which Buddhism conceived. This belongs entirely to the work of the future. There science and Buddhism will combine. If you read the Prajna Paramita Sutra you will get many hints pertaining to this problem. It is in Chinese and consists of five hundred volumes.

There are a few Japanese students of Zen, as there are a few members of Kegon and Shingon, who seek to make a more intimate alliance between it and Western science, notably Professor Nurakiya, of one of the Zen colleges in Tokyo, who gives his Buddhist philosophy an essentially materialistic coloring and who owes quite as much to Haeckel as to Gotama. He represents a small school of very modern-minded Buddhists to be found in all three of the groups I have mentioned. The school itself, however, is hardly representative of Buddhism, and certainly not of the Ch'an of China and the Zen of Japan. Very fundamental to Ch'an and Zen is the assurance that all scientific theories, even the most true of them, are but "fingers pointing at the moon." Only by the inner vision can the true

light be apprehended. Toward the gaining of this vision science can contribute only in a very preliminary and crude fashion; and once the vision has been gained, nothing else is of much importance.

The third group of Northern Buddhists, whom I have called Evangelical, is made up of the various Amida sects, in both Japan and China. Some of these sects, notably Shin and Jodo, are the most advanced and up-to-date members of the Buddhist world. It is chiefly they who have made use of Western methods in religious education, and here, as I have said, they come into direct relation with one limited field of modern science. To the rest of modern science, however, they have, as Buddhists, no relation. Doubtless many Japanese and Chinese gentlemen of various Buddhist sects happen to be interested in science, and some of them doubtless are scientists. But there are also many Republicans of my acquaintance who are scientists; and I should hardly think of deducing from that fact a relation between modern science and the Republican Party. Amida Buddhism has no relation to scientific thought other than the general and negative one to which I have several times referred—a type of relation which it might well share with the Republican Party. Its active efforts toward spreading and intensifying the good life have no close relation to science, and its philosophy is, in the last analysis, reducible to that of the metaphysical schools.

In a letter from Professor Suzuki of the Otani Buddhist College in Kyoto (received just before I started for Chicago) he writes:

Formerly Buddhists were glad to welcome a scientific approach to their religion. But nowadays a reaction seems to have taken place among them. Instead of relying on scientific arguments for the rationalization of the Buddhist experience they are at present trying to resort to its own dialectics. There is a growing conviction among the Buddhists that their philosophy does not require the support of Western logic, especially of modern science.

But while the Buddhism of our time is (as T'ai Hsu expressed it) emphatically non-scientific, there are interesting parallels between certain typically Buddhist conceptions and some of the dominant ideas of contemporary science. Buddhist thought anticipated the modern Western notions of the spatial world by many centuries. T'ai Hsu points out that

in ancient times men thought of heaven as above and earth beneath: then came Copernicus, who taught that the sun was the center of our system. Now we have arrived at the idea that there is no one center anywhere in the astral universe. This supports the Buddhist idea of the great unlimited Void, embracing numberless worlds, all interwoven like spiders' webs.

In their conception of time, also, ancient Buddhist thinkers—and in fact Indian thinkers of various schools—were far in advance of our Western ancestors. The Sukhavati Vyuha refers to a series of eighty-one hundred thousand niyutas of kotis of past Buddhas who succeeded each other long before the appearance of Gotama, at the rate of one in perhaps five thousand years. A niyuta is one million and a koti ten million, and I leave it to you to determine how many years are here involved; it will, of course, be eighty-one hundred thousand times five thousand times one million times ten million. There is no word in the English language, so far as I am aware, capable of expressing so tremendous a number; one can only say that it makes geologic time look like yesterday and is capable of being phrased only in light years. This was the common Buddhist conception about 200 A.D. Fifteen hundred years later, when Western scholarship first began to have some slight interest in the benighted heathen of the East, its representatives took to India the orthodox teaching that the world was created in the year 4004 B.C.

By about the year 500 A.D. Buddhist logicians had come to a view of the nature of matter which is of considerable interest. Although in their ultimate philosophy they were

idealistic, their conception of the material world was essentially realistic: matter for them was in no wise dependent on being known. Reality was to be found only in the particular; the universal was a construct of the human mind. This particular, in which alone reality was to be found, was not to be identified with the gross objects which we see and handle, for all these are analyzable into atoms. But the atoms themselves, the Buddhist logicians taught, are capable of analysis, as is every material thing. The ultimately real is therefore not a chunk of hard matter. It is rather to be understood as energy.

Stcherbatsky, in his *Buddhist Logic* (Vol. I, p. 190), says, "Our image of an external thing is only an effect of external efficient reality. Thus reality is dynamic; all the elements of the external world are mere forces." This conception would seem to be something like that of Leibniz's monadism. But the Buddhist thinkers did not stop here. From early times Buddhist thought had rejected the concept of substance, both physical and psychical. There is no such thing, it taught, as a real self, and no such thing as a substantive and abiding material entity. In reducing matter to a collection of centers of force it did not surrender its fundamental denial of substance. The doctrine of impermanence and transiency it had inherited from some very early stage of Buddhist history, and this it applied to its dynamic view of matter, as the early monks had applied it to human personality in the *anatta* doctrine. There is no enduring material particle, and there is no enduring and identical center of force. There are but instantaneous existences, without duration. The seeming continuity of change and motion is thus illusory. "There is no motion," says Vasubandhu, "because of annihilation." Things do not move; they have no time to do it. They disappear as soon as they appear. "Momentary things," says Kamalasila, "cannot displace themselves because they disappear

at that very place at which they have appeared." Buddhist logicians thought that matter was ultimately composed of point-instants, with no duration and no extensity.

This reduction of reality to a collection of dynamic point-instants is a rather striking anticipation of thinkers like Alexander, Russell, Whitehead, and Jeans. It is closely and logically connected with the Buddhist doctrine of causation. The Buddha himself, if we may trust the Nikayas, was one of the first thinkers, perhaps the very first, to emphasize unbroken and invariable sequence as the one character of causation. This comes out especially in his exposition of the twelve Nidanas, the causal chain that leads ultimately to decay and dying. The manner in which he puts his question concerning death is significant: "What now being present is decay and dying present; what conditions decay and dying? His answer is birth. And he then asks the same kind of question concerning birth: "What now being present is birth also present?" It is not his answer that here interests us but, as I have said, it is the form of his question. Invariable accompaniment is the touchstone of causation. In some respects the Buddha was a pragmatist; like that of Professor Dewey and Professor James, his method of investigating the nature of a thing was to ask, "What is it known as?" Cause is known as invariable accompaniment. That is its one unfailing earmark. Hence that is its very nature.

The Buddhist denial of substance also had its logical effect in leading up to the final doctrine of causation formulated by the later logicians. As one might easily foresee, it was in many ways like that of Hume, Mill, and Russell. Let me quote from Stcherbatsky's recent and authoritative work:

The standpoint of J. S. Mill would probably have been shared, in the main, by the early Buddhists, since their moments are impermanent sense-data, sensible qualities without any substance. Stability and

duration are for the Buddhist nothing but "chains of moments" following one another without intervals. The notion of a "chain of moments" corresponds very nearly to the modern notion of a "string of events." According to Mr. Russell the "string of events . . . is called one piece of matter," and the events are "rapid but not instantaneous changes," they are separated by "small, time-like intervals." "The common-sense thing," says he, "is a character which I should define as the existence of a first order differential law connecting successive events along a linear route." This reminds us of the Buddhist view, with the difference that the events are instantaneous and succeed without intervals or with infinitesimal intervals. If, as Kamalasila puts it, "not the slightest bit of what was found in the former moment is to be found in the next following moment," the change must be instantaneous.

The interpretation of causal laws of functional interdependence, the principle "this being, that becomes," we have seen is also a direct consequence of the theory of "Instantaneous Being." Causality obtains between point-instants, not between stabilities or durations. This is likewise the opinion of Mr. Russell. The same must be said regarding the repudiation of a series of prejudices connected with the common-sense realistic idea of causation. The prejudice that causes "operate," that they "compel" the result to appear, the inclination to consider a causal relation on the anthropomorphic pattern, the prejudice, further, that the result must be "similar" to the cause—in all these cases the coincidence is striking. On the negative side the coincidence is almost complete.

On the positive side there is all the difference which lies between a point-instant and a brief event. From the standpoint of ultimate reality there is but very little difference between a brief event and a long event; these characteristics are quite relative. But there is a great difference between duration and no duration. The point instant is for Mr. Russell a mere "mathematical convenience." But for the Buddhist it represents transcendental or ultimate reality. As a limit of all artificial constructions of our reason, it is real; it is the reality. There is no other reality than the point-instant; all the rest, whether brief or long, is constructed by our reason on this basis.

Not only in physics but in psychology, also, the early Buddhists anticipated by two thousand years or more the general analytic methods of Western science. I cannot say that in the content of their psychological teachings the Buddhists anticipated Western psychology; nor can I agree with the common Buddhist belief that Gotama was the greatest psychologist of all time. Buddhist psychology

is badly mixed up with moral concepts, and a good many traditional and primitive Indian ideas have been combined with it. But the general aim and method of Buddhist psychology, namely, to analyze the various constituents of human experience, with no reference to a self or subject, was set up by them about four or five hundred B.C., and rediscovered by Western science in the eighteenth century.

More important than these occasional and separate parallels of ancient Buddhist and modern Western thought is the general intellectual attitude of the Founder and of his abler followers through all the ages. Among the saints and the founders of religions, the Buddha is distinguished by his essentially scientific attitude of mind. He had a warm and loving heart, but his loving sympathy for all sentient life did not cloud his vision nor dull the keen edge of his native and trained ability to see things as they are, to make distinctions, and to think relevantly and to the point. Among all the great men of the past whom it is our privilege to know, few have combined in so excellent a fashion a soft heart and a hard head. The fact of universal suffering and his loving eagerness to heal it were the prompting emotional motives of his thought. But having thus selected his problem, he went at it as a scientific physician. "What," he asked, "are the symptoms?" And then, "What is the cause of these symptoms? . . . What now being present is decay and dying present?" Then, having discovered the cause of sorrow in desire and ignorance, he asks, "What can be done to destroy this cause?"

The scientific spirit of the Founder was handed on to his followers. Moreover, as I have previously pointed out, the type of metaphysics built up by the Northern School of Buddhism (the only school that constructed a metaphysics) is such that there is room within it for every new discovery that science has made or is ever likely to make. And thus we can understand how it came about that while

Christianity and Judaism have been so deeply affected by the advance of science, Buddhism has been affected so little. Christianity inherited, in part from Judaism, in part from Greece, a diminutive conception of the spatial and temporary universe. Buddhism inherited from Indian thought a universe whose time and space (in so far as they were real at all) were boundless. Judaism began with an anthropomorphic and very limited tribal God, who indeed developed magnificently, but who at the time of the birth of Christianity was still emphatically finite and still possessed the limitations of human personality and psychology. Buddhism grew out of Indian thought at the time when the Upanishads were being completed, and its Founder's attitude on theological questions was either skeptical, or indifferent, or atheistic. Judaism and Christianity began with belief in the creation of the world by the personal Yahveh, as an act of will, at a definite point in past time. Buddhism inherited the view that the world either developed from within in the manner of living growth, or that it was merely the appearance of a deeper reality. With theological beliefs such as they possessed, Judaism and Christianity taught that the personal God interfered with the processes of His creation: they taught miracles, special "providences," and specific answers to prayer. Buddhism, of course, made nothing of these things. Judaism and Christianity, centering their interest on the finite world of existence and of history, made use of empirical arguments, such as asserted specific historical events and particular "marks of design" in nature, to prove the truth of their theological positions. Buddhist metaphysics, like the Hindu Vedanta, having little or no interest in events or in the limited facts of a particular existential world, relied chiefly upon a priori considerations. With such divergent philosophies, it is not surprising that the attitudes of these reli-

gions toward the advance of physical science should have been markedly different.

With every great scientific discovery Judaism and Christianity have found it necessary to modify considerably some of their accepted and most treasured conceptions of the world, of God, and of man. Witness the skepticism, the undermining of old foundations, the heartbreak, the struggle, the painful and even bloody hostility between Christians, the disingenuous reinterpretation of old creeds, the right-about-face of theologians, that have followed every scientific advance such as that associated with Copernicus or with Darwin. All through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the theologians were busy reconciling Christianity with the new astronomy; and during the second half of the nineteenth century the best Christian brains were exercised to the uttermost, at first in attacking evolution and then in adapting Christian theology to it. None of these discoveries, none of these new hypotheses, has had any effect upon Buddhism. Within its fold such things as the insistence on Galileo's recantation or the recent "monkey trial" in Tennessee would be unthinkable. Is it the sun or the earth that moves? Are our human bodies descended from apes? Whatever answer you give to these questions, the Southern Buddhist will remind you that there still remain birth, old age, misery, despair, death: and the Northern Buddhist that only the One is real and the Buddha nature is in all things.

And so at the end of our investigation we come back to the conclusion proposed at its beginning. Between Buddhism and modern scientific thinking there is no close or significant relation. And after all, why should there be?

V

CONFUCIANISM AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING

By HU SHIH

FIRST, let me make my personal position clear. I do not want to appear in a series of discussions of world-religions under false colors. When I arrived in Chicago I asked Professor Haydon whether he had read my statement of faith published in the *Forum* and in the volume *Living Philosophies*, a statement which is naturalistic, agnostic, even atheistic. Professor Haydon said he had read my creed, so I am here, not as a believer in any one of these religions, but only as a student of the history of some of the intellectual-religious developments of my country.

In answering the question concerning the relationship between modern scientific thinking and Confucianism, I wish to point out that Confucianism, if correctly interpreted, will be in no sense adverse to modern scientific thinking. Not only is it my opinion that Confucianism will furnish very fertile soil on which to cultivate modern scientific thinking but Confucianism has many traditions which are quite favorable to the spirit and attitude of modern science.

In the first place, Confucianism has an agnostic tendency and a respect for truth, such a respect for truth that it makes us feel the responsibility of confessing our ignorance where ignorance is the more correct description of our position than knowledge. Confucius taught his disciples to say that they knew a thing when they really knew it, and to say that they did not know it when they really did not know it. That is knowledge. That is not exactly agnosti-

cism; it is common sense to be intellectually honest, to say that you know only when you do know.

Furthermore, on many occasions he taught the attitude of doubt. Once he was asked about the nature of God and the spirits. He said, "We don't know about men. How do we know the way to serve the gods and spirits?" And we recall that when he was asked, "What is death?" he said, "We know not life. How can we know death?" That attitude of professing not to know, confessing ignorance on questions which one really does not know, is really an attitude which is conducive to the modern scientific attitude.

Throughout the development of the intellectual and religious attitudes in the various Confucian schools you will find the same spirit present. Very often the philosophers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries would explicitly teach the importance of doubt. One of the philosophers said, "Doubt is the father of all knowledge." Wang Yang-ming, another Confucianist leader, said, "If my conscience doesn't believe in a certain thing not even the authority of Confucius can make me accept it." That attitude of doubt—doubt to the extent of defying the authority of the founder of his school, is, I think, the scientific spirit at its best.

Not only that. In the last seven hundred years there developed in China, in the neo-Confucianist school, from the eleventh century down, a strictly intellectualistic tendency. The founder of this school, Chien Yui, pointed out that the method of knowledge must be to go out to think, to go to things and investigate into the nature of them, to search the reason of things, and to extend one's knowledge thereby to the uttermost.

That idea is found in an essay of 1,700 words contained in an old collection of documents. In the essay there was a mention of this attitude, of going to things in order to extend your knowledge, and these neo-Confucian philoso-

phers tried to work out the meaning of the precept. They developed the theory by pointing out that knowledge must not be inward knowledge. Knowledge must be a knowledge of going to things and seeking, investigating into the reasons thereof.

"And what do you mean," people asked, "by 'things'?" The philosophers tried to define the scope of things to be investigated: From your own body to the height of heaven and the magnitude of the earth everything is fit to be investigated. Each blade of grass, each shrub, is an object for investigation. That also is the scope of modern science. At that time there was no method of working out the ambitious program, so gradually it narrowed down to book knowledge, to historical research, to human relations. But the tradition was very important. It encouraged people to go out, to do things; not to think, to contemplate, to meditate inwardly, but to go to things and try to find out their reasons, the causes from which they emerged.

That ideal was so much in line with science that when science was introduced into China in the nineteenth century and the word "science" had to be coined in Chinese, the newly-coined word for science was "ke-chih." It is an abbreviated combination of this philosophic slogan of the eleventh and twelfth centuries: "Go; extend"—go to things and extend your knowledge. "Go; extend" continued to be the Chinese equivalent for science for almost half a century until it was replaced by the new terminology imported from Japan under the influence of the Spencerian theory, indicating that science is organized, systematized. It is a much less expressive term than the term "Go; extend," as an interpretation of the meaning of science.

That tradition of neo-Confucianism during the eleventh and twelfth centuries has served to make our Chinese scholars, the intellectuals, feel quite at home in the new world of science. They found it easy to believe that the new sciences and new methodologies were simply supple-

mentary means of making that scientific ideal of the eleventh and twelfth centuries possible.

Apart from this agnostic attitude and this early scientific ambition there is a third element which makes Confucianism quite favorable to modern scientific thinking. That is the development of a scientific learning in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. As I said, there was this idea of going to things to investigate the causes of them, but the absence of methodology made that difficult.

In one of my lectures at the University of Chicago I told the story of a philosopher of the seventeenth century who ridiculed this methodology of going out to investigate things. He tried out this method. He tried to investigate the reason of the bamboo tree:

Mr. Chien took a chair and sat there to study, to investigate the reason of the bamboo tree. He sat there three days and three nights and the bamboo tree told nothing. He was exhausted. So Wang Yang-ming said, "I will try"; so he took a chair and sat by the bamboo tree and watched patiently for seven days and seven nights. He was exhausted; and the bamboo tree revealed nothing of its cause or reason. So Wang Yang-ming said, "It is this: We are not qualified to become sages because we have not the natural capabilities for going to things and investigating the reasons thereof."

But that method and ideal were attractive and could not be entirely ridiculed out of existence. Time was required to develop a suitable methodology to work it out. As historic fact it took four centuries to work out a scientific, critical methodology, applied not as yet to the objects of nature but to the historical humanistic sciences, to philology, to history, to archaeology, to the higher criticism. And that critical spirit produced a methodology so detailed, so scientific that every theory, every theoretical reconstruction of historical interpretation was forced to stand on sufficient

evidence—internal, external, collateral. It became the ultimate guiding spirit, so much so that one of the founders of the scientific theory once offered 162 proofs, scientific evidences, merely to prove that one word, “fu,” or “clothes,” was not pronounced with the initial consonant “f,” but that instead of “f” the consonant was pronounced “b” in ancient China. One hundred and sixty-two evidences to prove the ancient pronunciation of one word!

The most important thing is that this scientific, critical methodology was applied not to these general philological problems but to the sacred textbooks of the school itself. All the texts, all the classics of Confucianism, were subjected to these scientific tests. Not only the texts, but in some cases the higher criticism itself was so subjected. One of the classics, the book of history, was proved to consist almost 50 per cent of forgeries, and the scholars calmly accepted the verdict of the critical scholars and declared only twenty-eight out of about sixty chapters of that book to be genuine.

There was a continuous development of the higher criticism in the latter part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One man, Ts'ui Shu, fifty years before Renan wrote his great *Life of Jesus*, began to write a scientific life of Confucius. He used a very rigid method, ruling out all unreliable material, all the mythological materials, and relied only upon a very few documents, and he produced one of the most trustworthy, scientific biographies of Confucius fifty years before Renan's *Life of Jesus*.

At the end of the nineteenth century there was one movement aiming at the revival of Confucianism which sought to establish Confucian religion as the state-religion of China. The leader of it was K'ang Yu-wei, the reformer, whose main interest was in the new state-establishment of Confucianism. He was, curiously enough, also a scholar belonging to this critical school. On the one hand he was trying to establish the religion of Confucianism as a state-

religion; on the other hand he published books to prove that not only the classic of history, but most of the Confucian classics, the major part of the Confucian Scriptures, were forgeries invented by one clever scholar of the first century A.D., in the first decades of the Christian era. He proved conclusively that most of the texts known as the ancient script texts were dubious, or forgeries.

This may need a word of explanation. The Confucian Scriptures are of two types. One appeared quite early in the Ming dynasty, written in the modern script of the time. Then, gradually, there appeared another group of texts, written in the ancient script. So there were two texts, the modern script text which appeared early, and the ancient script text which appeared late, and the most curious thing was that those written in the ancient script are more readable, intelligible, and popular, and contain all the moralizing, philosophizing documents, while those written in the so-called modern text, which appeared first, were largely very simple materials and historical documents. Scholars began to be suspicious as to why those which were written in the modern script were so difficult to read and so uninteresting, while those which were written in the ancient script were so popular and so easy to read. That became the clue for the higher critics, and by the end of the last century the so-called ancient scriptures, constituting almost half of the Confucian Scriptures, were disqualified by this critical discussion. Curiously, the man who was trying hard to establish Confucianism politically as a religion was the man using the most radical method of higher criticism to disprove almost half of the Confucian Scripture. That shows the scientific spirit, the respect for truth which, after all, is the most important element in modern scientific thinking. That spirit is very strong in Confucian culture and offers a ready welcome to all scientific development of thought and method.

VI

HINDUISM AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING

BY K. NATARAJAN

THIS is the first occasion on which I have come out of my own country and there were many reasons why, at this particular time, I should have remained in India. But the message came from the University of Chicago asking me to interpret to America the social movements in modern India. I felt that it was of very great importance, not only to India but to the whole world, that I should avail myself of this opportunity to explain the position in which India actually is today. I have therefore made bold to accept the invitation.

The chairman has told you that I am the editor of a paper. I hold that position because I am a worker in a cause. We found it necessary that there should be in India at least one paper which approached questions, economic, political, or social from the point of view of society, and the *Indian Social Reformer* was started for that purpose. Today I find myself repeatedly wondering how this paper has continued for over forty-three years.

As Dr. Hu, my predecessor, did, I must also start with a personal statement. Early in life—that is, as soon as I began to take an interest in public affairs—I felt that it was my imperative duty to work against several customs and practices of Hinduism which seemed to me to be thwarting the growth of society. I did not ask myself whether I was laboring for or against Hinduism, but simply went on working, not only for society, but primarily for myself, trying to find a way of release from these harmful

customs and practices, and after thirty years, when I found that I had to a large extent emancipated myself, and that the Hindu community as a whole which had formerly been opposed to these reforms had accepted them all, then I asked myself, "Am I still a Hindu?" After much thought I came to the conclusion that the anchor held. Not only was I still a Hindu, but I was more a Hindu than I ever was before I had undertaken this fight against cramping social customs; for Hinduism, whatever outsiders may think, is not identical with any social custom, nor does it rest on infallible dogma. It is not a creed which Hindus must accept. The test of Hinduism is not in belief. Believing does not make a man a Hindu, nor does disbelief thrust him beyond the Hindu pale.

Within the Hindu fold itself is the Sankhya philosophy, recognized as an orthodox school which ignores God altogether, and the author of that philosophy is referred to as "the greatest of perfected ones." Among the great men of India this atheist, this man who has no word to say about God, who even denies God, is given first place as "the perfected one." This fact is evidence that Hindu religion does not depend upon any conception of God.

I am speaking to you not as a scholar, but as a man who feels the Hinduism in his blood. Hinduism is an attitude, an attitude of reverence toward everything. You may reverently believe; you may reverently disbelieve; but reverence you must have. That is an element of human nature without which humanity cannot grow. Hinduism insists whatever your faith, whether you believe in Buddha or Christ or the Prophet of Islam, or any other teacher, or whether you believe in nothing at all, that you approach any subject or question in a spirit of reverence. Then you are a religious man and you must be so regarded.

We must avoid misunderstanding in the use of our terms. I shall be using some words in different senses from those

generally understood in this country. "Religion" is one of them. When I speak of religion I am not speaking of any particular view of God but simply an attitude of reverence and faith. "Modern" is another. To one from India that word has no particular significance. To you "modern" means a very great thing. "Modern" means everything, in fact. The Chairman said he thought I had bridged the gulf between East and West; I have bridged the gulf between modern and ancient also.

In the admirable chapter by Professor Ames (pp. 25-33) it was shown that modern scientific thinking led to the conclusion that all faiths can be interpreted in such a way that they can co-operate with each other. But this point of view to which modern science has now led is the very beginning of the Hindu religion.

The Hindu seer does not approach religion as related to other phases of culture; religion is a matter of life to him and he asserts, "I know this plan; I know this universal principle. I have seen it." In the Gita, where the religion of faith is proclaimed, it is said, "This is the greatest of sciences; it can be proved." Again, in our own age, when a great Hindu teacher was asked, "Have you seen God?" he said, "Yes, and I will show God to you provided you follow my advice. God is no distant being whom we have to apprehend through any book or Bible." Thus to some saints of the Hindu religion God is a very near presence, a demonstrable fact.

So, with this scientific conclusion to which Professor Ames has come after reviewing the whole subject during the last several centuries, Hinduism starts. It was not a mere theory that all religions are sacred or worthy of reverence and should be respected. It was made a fundamental principle of Indian policy. In the time of the second destruction of the temple of Jerusalem the Jews came to India, as they went to Europe. How they were treated in

Europe is a matter of history. In India we have a very ancient Jewish community. When they came to us, eighty years after Christ, they were given lands and homes, and were allowed to live their own religion in their own way. Today that Jewish community still exists and enjoys religious freedom. Not only the Jews were welcomed. In the second century after Christ Syrian Christians came to India and they still continue to enjoy full privileges in the state. When the Mohammedans invaded Persia, the remnants of the Zoroastrian community left their homes and, just as the Pilgrim Fathers came to America, they came to India and were received, given lands, given privileges, and were allowed to establish their own religious worship. They are still one of the most flourishing communities of India. This principle of the sanctity of all religions, that no religion is superior to another and that no religion is entitled to look down upon another, is not only a theory but a practical, fundamental policy, followed not only by the Hindu sovereigns but by the best of the Mohammedan sovereigns who succeeded them, and it is still the policy pursued in India today. This principle which the West has learned in theory from modern science India knew and practiced from ancient times until now. This is one phase of Hinduism wherein its ancient wisdom coincides with the most modern findings of science.

Let us look now at science and the scientific spirit. How is a living religion related to science? I have been reading some modern pronouncements, among them that of General Smuts, of the British Association. What do these modern scientists say? Once matter and energy were the two fundamental things. But now other facts must enter the picture. There is love, holiness, compassion—real and fundamental things, which are not merely matter and energy. Matter, in fact, has already resolved itself into force. The very basis of physical science is giving way.

Scientists themselves are saying, "Our science, if it is to be a real science, must account for not only what we see, what we touch, and what we hear, but also for these great emotions, of love, of holiness, of affection, of the spirit of perfection, which are fundamental principles of the universe and which are, after all, the driving force of human progress.

Therefore, I rather think science is merging into religion. The scientific attitude is becoming more a religious attitude, at any rate when studied from the point of view of the recent address of General Smuts. He is himself a great botanist, but in his book he says, "Physical science does not account for the facts of religion. The great problems of the world remain." We all know that. For one hundred years a narrow view of science has been in control. It has been applied in regions where it was never meant to be applied. For instance, the Darwinian theory was often misinterpreted. I think we owe a good many of the evils from which we suffer to the misinterpretation of this historic theory, yet Darwin himself was a most reverent man.

Fifty years ago science was arrogant and domineering. If a finding was proclaimed scientific nobody dared question it. Today science is wiser and more humble for it must take the responsibility for the present state of civilization. Science cannot say, "I am concerned only with teaching in the schools," because science has permeated civilization, with the result that our world is involved in maladjustments so tragic as to baffle the minds of the most astute persons of the age. That is my own personal view and that is, I think, the Hindu view. I do not claim to speak for all Hindus, but as one who has found a working definition of Hinduism for himself, and I say that there is no antagonism, and there should be none, between the scientific and the religious realms. If religion does not provide solutions for our problems you may call it impractical, but

I call it useless. Religion must cover all of life, and in my humble view religion does cover the whole field, including the field of science. Science cannot escape from religion. All the evils we are suffering from today flow from that mistake. Assuredly our economic evils are due to the fact that economics have escaped from the control of the ethics of which it is really a branch.

The fact that we find it possible to discuss objectively what is the scientific inference of religion shows that it is necessary for us to reinterpret religion altogether. Yet I find it almost as difficult to discuss religion in an objective way, as it would be to discuss my own father and mother. Religion so enters into our life and spirit making us what we are that we cannot adequately analyze it. After trying Hinduism on the practical touchstone of social reform, after eliminating many of the evils which are associated with it, and which are so often proclaimed to the world as its essentials by people who ought to know better, those like me who have worked for years, not without success, to get rid of those evils realize that Hinduism is a living religion, and that for India, and at least for the Hindus, all hope of future progress or greatness, even of existence itself, is bound up with the preservation and practice of the Hindu religion in its purest form.

A great German philosopher, some thirty or forty years ago, delivered a lecture at the Bombay branch of the Royal Society of Philosophy. He pointed out that the Vedanta includes both morals and metaphysics. He went on to give an example: Christianity says, "Love your neighbor as yourself. But Christianity does not say why you should love your neighbor. What is the reason? It is easy in the Vedanta, because your neighbor is yourself." That is, I think, what science also is now teaching us; that we cannot allow our neighbor, whether nation or individual, to go to destruction without ourselves ultimately sharing his suffer-

ing and misery. All peoples are organically related. Humanity can progress only if all nations progress. No single nation can selfishly forge ahead and leave the others to perish. The nineteenth-century philosophy of "the devil take the hindmost" has brought untold misery and suffering upon the world. We must realize the scientific fact of the solidarity of mankind. We must recognize that prosperity, the well-being, the health and the happiness of each one of us can be secure only if each of us works so that other people, our neighbors, will have the same peace, the same happiness, the same economic advantages, and the same educational opportunities as we ourselves enjoy.

That, to my mind, is what Hinduism teaches. I do not say that this is the everyday practice of Hinduism, but we are here dealing with ideals. If, as so many do, you insist upon comparing the ideal of Christianity with the practice of Hinduism, you may do so without complaint from me. Hindus are accustomed to patience. But it is not fair. You must compare the ideals of one religion with the ideals of another, and so comparing the ideals you will find that the conclusion Professor Ames offered to us is absolutely correct, that all religions are striving for the same supreme values. Of course that does not mean that all of us will profess the same religion. We have been born under different historical conditions, with differing geographical and social environments which make particular religions congenial to our own development; but we must understand that there is a religion behind all these religions, and that it is the duty of religious-minded people not to stand apart in their differences but to stand together and to work for the greater glory of God and the greater happiness of mankind.

II. WORLD-RELIGIONS AND MODERN SOCIAL-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

VII

HINDUISM AND MODERN SOCIAL- ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

BY K. NATARAJAN

SO FAR as can be it is my intention not to go into the questions which are labeled as political, because I am not one of those who believe that America, or any other country in the world, can help us very much in these matters. We are very grateful for the good will and kindly feeling that other countries do have, but this is our own problem, and even if, as some of my friends think, through the influence of America we are going to get some of these things, I do not care for it. We must win what we want by our own exertions.

At the outset I want to tell you, in speaking of modern influences on India, that the modern Western influence was not allowed to play upon Indian life directly as from the West itself. There was a very solid phalanx of men of the greatest intellectual and spiritual caliber in our country who first drew upon themselves this Western influence and allowed to pass, as they thought, only such things as they thought were necessary and conducive to the progress of the country. In that way India has not suffered from the floodgates of modern influence being let loose upon her without any breakwaters to stem the tide. There has been, as I said, a filtering process, a careful filtering process, for the last one hundred years, by men of the highest intellectual and spiritual character in our country, who have analyzed and discriminated and said, "These are the things we want and these are the things we do not want."

Even in the realm of science, which is so peculiarly

claimed to be Western and modern, I can tell you from my own knowledge of men who have attained great eminence in India, who if you found them in their own homes you would see them living the simplest life, just like any ordinary Hindu. I know men who are considered to be the greatest Shakespearean scholars who have in their houses all the editions of Shakespeare, but who sit in their homes wearing a coat and perhaps nothing on their bodies.

India has not taken kindly to the externals of Western civilization, but it has taken to the scientific developments, and it has taken avidly to the great lessons of political freedom which English history, literature, and constitutions proclaim to the world. This is the method of procedure adopted in my country.

There are no revolutionaries in India except a few who have no influence. The reformers were reformers simply because they wanted to conserve what was good in the old order of things. These men, the reformers of India, proceeded on this principle: They never wanted any institution unless they were convinced that it was right. They wanted to know by experience if an institution was wrong, and not out of any abstract principle, that because the West has adopted the reform, therefore the East must have it. They have always stood against that. They have always considered whether an institution is working real hardship on men or women, and then they have said, "Well, this must be changed."

And before they changed it what did they do? They referred back to the ancient authorities: This is the institution that we see now before us. Has this any sanction in the old authorities? Is this really a phase of the organic integral past of the social and religious concept of India? They went back, and these men were themselves the greatest authorities in India. Íśwar Chandra, for instance, was a great scholar and authority, and even the orthodox people

who disagreed with him had to respect him and had to go to him for advice in all matters of social and national import.

Men of that type, when they found necessity for reform, referred back and decided whether it was an integral part of our system, because in India the reformer keenly feels what others have felt who have been working in a definite direction, that the social organism is such a delicately adjusted body that if you pull one thing inadvertently, you will bring the whole edifice toppling to the ground, which they did not want to do. As a rule they found that these customs which they wanted to change had no sanction in the most ancient authorities of the Hindu culture. But in some cases they found that this was not the case, and the paper which I edit, which was founded forty years ago, was started chiefly for the purpose of avoiding the textual and often vexatious conflicts which arose out of this constant reference to the Shastras, the sacred scriptures. We pleaded that we ought to consider these matters on their own merits and if we found that a certain reform was necessary for the good of the community, we ought not to think about whether the Shastras accepted it or not.

To a large extent that position has now been accepted, but it was quite recently—only last December—that I met Mahatma Gandhi in jail, and he was again calling the pundits into council as to whether this reform should be undertaken or not. I pleaded with them. I said,

This matter we have settled for forty years, that social reforms ought to be adopted on their own merits, and if you call these men now it will only complicate matters. The pundit's position is not whether a reform is good or sound; the pundit does not know anything of what is going on in the world. He knows only the Sanskrit books. What we should do is to see whether a reform is essential for the well-being of the country, and if you and I and other people consider that it is essential, as we do, and that the very existence of Hinduism is threatened if this reform does not take place, it is for us to tell the pundits that the very existence of Hindu culture is at stake.

We do not want to leave anybody behind. We know that if we do not take the people with us, if we do not take the custodians of Indian culture with us, other reforms will simply be a failure.

Therefore I say that, just like our Indian elephants, which, when they go into new ground, feel whether the ground is firm and secure to bear their weight, so our Indian reformers, in every step they took, tested it again and again and again in all sorts of ways and then took the next step. The point that I wish to emphasize is this, that Western influence has not come as a sudden flood upon our country. It has not upset any old ideas. There were men of the most intense, highest character and culture who were there to receive its onset, who were there to stop whatever they did not consider desirable or essential to the progress of the country, and who allowed only those things to filter in which they thought the country could assimilate and adopt with benefit to itself.

Now I am coming to the social side of the question. This is the long story of the struggle for social reform. In the pioneer days, some thirty or forty years ago, there was a great deal of misapprehension existent and some of the workers were simply excommunicated. It is impossible for anybody here to understand what excommunication in India means in the villages. (Of course in a place like Bombay it is different.) It means that a man will not get a barber to shave him, a washerman to wash his clothes; that he will have to fetch his own water, because there are no pipes in the villages of India. He will have to fetch water for probably two miles. If anybody dies in his house, nobody will carry the body to the burying ground.

That was hard enough for a man to stand, but for the women in the house it was a terrible thing to bear, especially when the women themselves were not convinced that these reforms were essential, and in fact were hostile, as

they were, largely. Things have changed considerably, and I think I may say that one of our great leaders, when we saw five girls coming with books in their hands, stopped dead on the spot and said, "When I see that in Bombay City I see that we have not worked in vain." That is the position in social matters.

And what have been the reforms that we have effected? Largely removing certain restrictions which were really felt to be cruel and inhuman. That we got them is to the credit of Lord William Benton, but the man behind the reform was the Rajah Rammohan Ray, Indian reformer. The Governor-General sent for him. The Rajah was one of the greatest intellectual figures of his time. In India he represented all the three extremes of culture, namely Hindu, Islam, and Christian. He hailed the Bible, the first appearance of the Christian Scripture, with great enthusiasm. He published a book called "The Precepts of Jesus, the Truest Matter for Happiness," but he frankly objected to the missionaries, because he violently objected to people being proselyted, but that is another story.

The Governor-General asked the Rajah to come to see him. The Rajah said that he could not come. At that time he had retired from service and he was leading what is called the third stage of life. First of all the boy is educated and then he has to be a householder. All these things must be fulfilled. You can't skip anything. Thirdly, when he is about sixty years old, he retires. He doesn't wait until death compels him to give up his property. He retires to the forest to meditate, leaving everything to his children.

The Rajah said that he had adopted that stage and that he would not go to the house of any Governor-General. Then Lord Benton wrote, "I invite you, not as the Governor-General but as a friend." Then the Rajah went. The Governor-General consulted with him about the reform, and it was his great support that enabled the British gov-

ernment to carry out the abolition of the practice according to which widows burned themselves on the funeral pyres of their dead husbands.

The next reform which was taken up was the abolition of the restriction on the remarriage of widows. Among the higher caste Hindus, widows are not allowed to remarry. Once a husband dies, that woman remains all the time a widow.

Very much misunderstanding has been caused in this country and elsewhere because the word "marriage" is used. Well, the word "marriage" in India means a very different thing from what it means here. The sexual relation in marriage in India is an incident; there are very many other things which are the essential consequences of marriage. If a girl is married at the age of seven it does not mean that she lives with the husband at the age of seven. Sometimes twenty or thirty years elapse before she goes to her husband. But if the husband dies in the meantime the marriage is a sacrament; the girl remains a widow all her life and cannot remarry. That was the state of things, and we felt, especially for the child widows, that that thing was not right.

A great Sanskrit scholar, Vidyasagar, was interested in these reforms. His old mother came to him one day with a widow and told him, "You are a great pundit and a scholar. Can you not find authority to give relief to cases like this?" He examined the Shastras and the published books and was able to persuade Indian opinion and the government to pass an act validating the remarriage of widows. That was the reform that came next.

Third, thinkers began to ask (because even now there is a great deal of prejudice against the remarriage of widows), "Why not raise the age of marriage? Why not prevent the existence of child widows?" And that movement went on for forty years, and then we had legislation put on the

statute books three or four years ago, and you will find a statement there that "the existence of child marriage leads to the creation of child widows and, to prevent that, this act is being passed."

Then, again, rose the question as to women being allowed to exercise their own independent judgment. Their education was in a very backward condition. Why should they not be educated? Even now, although hundreds have graduated from the universities, still among the masses education, especially women's education, is in a very sad plight. We are doing very little for education. If one of you should examine the figures and see what is being done for education you would be astonished.

I do not want to go into the matter, but this question of women's education was taken up and we worked at it. As I said, there are not many girls in our schools, simply because we have not enough schools, but we have broken down the opposition to girls going to schools and there are hundreds and hundreds of families in which, as a matter of course, boys and girls go to the university, as they do in your own country here.

This work has been going on for about seventy or eighty years, and people who do not know what has been going on were astonished three years ago when thousands of women came out at the call of Mahatma Gandhi in the Nationalist movement. They thought it was a sudden thing. Not at all. For seventy or eighty years the best minds of India have been working toward freeing women and bringing the great force of women's moral influence on the side of social reform, and so it happens that today these very women, or, rather, the mothers, who were the greatest and bitterest opponents of social reforms thirty years ago have now taken social reforms into their hands; and we men who have been working so long are very glad indeed to leave it in their safe and experienced hands.

That is the greatest achievement of social reform and I think it illustrates to you with what care and caution we have been moving in the matter.

My time is short, and also there is a great deal of difficulty in my dealing with the economic question in its fulness. As a matter of fact, the economic policy of India for the last hundred years has been entirely opposed to the best opinion of the country. India never accepted free trade; India has always asked to follow the example of other countries, like America or Germany—every country that has built up industry. It has been said that we must have a policy of national economics which must provide for that. We have not been able, in the face of Indian opinion, to get it. The free-trade policy has been the policy of the country, although the condition of England and the condition of India are entirely different from each other. India's condition is continental, like that of America or Germany, whereas England's conditions are insular.

But when the time came that the budget could not be balanced and a revenue duty had to be imposed on the cotton goods, then a counteracting duty was imposed on the manufactured goods of our Indian mills in order to countervail the duty imposed for revenue purposes. For long years the whole country was bent on getting rid of the countervailing duty, because it had never been done in any country. Even the most rabid free trader never speaks of having a countervailing duty, but a duty for revenue purposes.

The depression has been a very great force in India in many respects. More and more the budget had to be balanced by raising the import duties, and the insistent call of Indian reformers since 1875, when the last little bit of cotton duties was abolished against the protest of the then Viceroy of India (Lord Northbrooke), who resigned, has been one of protest.

Then the policy that is called "discriminating protec-

tion" was adopted. That is to say, if any trade wants protection it goes before a tariff board. The tariff board examines it. You must prove that the industry can, within a reasonable limit of time, become self-supporting—and many other things. If that is all proved, then a temporary protection is given. That is the present policy in India, and I believe that after we adopted it England herself went in for that policy.

We must wash our hands of all responsibility for the economic policy of the present and for the consequences of that policy. I can only tell you what Indian opinion holds. Indian opinion holds that India is entitled, by virtue of her being the greatest producer of raw materials, by virtue of her having abundant labor, and by virtue of her having a very great market in her own country, to manufacture all the goods that she wants within herself, and for that purpose, if necessary, we ought to prevent foreign goods from swamping our own industries. That is the Indian position. I am very hopeful that we shall succeed, because the cause is right and just.

There are one or two other things that I might mention; for instance, labor legislation. In India, during the last twenty years, we have had factory legislation for protecting the workers from being overworked. Well, that is a very good thing in itself, but I think there is a strong feeling among the Bombay Indian mill owners that this protective legislation has not been motivated entirely by considerations for the good of the Indian workers. In one case, for instance, such legislation prevented the women from working underground in the mines. Indian mines are not very deep, as they are in England, and what is more, the women of India insist that the men shall not go underground unless they can accompany them, so it comes to pass that in some cases the men will not go; the women will not allow them to go. They are equalitarians; they want to take the risks that their men take, and if they cannot go

underground the men shall not go underground. That is the position, and when a law is passed which has only a small matter of public opinion behind it I think in most countries that law is not and cannot be very strictly enforced.

I think I have taken up more of your time than I should, but the Hindu view is that, while it has no thought of opposition whatever to missionary or similar activity, or to motor cars which run 200 miles an hour, or to anything of the kind, it is very particular that the village life of the country shall not be disturbed. It wants village industry; it wants the people of the villages to remain there. It does not want them to go to towns to get looseness of character and then to go back and infect the villages. It wants the family life to be preserved.

In India you will be surprised to know that there has never been any poor law. The community supports itself. Each family supports its own destitute or helpless people, and that is the system still. There is vast unemployment in India. The old agricultural population has no work for five months in the year, but there is no unemployment dole. There is no old-age pension, there is no sick insurance—nothing of the kind. The Indian community takes care of its own poor and its own destitute. There is a joint family system which has been condemned as stopping initiative, but I know for a fact that many of us would not have been able to take part in public life, as we have been doing for years, ignoring our own personal interests, had not a brother or uncle, or some other member of the family, taken upon himself the duty of maintaining the whole family.

We want the reforms, but we do not want things to be destroyed, because we feel that whatever may be the case in other countries, in our country we must build upon our own past. If you approve, well and good. If you do not approve, if you do not sympathize, we shall go our own way.

VIII

BUDDHISM AND MODERN SOCIAL- ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

By Y. Y. Tsu

THE response of any religion to the impact of a new age usually takes the course of internal reformation, the development of a new apologetic and the formulation of a social creed, in the order named. Self-preservation requires that it spread its energy first in adjusting its own organized life to the new social environment in which it must live and from which it must derive its nourishment. Then comes the intellectual task of restating or justifying its doctrines in terms of the new ideas that sway the thinking of the age, and finally it develops a social gospel, that is to say, it becomes aware of its social mission. This has been the course taken by Christianity in the last century of modern progress, and indications are that Buddhism in Japan and China is following the same course.

Let us take into consideration Buddhism in Japan first. In regard to internal reorganization much progress has been made. It is well known that in reorganizing itself Buddhism in Japan has consciously made the Christian church its model, so that there are Y.M.B.A., Y.W.B.A., Sunday Schools, hymn singing, and even a Salvation Army. All sects report larger memberships, at least statistically, though it is difficult to tell whether larger figures indicate greater fervor or much better bookkeeping. The *Buddhist Year Book* of Japan presents an imposing array of statistics.

Fifty-six main and sub-sects are registered with the government. Each sect has a "kancho," or "bishop," at

its head, some hereditary and others elected. Buddhism claims 41,042,075 members, supports 71,329 temples, 9 universities, 6 special course colleges for men and 3 for women, 1 college of music, 16 Buddhist middle schools, 66 high schools for girls, and also operates numerous charitable and welfare agencies, as follows: 211 institutions for children, 147 institutions for assisting working people to improve themselves educationally, 139 labor bureaus, 47 hospitals, and 20 schools for the blind and deaf. It has 2 dailies, 219 monthly magazines, 23 weekly or ten-day magazines, and 31 publishing houses.

Historically Buddhism has always been active in social welfare work, especially for neglected children, the poor, and the physically handicapped. It has played a very important rôle in the introduction and development of culture in Japan. It brought the advanced arts and crafts of the mainland to the island; it encouraged farming and trade, architecture and road-building, the study and practice of medicine, and even the military arts, such as fencing and archery. For a long time education was practically in the hands of monks, and monasteries were centers of learning much as was the case with Christian monasteries in Europe in the dark ages. So it is not surprising that Buddhism is still strongly engaged in its traditional sphere of philanthropy.

For spreading its teachings among the rising generation as well as for training its clergy Buddhism has also gone into the field of education. One also notes the widespread interest in the scientific study of Buddhism centered in university and college circles. Twenty-six institutions of higher learning, including nine Buddhist colleges and headed by the Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto, carry on studies in Sanskrit, Hindu Philosophy, and the history of Chinese and Indian Buddhism, as well as Buddhism in Japan. What the effect of such scientific and

critical study will be upon the beliefs and traditions popularly held as Buddhism is yet to be seen, but the total result should be beneficial.

This brief survey ought to convince us of the large place Buddhism occupies in the national life of Japan. In fact, Buddhism is so inextricably intermingled with the art and literature, the manners and customs of the Japanese people, that no cataloguing of Buddhist institutions can adequately represent its all-pervasive influence, yet both Japanese and foreign observers in Japan have noted the fact that Buddhism's hold upon the people is weakening. One Western observer writes, "If Buddhism as an ideal force has lost its hold on many of its own clergy, it is even more obvious that the great mass of Buddhist adherents are still less influenced by their professed religion." A Japanese educator writes, "Buddhism has revived somewhat recently but it is not more than a formal religion, the members who belong nominally to the temples neither sincerely believing or earnestly practising the teachings of Buddha." All this, however, is not strange in the modern age of secularism, and the language fits the case of Christianity as much as that of Buddhism.

During the past few years there has been an antireligion movement in Japan, and Buddhism, because of its conspicuous position, bears the brunt of its attack. It is generally understood that the movement is inspired from outside and forms a part of the communist revolutionary propaganda. However, there seems to be ample ground for dissatisfaction with organized Buddhism. To quote the Japanese observer already referred to above,

The magnificent temples and thousands of priests have naturally depended upon the wealthy people for support, and in this the religious leaders have sided with those mammon worshippers in the name of the merciful Buddha. Thus, as the friends of Capitalism instead of the people the so-called religious believers sometimes supply the reasons for attack by the anti-religionists and communists. At present most of the

activities of the anti-religionists are carried on among the youth of rural sections which have suffered most from the financial depression. While people were suffering, the religious organizations—mostly temples—did scarcely anything to help them, but rather hurt their feelings by refusing to open the temples for meetings of tenant farmers while renting them to political gatherings of the wealthy landlords. And yet the temples continue to collect from the people enormous sums of money every year on every conceivable pretext. Therefore the leaders of the anti-religion movement are urging the youth of rural villages and towns to revolt against the temples and priests. For these are the visible symbols of religion which they take as an ally of the hated capitalistic system.

Thus once more is repeated the common phenomenon of organized religion allying itself with the dominant economic system from which it derives its material support, and for the mess of pottage gives up its birthright of prophecy. The case of the West Hongwanji, the most powerful ecclesiastical organization and the richest in the country, offers interesting study in this connection. Being of the Shinshu sect, its priests marry and lead the normal family life. The office of the head of the temple is hereditary and the occupant always marries a sister of the reigning empress, thus acquiring a tremendous social prestige. This temple publishes a daily of its own, the *Bunka Jiho*, which recently offered a special prize for an essay that discusses how to defeat and destroy Marxism and its antireligious principle. The other Buddhist daily, also published in Kyoto, the *Chugwai Nippo*, sponsored public debates between religionists and anti-religionists in 1930-31, which, except for their news value, could do no good either way. This called forth the cryptic remark that "both anti-religionists and Buddhists are busy attacking their opponents with pen and tongue."

The story of Akamatsu Yoshimaru sheds some sidelight on the same subject. He was the son of the head dignitary of the West Hongwanji and according to the custom was to succeed his father in that high office, and probably

marry an imperial princess. But he imbibed liberal ideas, renounced his inheritance, and joined the Labor Party, incidentally marrying the daughter of the late Dr. Sakuzo Yoshino, the well-known leader of liberal political thought. Akamatsu Yoshimaru was for many years the secretary-general of the Labor party, only recently quitting that post because the policy of the party did not satisfy his expectations. It is permissible to comment that his is an instance of men of liberal tendencies finding it necessary to leave the fold of organized religion to work out their economic ideas.

Instances are not lacking of Buddhists being deeply conscious of the social problems of the time and of the duty of Buddhism to meet them, as illustrated by the work of Professor Tomomatsu Entai, at the Taisho University, Tokyo, in organizing for the study of the social and economic implications of Buddhism and publishing the results in occasional monographs, or in an outburst of social passion in the writing of Kishio Satomi, a leader of the important Nichiren sect, when he wrote, "What is the primary aim of a religion worthy of existence? As a matter of course it is salvation, but is it intended to be in a spiritual sense only? Salvation is pregnant with relief and redress of life, and of the world."

However, on the whole we may say that while Buddhism in Japan has succeeded in reorganizing its own institutional life to meet modern requirements it has yet to develop a social consciousness and an independent creed of social-economic criteria worthy of its great influence and inheritance.

In China Buddhism has not yet achieved its own modernization, although voices urging reform are not lacking in the ranks of clergy and laity. In 1918 T'ai Hsu, the noted reform leader, published his famous essay on "Reformation of the Sangha," in the first number of his monthly magazine, the *Voice of the Sea Waves*. The urgency for reform

comes partly from the pressure of modern social conditions, as for instance the rising standard of education among the people and the consequent need for a better educated priesthood, partly from the pressure of specific demands, such as threatened legislation for confiscating temple buildings and lands for educational purposes, and partly from the stimulation of the reform movement in Japan. At the close of the last century and the beginning of the twentieth, numerous Chinese students went to Japan to study. Some of them brought back a renewed interest in Buddhist studies and translated into Chinese the results of Japanese scholarship. Japanese Buddhists also came over to China to fraternize with Chinese Buddhists and co-operate with them in the common cause. One of the earliest schools for monks was opened in the interior province of Hunan by a Japanese priest. T'ai Hsu himself visited Japan on several occasions.

In this connection we recall that one of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915 was that the Chinese government permit Japanese missionaries to preach Buddhism in China, the reason given being that although historically Japan learned her Buddhism from China, yet at the present time Buddhism is better preserved and developed in Japan than in China.

Buddhists in China are trying to unite as a national church, but so far the National Buddhist Federation is more a longing than an achievement. Out of a dozen, two monthly periodicals have acquired some degree of prestige, the *Voice of the Sea Waves*, already referred to, and the *Buddhist Critic*, edited respectively by T'ai Hsu, and Ch'ang Hsin, one of his disciples. There is no Chinese *Buddhist Year Book*, so we do not have any statistical data to indicate the numerical and material strength of the Buddhist religion in China.

Three tendencies have manifested themselves in the Chi-

nese Buddhist Revival, which can be conveniently called the conservative, liberal, and scholastic, and which are centered around three leading personalities.

Ing Kuang, an elderly monk on the Sacred Island of P'u t'o, off the eastern coast of Chekiang, stands for the fundamentalists (Buddhism has also its fundamentalists) among Buddhists. A scholar and a retired government official, he has embraced the Buddhist monastic life as a protest against and refuge from the wickedness of the world. He decries the social gospel of the liberals as untrue to the Buddhist religion and T'ai Hsu as a danger to their faith, for, according to him, Buddhism is fundamentally other-worldly, interested in saving souls out of this world, which is hopelessly lost. Any attempt to compromise with it as the liberals are trying to do in building for a better world, as they say, leads men away from real religion, which is implicit reliance upon the saving power of the All-Merciful O-Mi-T'o-Fu for passage into his Pure Land Paradise.

Eu Yang Ching Wu, founder and director of the Nan-king Buddhist Institute, represents the scholarly interests in Buddhism. Starting from a dozen persons gathered together for study, the Institute has developed into the dignity of a college of Buddhist studies, the center of the idealistic or Dharmalakṣaṇa school, identified with the name of the famous ancient scholar and traveler, Hsuan Chuang. The Institute is engaged in research and translation, editing and publishing Buddhist works. Eu Yang Ching Wu denies that Buddhism is a religion, or even a philosophy interested in the problem of ultimate reality. To him Buddhism is a way of living or self-realization through mental and moral discipline whereby the restlessness of mind and soul may be overcome. He claims to represent no sectarian interest but the common desire to understand the meaning of Buddhist teachings in terms of life.

In passing we may note that evidence of scholarly interest in Buddhism and its scientific study outside of Buddhist circles is not lacking in China. Dr. Hu Shih has written voluminously on the historical side; so did the late Liang Chi Chiao, both writing from the critical objective standpoint, as historians.

The third figure is the well-known T'ai Hsu, the Fosdick of Chinese Liberal Buddhism, and for the last two decades its spokesman. Genteel and scholarly in appearance, soft-spoken and saintly in his monkish garb, he nevertheless wields a great power and commands a large following with his pen and his tongue. As already referred to, he made himself a marked leader when he published his famous essay in 1918 on the "Reform of the Sangha." He emphasized the need of better education and training of monks, elimination of such formal practices as the sale of priestly indulgences for the departed, and the participation of monks in funeral processions, and, except where the masses must be accommodated, he would do away with the idolatry and ceremonialism of temple worship. He would greatly enlarge the teaching profession of the Sangha, and would, for the sake of the order itself, require every monk to be engaged in productive labor. He would organize the Buddhist Church nationally with a national monastery at the capital of the country, with a museum for the preservation of Buddhist art and a library of Buddhist literary treasures. At present the realization of this grandiose scheme awaits on the one hand a better educated clerical leadership and on the other the munificence of lay support.

At the present time T'ai Hsu is mainly interested in promoting theological education for Buddhist clergy, in developing a new Buddhist apologetic, and in cultivating international affiliation. The burden of his new apologetic is that Buddhism alone is adequate to satisfy the social needs of the day. At the bottom of the stress and storm,

the discontent and unhappiness of this restless modern world, as of all ages, is a mistaken understanding of the nature of life. Buddhists call it the delusion of things and the delusion of self. Out of this twofold delusion has sprung all the greed and quarrelsomeness of man. The cruelty of the competitive economic struggle on the one hand and the brutality of international warfare and interracial conflict on the other are but the inevitable effect of the mistaken philosophy. Buddhism alone consistently teaches and practices human brotherhood by pointing, on the one hand, to the truth that all are sharers of the Buddha-nature, which is in all of us waiting to be realized and which therefore makes us one, and on the other, to the doctrine of collective Karma, that what is is the result of the interaction of countless lives and generations, that we live inter-dependently one to another, and that by co-operation we may consciously work toward a better world.

At present T'ai Hsu is but a thin voice in the wilderness of tradition and vested interests. He, in fact, seems to have more following among the laity than among the clergy, so much so that one Chinese Buddhist has remarked that the modernizing movement has passed into the hands of lay people. It is possible that some day the Buddhist Sangha in China may yet achieve its own reformation, but the task will be a tremendously heavy one, and until then Buddhism will play no part in the thinking and solution of social-economic problems of the day beyond the traditional rôle as dispenser of charity. T'ai Hsu probably felt the weight of his self-assumed task when, in concluding his "Essay on the Reform of the Sangha," he wrote, "But if I fail I shall, relying upon the mercy of Buddha, end my life as a wandering mendicant."

The test of any religion for the right to survive is its ability to contribute to the social-economic welfare of the age. This comes even before the test of intellectual worth

or philosophic validity. It may be that, as in the case of Christianity, Buddhism with its essentially other-worldly viewpoint may yet succeed in transforming itself into a religion that makes the betterment of this world its chief task. The fact that Buddhism in Japan could so change its monastic discipline as to encourage its monks to lead the normal life of the householder seems to indicate an innate versatility in Buddhism promising that the transformation will be made. Whether, so transformed, Buddhism can still be recognized as itself and not some other religion, need not trouble us now. The human mind is an adaptable and charitable judge.

IX

CONFUCIANISM AND SOCIAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

By HU SHIH

WHEN I listened to Mr. Natarajan this afternoon I was very much interested in his assertion that all early reforms in India had to originate in asking the pundits to find authorities for them in the sacred scriptures. If that is a necessary condition for social and economic and political reforms Confucianism certainly affords an abundance of scriptural authority for all kinds of far-reaching reform movements in the economic, social, and political spheres.

Confucianism, as you all know, is not strictly a religion in the Western Christian sense. Confucianism has always been a system of teaching—social, moral, and political teaching. Its founder, Confucius, who lived in the middle of the sixth century B.C. and died in the first quarter of the fifth century, never considered himself a founder of a religion. He was always an educator, a reformer. He spent his whole life in educating people. He had a famous saying, "Education recognizes no classes. Through education all class distinctions are abolished."

He was one of those reformers who helped to break down spiritually and intellectually the feudal system that was tottering at the time. He was a reformer of such repute that while he passed through one of the gates of a city the gate-keeper inquired of his disciples, "Who is that man?" And the disciple answered, "Confucius of the state of Lu," and the gate-keeper said, "Oh, he? He who knows it to be impossible yet cannot forbear to stir?" That was the spirit of the man.

On one occasion he was stopped. He was questioned by the recluses, the hermits of the time, and scolded for being such a busybody, occupying himself not with affairs of his own personal cultivation but with affairs of the state, that is, social improvement. These men refused to accept him because of this activity in other people's affairs, and he sadly replied, "I am a man. If I do not associate with men, with whom shall I live? And if the world is already in good order, I should not feel the call to set it to rights."

In that you see the spirit of this reformer, and that spirit has inspired many of the later believers, leaders of Confucianism, today. In Chinese history you find two tendencies of thought in political-social activities. One is the Taoistic, the other the Confucianist. The Taoistic teachings center around one item, naturalism: Nature has its own course; everything will become so by itself, of itself. There is no need to accelerate, to anticipate time and nature, and no reformer will ever succeed if it is too early, if the time and the age are not ripe for him. The best way is to wait until nature has finished its own course. Then, with a little bit of human effort, you achieve success, a success which is really probably due to the natural course of events.

That is the philosophy of non-action, to do nothing, and in the course of the centuries the Chinese empire-builders found that to be quite convenient.

In a vast empire the size of ancient China, without the modern means of transportation and communication, without modern means of transmitting ideas and ideals, it was found necessary to practice the idea of *laissez faire*, of no action, of non-interference, of leaving the different parts of the country to themselves. The central government exercised only a certain elemental function of police power, maintaining order and safety from foreign aggression. The necessity of this far-flung imperial rule, then, has given the Taoistic policy of non-action its ascendancy. Most of the

political thinkers took that view, particularly the practical politicians, because it was the line of least resistance.

But Confucianism always took the opposite view of things: Do something! They favored active politics, active government, active reform. After seventy years of non-action, of a laissez-faire policy in the Han dynasty, you find the Confucianists coming forward to advocate an active policy of social-economic reform. Invariably, throughout the centuries, whenever the government relaxed into a period of laissez faire, of doing nothing, of following the natural course of events, you find Chinese Confucianist leaders coming to the front to advocate active social or political reforms. Such worldly men, under the leadership of the usurper Emperor, Wang Mang, brought about a great many very radical socialistic reforms.

Such was the movement led by another man of this family, Wang An-shih, in the eleventh century, who, after sixteen years of hard work brought about a long series of economic, political, and educational reforms, including the nationalization of industry, commerce, and of a great many of the public utilities. Throughout the history of China you find Confucianism always the philosophy of political reform.

Toward the end of the last century this great reform tradition, which culminated in the hundred days of radical reforms in the year 1898, a Confucianist movement, was led by K'ang Yu-wei. The name of the man is significant. As I said, there are two types of political philosophy; one is to do nothing, *Wu-wei*. "Wu" means "no"; "Wei" is "action": Do nothing. The other school, the Confucianist philosophy, is *Yu-wei*, "have action." The reformer's original name was K'ang Tsu-yi, but because of his political philosophy of active reform he changed his name to Yu-wei. In that you see the spirit of this whole movement.

The activistic, reform quality of Confucian philosophy cannot be denied.

You may ask, Are there some specific modern reforms which certain doctrines in Confucianism do not favor? There are: birth control, for example. You will find the old ancestor cult, with the emphasis laid upon the continuity of the family life through male descendants, sometimes acting as a spur to the unlimited increase in population. Any talk about birth control, artificial checks, will be opposed by copious quotations from the *Book of Filial Piety*; but I think economic pressure will probably be stronger than that little classic of a few pages. Apart from that one problem of population, birth control versus filial piety, I do not see any modern economic or political social movement which cannot find some pundit to quote authoritative statements from the Confucian Scriptures to substantiate it. For example, equality of the sexes. The conservative scholar can say, "According to the ancient dictionaries the wife is one who prostrates herself before the man." That can be quoted against the equality of the sexes. But the reformers say, "No; there is another definition: the wife is equal to man." If scriptural authority were the magic gateway to reform in China the reformer could always find the necessary quotations.

For political changes, the conservative supporter of the monarchy can quote copious passages from the Confucian classics to support the monarchist movement, but the supporters of the republican form of government can also find ample support in the Confucian classics, particularly in the writings of the second leader of the school. In Mencius these reformers are backed by vigorous statements which justify revolution. Mencius frankly points out that the people are the most important element in a state, and the ruler, the monarch, is the least important; and if the monarch maltreats his subjects it is the right of the subjects to

regard him as an enemy, thereby justifying revolution as a means of overthrowing those despots who are no rulers of men, but individuals who stand alone without the support of the people. They are isolated, pitiable despots, and they are rightly the object of a revolution.

Then, too, socialism, particularly the modern socialistic tendencies, will find the Confucianist economics a very interesting source. Confucianism stood for active use of the government for curing injustice, for righting human wrongs. This attitude of interference, coupled with a rather feudalistic conception of society, led the early Confucianists to pay especial attention to the agricultural class, thinking that agriculture was the basis of the nation's life, while commerce was only grudgingly justified. Still less justified was the practice of making money.

And so you find in Chinese history that the Confucianists always stood for a policy of interfering with and suppressing the commercial class, while, on the other hand, the non-interference philosophy of the laissez-faire school of Taoism very often supported the mercantile class. Thus, throughout the history of Confucian culture you find a strong emphasis on the agricultural population. The profession of the farmer was exalted as the highest, the most important, the most necessary of all human occupations.

There was, therefore, a very long historical tradition which made the Chinese people rather uncomfortable in a mercantile world, when the status of the merchant became almost highest in society, particularly if the merchant happened to be a rich man. It is the same historical tradition which makes our scholarly class hesitate to enter the field of modern industry and commerce. It is the same historical tradition which makes our young generation feel quite at home with the new socialistic and communistic theories. The capitalistic economics, the mercantile economics, have never been, in fact, fully recognized by the

Chinese. Indeed, before they could be fully recognized they were already being attacked by these new movements, and the modern socialistic and communistic programs and ideals easily find historical justification and authoritative support in the Confucianist economics. This, then, is another very interesting and important factor in the relationship between Confucianism and modern economic social movements.

But we need not be alarmed by this Confucianist support for socialism. Probably the historic regard for interference, for active use of the government as an instrument for righting human wrongs, and the idea of paying special attention to the interests of the largest class in the country, the farmer, will help China to move more cautiously in her adoption of modern industrialism. Let us hope that this historic attitude may lessen the evils of industrialization if industrialization must come at all to China.

X

JUDAISM AND MODERN SOCIAL- ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

BY ABRAHAM CRONBACH

OUR title is as meaningful for what it excludes as for what it includes. The word "modern" excludes the historical Jewish past. The word "religion" excludes secular Judaism, and much of contemporary Judaism is secular, that is, non-religious or anti-religious. For this reason, such names as Marx, Lasalle, Trotsky, Liebknecht, Gompers, Hilquit, Hillman, Abraham Epstein, Sidney Webb, Joseph Fels of Single Tax fame, Emma Goldman, Rosa Luxemburg, Josephine Goldmark, and their hordes of Jewish followers will have to fall outside of our theme. Though their leadership in the direction of social-economic innovation is far from negligible, we shall for the same reason have to forego consideration of the Jewish social workers. The labor movements and the novel economic experiments of rehabilitated Palestine will, for the same reason, lie beyond our purview. Nor may we expand upon the Jewish names that are ever cropping up in civil-liberties controversies. Arthur Garfield Hayes, Felix Frankfurter, Waldo Frank, Samuel S. Liebowitz, Amy Schechter are only the most conspicuous.

Again, the tendency to differentiate between charity on the one hand and basic economic alterations on the other warrant our excluding the fertile domain of Jewish philanthropy and benevolence. We are further debarred from treating those grievances borne by Jews as Jews, such as discrimination in the matters of employment, immigration, clubs, schools, and hotels and, in certain foreign countries,

civic rights. Our subject seems to imply the Jewish reactions to the social-economic quandaries of mankind in general.

Finally, we shall have to leave unopened the whole of the impressive volume of Jewish aspirations, declarations, and activities relating to world-peace. We must use the term "social-economic" in its narrowest implications if our treatment is not to grow unwieldy.

Far reaching though the changes wrought by time, there is one aspect which the Judaism of today presents in common with the Judaism of ages past: Judaism is still what it has always been—a system of ritual modified by a prophetism which began by defying but ended by amalgamating with the ritual. The several Jewish groupings of today—liberal, conservative, orthodox—represent so many locations on a scale of ritual observance or non-observance. Generally speaking, interest in social-economic problems varies inversely with the degree of ritual attachment.

Let us begin with the Central Conference of American Rabbis, a liberal organization whose membership is drawn entirely from the rabbinate. For nearly two decades the Central Conference of American Rabbis has had its Commission on Social Justice presided over by a series of vigorous chairmen. Guided by this commission, the conference adopted a social justice platform in 1918 and a revised social justice platform in 1928. The commission has issued a series of annual social justice messages to the laity and has published a succession of bulletins setting forth, from time to time, the public efforts of individual rabbis in behalf of the underprivileged. In conjunction with an allied body of liberal Jewish laymen, the commission conducted at Cincinnati in May, 1931, a successful social justice seminar. The commission has joined the corresponding Protestant and Catholic bodies in the issuing of statements on crucial economic situations, in the investigating of vari-

ous industrial conflicts, and in many a move of intercession in behalf of the victims of social and economic exploitation, as well as in the arrangement of a notable conference on unemployment held at Washington in January, 1931.

The social justice platform of the liberal rabbis opposes lynching, child labor, class conflict, and the acquisitiveness which places dividends above humane working conditions. The platform favors freedom of speech, a living wage, collective bargaining, industrial health and accident insurance, old-age pensions, mothers' pensions, unemployment insurance, labor exchanges, industrial stabilization, the eight-hour day, the six-day and, where possible, the five-day week for industry, the rehabilitation of industrial cripples, scientific penology, special health and safety measures for working women, and equal pay to women and to men for equal work. More recently a clause was added favoring an objective attitude toward birth control. The liberal rabbis were the first of the several religious groups to mention birth control without aversion.

Early in the depression the liberal rabbis proposed a thoroughgoing program for the relief of unemployment, anticipating some of the measures which our federal administration has since then adopted—measures such as the limitation of working hours and the initiation of huge plans of public construction. A system of federal employment exchanges like that advocated at the time by the Central Conference of American Rabbis has recently been authorized by Congress.

Only a month ago the liberal rabbis issued a scorching denunciation of those of their own co-religionists to be found among the employers responsible for the recent breakdown of industrial standards and the appalling recurrence of sweatshop conditions.

One of the most striking achievements in the history of organized religion in America was the success of the com-

bined denominations, Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic, in securing the abolition of the twelve-hour working day in the steel industry. The president of the United States had attempted it and failed. The experts of the Iron and Steel Institute had solemnly and officially declared that steel need not or should not or could not be produced under any other schedule of hours. The late Rabbi Horace Wolf, at that time chairman of the Social Justice Commission, contradicted the experts. The Catholic and Protestant commissions on social justice promptly came to Rabbi Wolf's assistance. A joint pronouncement was issued whose impression upon public opinion was such that shortly thereafter the twelve-hour day in steel was abandoned.

Our Social Justice Commission, either concordantly or jointly with their Catholic and Protestant confrères, pleaded in behalf of Sacco and Vanzetti, of Mooney and Billings, and of the Scottsboro unfortunates. Together with the Protestants and the Catholics they investigated and reported on the case of the Centralia prisoners. They similarly accepted the invitation of the citizens of Cumberland and Hagerstown, Maryland, to investigate the Western Maryland Railroad lockout. They joined the Protestant group in admitting light into the industrial complications prevailing in the Real Silk Hosiery Mills. They further associated themselves with the other denominations in acts of sympathy and succor toward the Pullman porters, toward the textile strikers of Elizabethton, Tennessee, Marion, Gastonia, and Goldsboro, North Carolina, and toward the destitute and embattled miners of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. Only a few days ago there appeared a combined statement of the rabbis, the Catholics, and the Protestants urging upon all of their constituencies a consecrated participation in President Roosevelt's program for industrial recovery.

This says nothing yet of what has been done by indi-

vidual rabbis, both liberal and conservative, in behalf of the underprivileged of their respective localities. With surprising frequency, rabbis have functioned as industrial arbitrators, always to the satisfaction of the workers and usually to the satisfaction of all parties. Our colleague at Portland, Oregon, has rendered such signal service unsnarling the tangles of the milk industry that he has acquired for himself the sobriquet, "Milk Czar."

Occasionally rabbis, with their social-economic liberalism, excite the antagonism of their congregations. The dread of the Christians is a factor in these conflicts. The Jewish layman is ever apprehensive of anti-Semitic forces lying in wait to pounce upon any pretext for branding the Jews as "Communists," "Bolsheviks," or anything else disreputable. A month ago, when the liberal rabbis, in the name of social justice, adopted a resolution favoring American recognition of Russia, it was with the explicit admission that they were exposing themselves and their people to some degree of jeopardy.

The liberal Jewish laity is by no means as assertive in social-economic matters as the liberal rabbinate. It is only under rabbinic pressure that such a liberal religious body as the Union of American Hebrew Congregations has taken a stand on social-economic problems. A few years ago, at a convention in Cleveland, a whole day of arduous pleading and prodding on the part of the rabbis present and of a few socially minded laymen was required in order to push that liberal Jewish lay body into resolving "that human rights take precedence over property rights" and that labor is vested with dignity. The sentiment among the laity seems to be that the task of their organization is the financing and the maintenance of their several institutions and that social-economic pronouncements are somewhat beyond their scope. Despite all of this, the Jewish laity, now and then, evince a curious delight in being oratorically excori-

ated for their backwardness in these matters. Good orators, advocating extremely progressive measures, have elicited the uproarious applause of wealthy and supposedly bourgeois Jewish audiences. The Jewish lay body which most nearly approaches the Central Conference of American Rabbis so far as social-economic adventuresomeness is concerned is the National Council of Jewish Women. While this order consists predominantly of women of the Reform or liberal *milieu*, women of conservative and orthodox connections are eligible and affiliated.

The conservative rabbinate has but recently begun to take official cognizance of social and economic problems. Their latest pronouncement (May 3, 1933) favors the thirty-hour industrial week, a minimum wage, unemployment insurance, free speech, federal mitigation of unemployment, education in social questions, and a sympathetic attitude toward Mooney and Billings and toward the Scottsboro victims.

It would be interesting to know to what extent such Jewish laymen as Gerard Swope, Edward A. Filene, Henry Dix, the Hart, Schaffner, and Marx associates, and other Jewish industrialists who are blazing the way to more humane relations between employers and workers were influenced by the Jewish religion. David Lubin, the father of the International Institute for Agriculture and, some say, of the American parcel post, did profess Jewish religious motivation. Bernard Baruch, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Jesse I. Straus, Leo Wolman, Isidor Lubin, Alexander Sachs, Mordecai Ezekiel, among the Jews assisting the President in his "New Deal," the great liberal on the supreme bench, Louis Brandeis, and the numerous other Jews in all parts of the world who are toiling for the social-economic betterment of the world may or may not be actuated by Jewish religious considerations.

Even those Jews who, like numerous Christians, con-

tend that the house of worship is a place of rest and of refuge from the sordid turmoil of the world and who deprecate harassing the worshiper with such questions as wages, unemployment, and group relations—even these are not as remote from social-economic interests as may appear. The chief obstacle to economic betterment is not human greed. Greed would, above all things, crave economic betterment. The real impediment is our emotional twists, our complexes, our repressions, our fixations, our infantile reaction patterns, our unconscious prejudices, our deceptive mental associations, or whatever modern psychology may call them. Any religious process which brings serenity to the soul and poise to the mind is a remedy for such warpings—call it grace or comfort or strength or uplift or hope or the peace that passeth understanding—call it what you will. Anything that conduces to psychic wholesomeness is a neutralizer of those resistances that stand in the way of a better social-economic order. If, as, and when Judaism can make “the heart firm trusting in the Lord,” it will contribute not a little to our progress out of our social-economic woes.

XI

ISLAM AND MODERN SOCIAL- ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

BY HENRY E. ALLEN

I WOULD have preferred to limit the subject of my paper to a single Moslem country, such as Turkey, rather than to attempt to deal with the whole complex Islamic world. Unfortunately, I am not permitted thus to limit my field.

Before we discuss the social and economic problems which today confront the Moslem world, it might be well to refresh our minds for a moment regarding the chief characteristics of the Islamic social system, and then, with this as a background, we may be better able to understand and evaluate the significance of some of the current trends.

Of Moslem society in an unspoiled state, whether it be in savage Africa or sophisticated India, one can say that it is extraordinarily God-conscious, that it is permeated, as are few other social systems, by a religious control which extends into every area of conduct. For the bona fide Moslem community laws are not made by congressmen, M.P.'s, or commissars whose authority is granted by their fellow-citizens; the great law or *Shari'a* of Islam rests upon sacred foundations, the Holy Koran, which is regarded as God's ultimate revelation to His people. Never is the Moslem permitted to forget his religion and his God. Allah is everywhere, and one must pray to Him five times daily—and without the intervention of a priest. There is one day a week upon which special prayers are offered, but this does not cause the Moslem to shower his adulations on God that one day, Friday, and forget Him the rest of the week. In

every town or city are beautiful mosques with graceful minarets pointing skyward high above the marts of commerce, constant reminders of the simplicity, majesty, and beauty of religion. To the mosque trudges the child to obtain the only education he is likely to receive—the study and repetition of God's holy word. For her ailing babe the worried mother hastens to the marabout to secure his prescription, a scribbled text from the Koran, to restore her child to health. And for the settlement of disputes and litigation the Moslem has recourse to the Kadi, a judge trained in holy writ and its commentaries.

Moslem society, which has these features constantly to remind it of God and religion, exhibits certain other distinctive characteristics which are traceable more or less directly to religious sources. Take, for example, the high estimation accorded the warrior, resulting from the belief that one who dies in combat with infidels will immediately attain paradise. Consider the contempt with which Moslems regard bankers and business men whose fortunes are acquired not through work or service but through usury in disobedience to Mohammed's injunction. In how many Moslem communities have financial and commercial enterprises been disdainfully left in the hands of the subject races—Jews, Greeks, Armenians!

Notice the emphasis placed upon generosity and sharing in Islam. The regular giving of alms, *zikat*, is one of the five important duties or Pillars of Islam. Great credit is his who donates generously to philanthropic enterprises or who gives freedom to a slave. Few religions can boast a greater proportionate wealth devoted to pious purposes than Islam, with its rich *Vakfs* or *Evkafs*, philanthropic endowments built up through the centuries as a result of innumerable individual gifts and bequests. Not for Moslems the selfish and anti-social accumulations of huge private fortunes. These were prevented not only by obligations of

generosity but by laws of inheritance, which granted to widows as well as children important shares in the estates of departed husbands.

A word must also be said concerning the high standards of morality and purity stressed by Islam. Moslems have always stood as uncompromising prohibitionists, and among the rigid Ikhwan of Arabia, puritanical tendencies outlaw even tobacco. As for sexual purity, one has only to point out the close seclusion of women within the sanctified enclosures of the harem to appreciate what extreme measures were taken to guard against promiscuity. In order to eliminate the degrading and anti-social practice of prostitution, Islam has preferred to legitimize polygamy, thereby granting to surplus women an opportunity to attain a respected status in society. I might remark here that as a matter of fact polygamy is much less frequent in Islam than people have often supposed. Monogamy has been frequent because of economic reasons. It costs more to support two wives than it does one, and except in the country, where wives make excellent economic help on the farm, to tote the wood or to help with the plow, Moslems tend to be monogamous. Incidentally, the factor of household and domestic tranquillity is also important.

Significant, too, in Islam's social order is the absence of caste and color distinctions. From the time of the Prophet men of every hue have co-operated in the propagation of the faith, and Islam has always insisted that all believers are equal in the sight of God.

Such in general can be said to be the chief characteristics of Moslem society, subject, of course, to variations according to local influences. By and large, however, the essential elements have been manifest throughout the world of Islam, a world in which religion has long exerted a commanding influence. Had it not been for two important factors, the Moslem world might still be poised and confi-

dent, unconfused by the cataclysmic events of the last century, more especially the last twenty-five years. These two factors are, first, *fatalism*, the development to an extremity of the concept of God's omnipresence and omnipotence, resulting in a fatalistic reliance upon the supernatural for all development, and a resigned acceptance of the *status quo*, presumably the product of God's will; second, *pride*, the growth of a false sense of superiority and security, based historically on the conquests and intellectual achievements of Islam, and causing Moslems to ignore or view with disdain the new discoveries and techniques of the long-despised Western world. Thus having cut itself off from internal and external stimulation, Islam has been shocked into a state of confusion by the terrific onrush of recent world-events.

It is not our purpose at this time to deal with the factors responsible for this chaos. They are largely bound up in the impact of West upon East. We may now merely point out that Islam was rudely awakened to its inferiority by the events of the World War and succeeding years. It found itself broken up into independent units, each of which had to determine for itself how it should adjust its life to the new era. The old Moslem sense of unity, symbolized by the Caliphate, was lost. If, in adjusting itself to the new age of industry, education, and emancipation, our Western world has become rather dazed, it is no wonder that Islam, with a much shorter time to make adjustments, casts blindly about and occasionally slips into absurdities.

By no means has the response to new conditions been uniform throughout the Moslem world, for that world contains groups in every stage of advancement. But the amazing thing is that no corner of the Moslem world, from Morocco to the Philippines, has escaped a severe wrenching. A possible exception may be noted in Arabia, where, in distant Yemen, the Imam Yahya seems to have main-

tained old customs in the face of modernization. And Afghanistan, after Amanullah's premature attempt to introduce new customs into his very backward kingdom, seems to have returned to medievalism, while her scattered cities and mountain fastnesses serve as places of refuge for bigoted Moslems of other countries who cannot tolerate the changes experienced in their own lands. In some instances the changes appear to be minor and superficial; in other cases, as in Turkey, they are sweeping, but usually it is the same process: a removal of religious control from one social area after another, and a gradual restriction of the domain of religion to a narrow sphere, that of the individual conscience. In Turkey the change has apparently gone the limit; the old institutions of Islam are cut off from exerting social influence and are attempting to keep alive with a status comparable to the church in the West. One cannot predict with any certainty that other Moslem countries will follow Turkey's lead in this regard, for it is conceivable that the religious forces in other parts of Islam will have time to come up to date and will not be shoved suspiciously aside as enemies of progress. One may note in this connection the new modernization of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, a great traditional center of Moslem learning, and the growth of new universities in India, particularly the University of Aligarh, and such movements as the Association of Moslem Young Men, or, as it is called, the Y.M.M.A., the Young Men's Moslem Association. These give indications that in Islam, outside of Turkey, there are forces stirring which are seeking to come to date. Certainly one thing seems predictable, and that is that any religious feature inherited from the past will not be allowed to stand if it interferes with the attainment of human satisfaction and the complete life.

Examples of Islam's social upheaval and its loosening of religious controls are so numerous that selection of illustra-

tions is difficult. Let us take first the fate of the holy law, or *Shari'a*, which has always been the foundation of Moslem jurisprudence. What changes it is undergoing as independent states set up their own constitutions along modern lines and as externally controlled regions find themselves ruled by people with totally different legal concepts! Egypt, for a number of years, has been attempting to patch up and modernize her antiquated legal system. Turkey, under the Committee of Union and Progress, tried many years to bring her *Medjelleh* up to date, but under the Ankara government gave up once and for all the attempt to renovate it. It is well known how, in 1924, she abandoned it completely and replaced it by modern codes from Switzerland, Italy, and Germany. In contrast to the notion that laws are based on God's revelations, the Turkish Law of Fundamental Organization, No. 85, Article 1, states that "The Government belongs unconditionally and without restriction to the nation. The system of administration is based on the fact that the people govern strictly and effectively, in fact and in person, their destinies." In the dozen or more Soviet Republics where the population is predominantly Moslem one can easily guess what has happened to the holy law under Moscow's guidance. The Soviet Republics and Turkey have also not hesitated to appropriate for state and social purposes the ready treasures of the *Vakfs* or pious foundations.

Education is no longer exclusively an affair of the mosque except in regions untouched by the new influences. Throughout the Islamic world one notes a growing eagerness for education, especially for the new learning from the West. Since the religiously trained *hodjas* are unable and unwilling to impart such knowledge, the political governments in the several countries are establishing secular school systems. The teachers in these schools are much more likely to derive their inspiration from Paris, Berlin,

London, or Moscow than they are from Mecca. It is an interesting thing that in Turkey the experiment is even being tried of co-education, which is, of course, revolutionary for the Moslem world.

Unprecedented activity is to be noted in the fields of health and sanitation. The old fatalistic attitude which accepted disease as the will of Allah is giving way before determined attacks of health societies and physicians versed in the medical science of the West. Marabouts and shrines of healing are being gradually supplanted by clinics and hospitals. Turkey has even used some of her religious leaders to write sermons for delivery in mosques during the holy month of Ramadan, pointing out that Moslems should defend themselves against tiny animals like microbes just as they defend themselves against dogs or wild beasts.

Another severe blow to the prestige of religious prescriptions is to be found in the growing interest of Moslems in the commercial and financial methods of the West. Instead of leaving these long-despised matters to Christians and Jews, Moslems are themselves learning how to carry on banking and trade. No longer are they deterred by piety from lending money at interest. Mastery of European business methods seems to offer them a challenge. I shall never forget the eagerness with which an Arab hotel-keeper in Beirut sought to outdo his foreign rivals with a hostelry which he regarded as thoroughly up to date. In order to escape competition from non-Moslems who are more experienced, an independent country like Turkey, which can get away with it, has passed laws making it virtually impossible for non-Turks to do business in the country. Financial pre-occupation has reached such a stage that adoption of the Sunday holiday in conformity with European practice is even considered so that Moslems may not have to lose Friday as a day of trading on the stock exchange!

Industrialization is not yet a severe problem so far as I can tell in the Islamic world. There are few countries of Islam which have made much progress in large-scale machine production. It is all too new to them, but before many years they will unquestionably be at it.¹ Much more interested are they at the present time in scientific agriculture. Many experimental farms are being set up in an attempt to bring better crops.

Another interesting development in the modern time is the decrease of nomadism. This, of course, was started centuries ago. The civilized city and town dwellers and farmers have gradually been pushing back the nomads, but now it seems to be going faster than ever. It is noteworthy that in Persia, where oil wells are developing, many nomads are for the first time finding settled occupations attending the wells and doing various other jobs which they find there.

As if the growing prestige of the business man were not bad enough, there are many indications that the career of the warrior offers far less attraction and prestige than formerly. Young Moslems do not show enthusiasm for military service, and one can imagine many an intrepid hero of the past turning in his grave as he hears modern apologists, particularly from India, emphasizing the inherent pacifism and tolerance of Islam, declaring that in Islam alone may one find the true practice of the spirit of Love!

In the realm of family life and the place of woman, dramatic changes are occurring. Every one is familiar with the rapid disappearance of veils and the new freedom accorded to women in various Moslem countries. While this has happened in cities where people are in touch with modern happenings, it will be many years before the status of conservative women in outlying districts will have per-

¹ Turkey's new Five-year Industrialization Plan is significant.

ceptibly changed. Perhaps as the Moslem woman becomes better acquainted with her sisters of the West, with their penchant for vulgarity and exhibitionism, there will be less enthusiasm for complete abandonment of privacy and maidenly modesty. And it is not easy to see bars and cabarets penetrating the Moslem world and apply the word "progress." The adoption of the new Swiss civil code in Turkey of course brought with it legalization of monogamy. Turkey, therefore, is the first country in Islam which has outlawed polygamy.

Those Moslem lands which have been most exposed to Western influences have been rather precipitate in their abandonment of traditional ways in their rush to become Europeanized. Much of the old undoubtedly had to go, but it is to be hoped that henceforth modifications are made wisely. In its hungry rush to sate itself with those viands which make up the pottage of modernity, Islam must take care not to barter away its birthright. The followers of Mohammed, with their fine traditions of chivalry and reserve, their high esteem of virtue and morality, and their acceptance of religion as a meaningful element in society, must not abandon these treasures, tarnished though they may appear, without a clear realization of what is being given up. Certainly Islam has something to share with humanity in its lack of racial prejudice and its ideal of generous, individual sharing for social welfare. In an era where the extremes of individualism and communism are striving for mastery, perhaps the Islamic order, with its sense of private ownership tempered by individual responsibility for community welfare may merit more careful attention than it has yet received, and may provide a harmonization of the opposing principles taught in Wall Street and the Kremlin.

XII

CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN SOCIAL- ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

BY ALVA W. TAYLOR

I COULD undertake my problem with a consideration of the prophetic message that we find in the teachings of Jesus relating to social issues, or from the standpoint of institutionalized and organized Christianity, but I think it would hardly be scholarly and just to do either one. You can no more part a religion, when you talk about its contribution to social progress, from its institutionalized life and its ideologies than you can part a mind from a body.

The recorded teachings of Jesus are brief. Thomas Jefferson segregated them, and you can read them very deliberately in an hour. There is within that brief body of recorded precepts a certain irreducible minimum that applies to social relationships and therefore to the social complex of which we are a part.

The prophets were nationalists. They attacked immediate political, social, and economic problems, and they did it with a concrete forthrightness. They were contemporary political and social reformers as well as religious revealers. But Jesus apparently saw the break-up of Jewish nationalism. He wept over Jerusalem that would, as he foresaw, be destroyed if it went on its way. He warned the people about the great disaster that was to fall upon them and tried to call them back to something that was more fundamental than nationalism. He took the national concept of it and broadened the term "Kingdom of God" into a universal brotherhood of righteousness. He replaced the stat-

utes of the law books with principles which he wrote "in fleshly tablets of the heart." He was a universalist, an internationalist, a humanist in the broadest sense of the term.

This irreducible minimum of his social precepts can be put under four heads. First, that human life—and the human personality—is a sacred thing. "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and forfeit his life?" "It were well for him if a millstone were hanged about his neck and he were thrown into the sea rather than that he should cause one of these little ones to stumble." "Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least ye did it not unto me." The least of men was of infinite worth.

What are we to do about war, crime, occupational disease, and preventable accident if we test our industrial civilization by that norm? We are killing almost as many people with this new-fangled device of civilization called the automobile as were killed in our army in France, where we had a couple of million men, to say nothing about industrial accidents within shops and factories.

What are we going to do about starvation? One week ago today, on behalf of the Church Emergency Relief Committee, I was in a mining village in the mountains of Tennessee, where there is mined as fine coal as is produced in the bituminous field, selling at the highest market price, veins four to five feet thick and no shafts—and yet there are 1,600 people living in that mountain-locked valley, as beautiful as nature can make one of her pieces, with 150 cases of pellagra; little children are dying of diseases of malnutrition, and the entire community is on the borderland of starvation. The mountains where coal is digged are dotted and flecked with these socially rotten spots. How can you maintain a healthy social order with these places of social infection within it?

The second is his teaching regarding brotherhood. Men

are *to be* brothers; not theoretical brothers; they are to act like brothers toward one another in all their relationships. That was his ideal, and lest his disciples should not do it was the agony of his last prayer. How much brotherhood is there in our Christian civilization? How deep is the sense of brotherhood in a divided church?

A superb Frenchman stood up at Geneva, after Versailles, and said that for five hundred years these two nations had lived side by side, never in peace, always at war or under a truce. One of them produced Luther and the other Calvin, but they have never, though they both profess to be Christian, lived one day together like Christians.

What about brotherhood in an arbitrarily managed industry? The spokesman for steel told a Senate committee that their control was "arbitrary." And did you notice the code they proposed the other day? When the Recovery Act says that labor must have the free right to choose its own form of organization for collective bargaining (that is in the statute) they have the temerity to propose that they shall utilize unions within their own organizations, known as company unions, and that collective bargaining shall be modified in all cases in steel by the meetings of the organization being held on the property of the employers and all final disposition of any difference of opinion must rest in the hands of the executive of the employers. Is that democracy or is it a form of industrial monarchy?

The third of these principles is that of service as the actuating motive in social conduct. That, of course, is completely revolutionary to a competitive society, to a society whose industrial and international life is built upon the principles of a laissez-faire ethics which means let every man do as he pleases and let everyone look out for himself. A great archbishop said that a merciful and omniscient providence has somehow so arranged things that

if every man looked out for himself and took care of his own, it would come out best for all of us. Try it at home with your family if you have five or six children!

Ours is a profit-motivated society. A young lawyer friend of mine sat in a committee of laymen recently and as they were munching sugar lumps waiting for real food he proposed to them this: Is it possible to do business on the basis of what we all recognize to be the Christian teaching? He didn't say what it was. And the twelve or fifteen laymen, among the chief of the lay churchmen in this city, voted unanimously, with the exception of this young lawyer, that it was impossible and impractical to undertake it. Unless, somehow, this laissez-faire principle, this profit-motivated, competitive social order can be modified in the name of fellowship, we shall not have any broad social impress of these teachings of Jesus upon it.

Jesus carried this actuating motive of service to the extent of saying that when the common good and your personal success or welfare conflicted, *you* must sacrifice and not sacrifice the other man. That would be a strange gospel in Wall Street or on the Board of Trade.

The fourth of these minima motives that Jesus laid down is the right of every man to an abundant life. "I come," he said, according to our old version, "that they may have life and have it more abundantly." The alternative reading given in the American revision reads, "I come that ye might have life and abundance." Whichever is correct you and I know, out of our practical experience, that until there is a certain abundance of the material equipment of life most of us cannot live very abundantly. All these creeds of which Professor Cronbach spoke—Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish—say that there must be a better distribution of wealth and an abolition of poverty as the greatest crime of social neglect that characterizes our modern civilization.

Dr. Hu, if I understood him correctly, said that in his country the great dominant faiths were not making any contribution. In our own land there are intellectuals without number, profound students of the civilization in which we live, who feel that the dominant religions in our country may respond to the changing order under which we are living to save themselves, but they are making no contribution to the change.

Well, I cannot agree with them. It is a little difficult, when you try to write the story of the influence of Christianity in nineteen centuries upon Western civilization, to differentiate objectively and determine just where changing civilization changed the ideology and organized forms of Christianity and where this leaven of the gospel that Jesus talked about changed the ideology and the changing forms. Every great new idea seeks an institution. The fable is told of the devil meeting the Angel Gabriel and the Angel Gabriel saying, "I will beat you. I will take a great new idea and put it into the minds of men." And the devil said, "You won't beat me, because I will institutionalize it." Religious institutions, like all other institutions, even those of education, tend to run a gamut of life and then to ossify, or to get senile, but not always to die.

Protestantism in its effort at reform rebelled so against authoritarianism that it left us pretty stark individualists. That worked very well in this country when the country was new. I was brought up on the prairies. If you didn't take care of yourself even your prayers would not avail much. And in the years that have passed since I was a lad on the treeless prairies, without a house in sight, to this day in Chicago, there has been a millennium of change.

Judge Gary, when we were talking to him about the twelve-hour day, said that when he was a boy on his father's farm he worked twelve and fourteen hours and it didn't hurt him. As if there was no difference between

working fourteen hours on a farm, driving your own team, governing your own actions, resting a while, and standing twelve hours before a roaring furnace of a red-hot rolling mill! In that is a parable of the change we have made under an "arbitrary" plan of industrial management.

Our civilization has stepped up more in fifty years than previously in a thousand years, and we are trying to live ethically by the individualistic concepts of the days of Thomas Jefferson.

Unless we can negotiate this change and recognize that we have moved up from a primitive to a complex social organization our great enterprises will become our undoing. Unless, somehow or other, the church itself can put the social passion into its litany, social justness into its sense of what is respectable, can somehow or other change the social mores, there isn't much hope of the man in the pew making the change. After all the masses of us are fixed in our moral outlook, our spiritual concepts, our social attitudes, by the mores, the social customs, the laws, the traditions, the things that are. The masses of men are busy earning their daily bread and are so supremely concerned about their daily tasks that they have little time to think about these things; and psychologists are telling us now that the great majority of the people do not possess the capacity to do much original or continuous thinking.

I think these simple principles of Christianity have, in nineteen hundred years, made their contribution. We have seen the emancipation of women, and of slaves, a redemption of childhood to freedom, a larger sense of human worth, the inauguration of democracy, a larger measure of brotherhood, and the masses share more equitably, even if unequally. All these things came first in the Christian world. The leaven has worked slowly, but it has worked.

We have seen the renaissance of learning, the break-up of political tyranny: They came first in the Christian world.

Practically all the great fundamental changes have come in this Christian world, and yet, strange as it appears, there is a paradox, or almost a direct contradiction, too, because this Western Christian world has been the most rugged in its individualistic expression and in its exploitation of its fellows. It has been the most ruthless in its imperialism, in the maladjustments of human living that created the palace by the side of the slum, in its maldistribution of the great new gains of wealth, in its political corruption, in everything else that relates to ruthless exploitation by the powerful, the successful, and the fortunate, of those who have less power, less success, and less fortune. I am willing to say that the Western world has been characterized by a greater ruthlessness than has any other part of the modern world.

Maybe we have clung to these benign principles, these healing, curing, medicating spiritual and social principles that are in the simple precepts of Jesus because we were rather unconsciously aware of our ruthlessness.

Now we have the social creed of the liberal rabbis, and that of the Federal Council of Churches, adopted by practically every great Protestant denomination, enlarged and reaffirmed at our recent quadrennial in Indianapolis. The encyclicals of two popes, last year and forty years ago, set forth the social idealism of the great Catholic brotherhood. All three of these pronouncements are as prophetic as a Jeremiah or an Isaiah.

How far are they operative? Farther perhaps than many think; at least in their influence on the ministry and the message. Such things must work under the law of the leaven. When the disciples, amazed at the radical statements of Jesus in the story of the rich young man and in his teaching upon divorce asked how it could be, he reminded them that they could not do it at once, that it was only as *grace* was acquired that it could be done at all.

The woman took the leaven and hid it in a measure of meal until it leavened the whole. The leavening process goes on though it seems to work very slowly. Then, to change the figure, like the coming of a harvest it may be consummated quickly in some great social change. We need not grow discouraged. The mills of the gods grind slowly and exceedingly fine, and civilization is a long, long time.

The "New Deal" seems to me to be an incident that admirably illustrates the thing that ought to be constantly taking place. When we endeavor practically to put into the machinery of our common living some control, some governance, some capacity to become the pilots of our own affairs, the engineers of our own destiny, we are on the move. The old *laissez-faire*, competitive order must yield to readjustments on behalf of the common good. Senator Borah said last winter that four per cent of the American people control eighty per cent of our wealth. Senator Davis said eighty-six per cent of this rich nation are in poverty; they never possessed more than their household goods or perhaps a cottage. It is time we awakened to the need of some social engineering.

John Ruskin said, "In all things competition is the law of anarchy and death, and in all things co-operation is the law of brotherhood and of life." Co-operation! The modern international conference begins to spell it. Remember that for sixty centuries nations have been unable even to meet, and now they can. Co-operation! That is the term brotherhood spells, the thing that Jesus taught. In the measure that our churches learn to practice it themselves, in the measure that the pulpit induces the pew to put the principle of co-operation into practical enterprise, in the measure that the "New Deal" succeeds, with all the errors that will be made and all the failures that will be registered and all the difficulties that will have to be bridged, we will change the social mind by that much away from the con-

viction that an omniscient providence has somehow so arranged things that if every fellow seeks his own it will come out best for all of us. Unless we take charge of our interrelationships and try to govern them on behalf of the common good it is going to come out badly for most of us. We can, if we will, set civilization apace in social progress with that we have accomplished mechanically and industrially in the last half-century. We suffer the "social lag," in no small part, because we have not tuned the Christian conscience up with the social imperative of Jesus' teaching.

III. WORLD-RELIGIONS AND INTER- CULTURAL CONTACTS



XIII

ISLAM AND INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS

BY HENRY E. ALLEN

IF ANY one of you were assigned the task of studying Christianity to find some sort of cultural picture of it, and you had to take as widely diverse regions as Abyssinia and Chile and our own New England, I think you would feel that you were up against a difficult proposition. You may then be able to appreciate my situation when I am attempting to do something of that sort for Islam, which, of course, includes not only the most barbaric of new converts in central Africa but people of a high degree of culture in such centers as Cairo, Damascus, and the great centers of India. Islam presents wide diversities—geographical, credal, and cultural—and that is not surprising, because Islam is and always has been an expanding missionary faith. Its control and its ideas have spread over wide areas, many of which, such as Persia, have cultural histories extending far back into remote antiquity. And when a new religion spreads itself over such localities one cannot expect a complete eradication of the indigenous cultures of those regions. The marvel is, rather, that one finds as much cultural uniformity in Islam as one does find, particularly since the practices of Islam were so largely of a desert origin.

Certain it is that the lands which radiate West, North, and East from Arabia display surprising cultural similarities. These similarities, I suppose, are explainable partly by their proximity to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; partly by the fact that they were conquered almost contemporaneously in the early centuries of Islam; but pre-

eminently because they utilize a common language, Arabic.

Farther away from the holy cities, in the more distant regions of Islam, one finds that the Arabic tongue and Arabic customs have not completely supplanted the local speech and customs. Thus, for example, in the land of the Berbers in North Africa, in Anatolia, in Persia, and Turkestan, the people have not been completely Arabicised. Many of their old dialects and customs have survived, and one finds that Islam resembles a coat of paint or the proverbial veneer which is now beginning to crack, and even to peel off.

So long as Islam represented power, and adherence to Islam brought prestige, these distant and usually more recent converts to the religion were eager to conform to it. They accepted the simple Moslem dogma. They shaped their manner of life to conform to the sacred law of the *Shari'a*. They made the pilgrimage to the holy cities and submerged their own national peculiarities and ambitions to share in the great religious super-state. To be a Moslem meant an honorable status, and as he traveled in backward, non-Moslem lands, the Moslem felt that he was backed by a powerful organization, represented not by the Union Jack or the Stars and Stripes, but by the prestige of a powerful Caliph, a Defender of the Faithful. The pride and sense of superiority exhibited by Moslems in the face of other religions and civilizations—Christian, Hindu, and the rest—have carried Islam far and have rendered it almost impermeable to the attacks and arguments of non-Moslem missionaries. Islam, with its haughty aloofness, was long able to keep rival civilizations at a distance. You remember that even as late as the latter part of the last century, when imperialist Europe was seriously threatening the Moslem lands of Asia, Abdul Hamid II, the Sultan of Turkey, "Abdul the damned," as he was so often called,

was able to lead a pan-Islamic movement which staved off for more than a third of a century Islam's eventual coming to terms with the new day.

It may be of interest at this point to list very briefly some of the important channels or ducts which have brought the West to Islam, which have caused Islam to feel the force of this new age, gradually convincing Islam of its need of renovation. First, and historically the most important of these channels, one must list the military class of the Turkish Empire. These military men of Turkey began to have Western training and military equipment in the latter part of the eighteenth century. You remember that after the defeat of Turkey by Russia in the 1770's, Turkey was convinced of her inferiority in war, and as a result of this defeat by newly Westernized Russian troops, she decided that she, too, must adopt Western technique. After the disastrous treaty of 1774 Turkish troops began to be drilled according to the Western mode. Even the reactionary Sultan, Abdul Hamid, to whom I just referred, who was on the throne from 1876 to 1908, exposed an Achilles' heel by allowing his own army to be trained according to Western patterns. You remember the achievement of that Westernized army—the revolution of 1908, which overthrew the old Ottoman despotism and brought on the new régime of the young Turks.

Another important channel of Westernization was travel and study in Europe on the part of the young Moslems, chiefly Turks, who thus came into touch with liberal Western thought in Paris and other centers, but were frequently denied permission to return to their native lands because of their radical ideas. This channel became increasingly important, after small beginnings, shortly before the middle of the nineteenth century, roughly about the time which the Turks call the Tanzimat period. And at the present time the tendency of young Algerians and other citizens in

the French possessions of Africa to study in Paris presents interesting possibilities which we shall touch upon later when we consider the cultural split-up of the Moslem world.

Two other important agencies for conducting Western ways into Islam were, first, the foreign residents who lived in large centers, such as Istanbul, under the capitulation privileges, furnishing actual exhibits of Western ways to urban Moslems and introducing Western goods and Western tools; and second, the Christian missionaries. Up to the period of the World War most of these missionaries ministered not to Moslems but rather to Christian minorities, the Armenians and the Greeks. Only a few of the French missions, through their schools, succeeded in winning the confidence of the Moslem citizens and overcame the suspicion that these Western enterprises were some sort of imperialistic scheme working ultimately for the destruction of the Moslem community. But since the war, as some of the Moslem nations have grown surer of themselves, many of these old fears have been liquidated, and Moslems as a rule have welcomed foreign schools in the absence of adequate ones of their own. But they are always careful, wherever they control the government, to restrict the teaching of the Christian religion.

Since the war several new factors have helped to accelerate Westernization in Islam. I need only remind you that we have, in the first place, new means of transportation and communication—railroads, highways, air travel, telegraph, telephone, and radio; in the second place, agencies of a visual character, such as the moving pictures, printed or photographed material of every description, all of which reach more persons as a result of child and adult education; and in the third place, a new and highly unpredictable factor, the establishment under Soviet supervision of model republics, such as Uzbekistan in the heart of central Asia,

on the borders of Persia, Afghanistan, and the Moslem far-western provinces of China. If these examples of the Soviet system, these model states and cities, make favorable impressions on Moslems who visit modern Samarkand or Tashkent, one cannot tell what the effect will be on Asia's millions. Our preoccupation with Russian treatment of Christianity must not blind us to the skilful Soviet propaganda in these Moslem regions beyond the Caspian Sea.

It is not surprising that Moslem civilization has been shaken loose from its foundations as never before in its history. Although Moslems began to fear the worst when they witnessed the succession of Turkish defeats in the Balkan Wars and elsewhere, it was not until the humiliation of the World War that utter demoralization set in. The failure of the Sultan-Caliph's call to Holy War in 1914 was painful evidence of the divided allegiance of Moslem peoples. Again, there was the bitterness of the Arab revolution in 1917, that conflict in which the redoubtable T. E. Lawrence played such a picturesque rôle. And so the popular ideals of national self-determination of peoples gradually shattered Islam into a jumble of jealously competing groups, each seeking its own local or national salvation. The new Turkish nationalist government, which was set up in 1920, realized that any further attempt to guide and protect the destinies of the Moslem world as a whole could only be a liability and lead to unnecessary complications. In 1924 this Turkish government did away once and for all with the Ottoman Caliphate, despite the intercession and energetic efforts of Indian Moslems to preserve it.

There was now little prestige in being a Moslem, and those states which had racial biographies outside of Arabia and cultural histories of their own began to re-emphasize their own particular national heroes and glories and to place the blame for their current degradation on the dead-

ening influence of Arab medievalism. Berbers, Turks, Persians, and to some extent Egyptians began to sing again the praises of their pre-Islamic ancestors. Countries which had their own indigenous languages resurrected forgotten literatures and started new movements in the vernacular tongue. The paint or veneer of Islamic culture began to peel off in huge chunks.

We may say, then, that the Moslem world, formerly bound together by common religious affiliations, now appears as a heterogeneous assortment of national or quasi-national states. Each group is charting its own course and reacting in its own peculiar way to the political or cultural environment in which it finds itself. The northerly line of independent states—Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan—are forced to seek some sort of equilibrium between four important forces. Those forces include (1) nationalistic and racial self-consciousness, (2) Westernization according to the European pattern, (3) Westernization according to the communist Russian patterns, and (4) the still powerful heritage of Islamic culture.

In the North African territories, westward of Egypt, European and Arabic influences seem to be engaged in a deadly struggle for the cultural allegiances of Libyans, Tunisians, Algerians, and Moroccans. From the present view of things Europe seems to have a fair chance to win. The tendency of many young Africans to study in France, and the service of the young men in French armies, coupled with the French encouragement of Berber renaissance and the traditional aloofness of Morocco from the rest of the Moslem world—all this gives one reason to feel that Egypt and the Arabic states must work fast and hard if they are to preserve these North African states for Islamic culture.

But there are the states radiating out from Arabia, where Islamic culture, fortified by the popular use of the

Arabic language, seems to have a better chance of survival. Here we must include not only the states of Arabia itself, but Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. With this bloc we must also include the Moslems of the East Indies, for though these East Indian folk originally received their Islam from India in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the new paths of commerce have tended to bind them more closely to their Western brothers in Arabia and Egypt. Certainly the migration of Arabs to islands such as Java, and the mass pilgrimages of these East Indians to Mecca are important links tending to hold the East Indies in the Islamic fold even though there is severe competition from Christendom, Hinduism, and indigenous nationalist movements. The little state of Yemen in Arabia holds itself somewhat aloof, reluctant to depart from its traditional conservatism.

The 70,000,000 Moslems of India present a peculiar problem as a result of their close proximity to Hindu civilization and the control of Britain. Already their leaders have done much to raise the intellectual and aesthetic appreciation of Islam. Scholars like Khuda Buksh and the late Amir Ali illustrate what minds they are capable of producing. From what we can now detect Indian Islam will develop along different lines from those of the Arab-influenced countries, but because of its self-conscious opposition to Hinduism and Christendom it will be a long-lived upholder of the spirit of Islam.

As for Islam and the Soviet Republics, the cause seems a hopeless one. The Moslems there are sore afflicted and no help cometh. If there still existed a Caliphate, or if the Turks of Ankara were interested in succoring their fellow-Turks beyond the Caspian, there might be some help. But since the Red Armies ten years ago overthrew that abortive uprising in Bokhara led by the discredited Turk Enver Pasha, the Soviets have had their own way. It is just

a surmise, but I wonder if Turkey's decision to terminate the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 at a period when the Soviets were beginning their forcible communizing in central Asia may not have been influenced by practical problems of Turco-Soviet relations.

From what we have seen thus far the prospects of Islam seem far from bright, yet there are indications that some semblance of religious and cultural unity may be regained. Moslem congresses have been held in Mecca and Cairo, to try to reach some solution of the caliphate question, and in December, 1931, a meeting was held in Jerusalem which may result in the establishment there of a Moslem university. Although from these gatherings thus far there has been little tangible in the way of results, at least precedents are being established and thought is being stimulated. Common attitudes are being built up and the world is being treated to the unusual sight of the rival Sunni and Shia branches of Islam ceasing their strife to confer together.

The more aggravations which are presented to Islam by such things as Zionism in Palestine and French high-handedness in Syria, the more chance there will be of Islam reviving and reuniting for a common enterprise. The energetic activities of young Moslems in Egypt and the Near East, and the growth of a wide-awake and effective Moslem press cause one to feel that an Islamic revival is far from an impossibility in the bloc of Arabic-speaking states.

Our concluding summary of this cultural survey must reveal the status of enfeebled Islam somewhat as follows: First, outlying areas in such places as Russia and the Balkans, where Islam seems doomed to extinction. Second, regions such as Yemen and Afghanistan, where Islam holds firm but is relatively stagnant. Third, regions where local and national conditions are reshaping Islam into forms

which may fit in with nationalist programs, giving it an institutional status comparable to that of the Christian church in Western nations. Examples of this, of course, may be found in Turkey, Persia, and some of the North African communities. Fourth, regions where national differences are not so vital as to break up an essential community of interest and where common customs, a common language, and, shall we add, common grievances, may preserve for the future the main features of the inherited Islamic civilization. Here, of course, we have in mind Egypt and the Arab states of the Near East. Fifth and last, we must mention those redoubtable Moslem missionaries not centered in any one locality but scattered throughout the world—in India, Africa, Europe, and America—who are carrying on with thinned ranks the missionary tradition of Islam. Here are no defeatists ready to concede the downfall of Islam, but a rugged band of aggressive ambassadors eager to restore the spiritual glories of Islam and anxious to share with the world the religious treasures which have come to them.

In this period when religions everywhere are confronted with the common dangers of indifference and materialism, Islam, if it follows its enlightened leaders, may be among the first to rally itself and help lead the way to a new kingdom of world-brotherhood and righteousness.

XIV

BUDDHISM AND INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS

BY JAMES BISSETT PRATT

THE theme proposed is a large one. As I understand, it is intended to cover the various changes taking place in Buddhism as a result of the narrowing of the world. The missionary religions are exposed, as stay-at-home religions are not, to contact with new and strange ideas and institutions. Compare, for example, the story of the three missionary religions with Hinduism, Confucianism, and Shinto. Against the excessive influence of foreign contacts two of the missionary religions, Christianity and Islam (and I might add Judaism as well) have been to a great extent defended by the armor of authoritative and divinely inspired scripture. Of this armor Buddhism, in a sense, has none. The word of the Buddha, indeed, is authoritative, and faith in it is inculcated; but specifically what is the word of the Buddha? It is something too great and too living to be found in specific statements. None of the Buddhist canon is considered infallible and authoritative in the sense of the Bible or the Koran; you cannot prove things to a Buddhist by quoting chapter and verse. Moreover, the almost exclusively moral interest of Southern Buddhism and the monistic philosophy of Northern Buddhism have produced in their followers an attitude of large tolerance toward all sorts of new ideas which the enthusiastic representatives of Christianity and Islam, intent upon certain particular cosmological or historical doctrines, could not consistently cultivate. It has, therefore, come about that in its invasion of new lands

Buddhism has taken up and absorbed into itself much of the culture and some of the moral and religious ideas which it has found.

Early in its history, as it spread into Bengal, it adopted a liberal and sympathetic attitude toward the Shaktism of that region even to the unfortunate extent of incorporating into itself some of the ideas and practices of this very inferior religion, which, later on, it carried with it into Tibet and Mongolia. In Burma it found the natives worshipping a multitude of local gods—the “nats” of today and their predecessors. Instead of attacking this custom as evil superstition, it adopted the local gods, partially moralized and civilized them, and made them subservient to the Buddha. In Ceylon, Siam, Cambodia, Champa, and Java it had been preceded by Hinduism. It therefore made friends with the Hindu deities, and began at once reducing them, in perfectly friendly ways, to a position of innocuous desuetude. In China, it took on many changes—borrowing gods from Taoism, and certain excellent forms of conventional morality from Confucianism, making the gods into Buddhist Pusas and subordinating the maxims to its deeper moral insight. From China as a whole it borrowed much of its ancient culture and its rapidly developing art, and incorporated these into itself so completely that it carried them with it when it went on into Japan. In Japan it found a new people, with new ideas of group loyalty, a new religion, and new needs. It brought great things to Japan but it also gained great things from Japan. Not only did it accept the various kami of Shinto—identifying many of them with its own lesser mythical beings—but, in response to the example and the needs of the Japanese, it modified its own rather excessive individualism, and identified itself with the social life of the people and the political solidarity of the state. Instead of confining its energies to the salvation of individuals from the misery of *samsara*, it exerted

itself in magnificently efficient fashion in extending Chinese and Indian culture, in encouraging various practical communal efforts, and in embodying its ancient precepts of love in humanitarian institutions.

But once solidly settled in and adapted to the six or seven lands which it inhabits today, it began to grow old and to cease exhibiting that elasticity and power of adaptation which had so distinguished it during its days of expansion. Was this merely a seeming loss, due to the fact that it was dwelling in a fairly static environment, in which there was little opportunity of further adaptation? Or was it a real loss? Had the life-force, the ability to change and grow, really died out of it? Had this question been asked a century ago there would have been no means for answering it. For the long sleep of the world's Middle Ages was not yet broken in the East, and no new intercultural contacts had been made to test it. There was, indeed, one piece of empirical evidence—of a negative sort, to be sure, but one of some significance: Buddhism was content to live on pleasantly in the lands it had won, with no thought of further missionary activity. Japan had been added to the Buddhist realm by the beginning of the eighth century. After that, during the long age of Moslem expansion and during the early years of the Christian missionary movement, no Buddhist seems to have thought of carrying his religion any farther than it had gone. Such a static attitude is evidence of much internal change since the days of the founder and his immediate disciples, of the great Asoka and Prince Mahindra who converted Ceylon; of much change since the days of Bodhidharma and Hiuen Tsiang, of Dengyo Daishi and Kobo Daishi. But even by this stay-at-home policy Buddhism could not permanently avoid the test of continued life and adaptability. For if Buddhism did not go to the West, the West came to it. Western culture, modern science, the Christian religion

began feeling their way eastward, and soon were rushing into the Buddhist lands. And the question now demanding an answer is, How has Buddhism responded to these new cultural contacts?

Having stated the question, I wish I might sit down and leave you to answer it. Indeed, though I dare not as yet sit down, I fear that in the end I shall have to leave the question for you, or someone wiser than I, to answer. The question is one of enormous difficulty, and its answer is shrouded in so much uncertainty that I really doubt whether anyone in our generation could give it a definite and certain answer. Such being our ignorance—at any rate *my* ignorance—we can but feel our way in the dark, and stake out a few definite lines as a beginning. And first of all it is necessary to make distinctions. The Buddhist world is a large and a varied one, and it is most likely that no statement involving detail which might be true of one of the Buddhist lands would hold for all of them. Let us begin with the easiest. Though my knowledge of Tibet, Mongolia, and Nepal is most meager, I do not hesitate to assert that in those lands the contact of Buddhism with Western culture and the effects it has felt from such contact are so slight as to be, for our purposes, negligible. Much the same thing must be said of Korea and eastern Indo-China. The so-called Buddhism of Tongkin and Assam is hardly Buddhist in anything but name; while the Buddhism of Korea is mostly confined to a few monasteries in isolated mountainous regions where the influence of Western culture is slight; and so far as Korean Buddhism has come in contact with it, this has been due to Japanese influence, and hence whatever of relevance has happened in Korea is really a part of the question of Japanese Buddhism. The four southern lands, Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia, may be considered together, while China and Japan will each form a separate problem.

For the reasons explained in my earlier lecture—on Buddhism and modern science—I do not think that contact with the West has had any important effect on the ideology of the southern lands. The great majority of the monks in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, and Cambodia are decidedly ignorant; and the learned minority directs its researches almost entirely to the Pali texts. The present condition of education in Ceylon and Siam leads one to hope that the next generation of monks may produce something new, but as yet the hope, so far as I am aware, remains little more than a hope. (I am speaking, be it remembered, about ideas and theory, not about good works.) In Ceylon there is a decided movement of the laity to breathe into Buddhism a new spirit of life. But this movement, thus far at any rate, has done little or nothing to develop and expand Buddhist thought in response to the new points of view coming in from the West. Not that the lay Buddhist thinkers are ignorant of these new points of view. But their efforts in relation to them, so far as they make any, consist in pointing out certain more or less distant analogies between recent scientific hypotheses and ancient Buddhist teachings. For the rest they are content to repeat the old pious formulas, psychological analyses, and the no-self doctrine, and to reiterate that the Buddha's teaching of love and peace is all the sad world needs. I take several of the leading Buddhist journals, and I must confess that they make rather monotonous reading. As the Reverend Sokei-Ann Sasaki writes, in the letter from which I quoted in my last lecture, "we must understand that Buddhism speaks truth but by ancient method."

So far as I can discover, the ideas of democracy, of internationalism, of pacifism, so prevalent in the world today, have had very little effect upon the Buddhism of the southern Buddhist lands, and have received very little reinforcement from it. Of course, many Buddhists—especially

lay Buddhists—are interested in these matters, but the interest did not grow out of their Buddhism nor has it been effected through Buddhism. Buddhism has always stood, in theory at least, for pacifism, and also for democracy or something like it, within the monastic order, and doubtless, therefore, it has in a general way predisposed the minds of its followers to favor these ideals of our time. But further than this I can see little mutual influence between the new ideas and the old religion.

A more positive response is to be noted in Southern Buddhism for the world-movements of education and philanthropy. In Ceylon it was the Theosophists, especially Colonel Olcott, who began the revival in Buddhist education, but it has been carried on by the Ceylonese Buddhists. The reason why Ceylon led the other Southern Buddhist lands in a movement of educational reform is to be found in the fact that owing to the schools set up by the British government and by Christian missionaries, the ancient method of education in the Buddhist monasteries had gradually died out and the more loyal Buddhists, under the encouragement of the Theosophists, felt that if the younger generation were to be saved to the religion of their fathers something must be done to give them a Buddhist education. In Burma and Cambodia the old monastic system of education has never been abandoned, though gradually Buddhist schools of a more modern type are being substituted for it. In Siam the Buddhist government maintains excellent schools, and religious education (consisting chiefly of the inculcation of Buddhist morality) is provided. The large increase in the proportion of young people who are being educated today in fairly modern Buddhist schools, rather than in mission and government institutions or in the antiquated monastic schools conducted by monks who know but little of modern ideas, must have its effect upon the coming generations. One ef-

fect which this, and the general psychology of our generation, is already having is to make Buddhism less monastic, and to put a larger part of the control of its activities and thought within the hands of its laymen. Whether the new education will result in further developments within Buddhism or will merely produce a larger number of religious agnostics remains to be seen.

Certainly the advent of Christianity in the East has had a considerable effect in rousing the slumbering loyalties of Buddhists in all lands, and making more explicit their evaluation of their own religion. Particularly in Ceylon is this to be seen. There a movement was started in the eighties for the defense of Buddhism and its rejuvenation, which has been increasing in strength and extent ever since. A number of societies have been organized both in Ceylon and in Burma for these purposes, by far the most important and effective of which is the Maha Bodhi Society, founded in 1891 by a layman who took the name of Dhammapala, and who for 40 years was both the heart and the brains of the Ceylonese Buddhist revival. In Burma the revival movement was led and inspired by a similar burning personality—a monk named Ledi Sadaw, who, unfortunately for the movement, died in 1923.

To Christianity Southern Buddhism owes not only the stimulus of rivalry, but also several of the methods which it uses in prosecuting its work. Traveling preachers occasionally go about exhorting the villagers to a more intelligent form of Buddhism. The Young Men's Buddhist Association was founded in Ceylon in 1898; and a few years later the Buddhist Sunday School. Several of the Buddhist organizations publish Buddhist journals; and once a year the various societies unite in an annual "Congress of Buddhist Associations in Ceylon." The renewal of missionary activity and the reintroduction of Buddhism into India is

cherished as an inspiring ideal. But of this I shall speak later.

The aim of the Buddhist revival is not only to maintain and spread the religion but to bring about a radical change within modern Buddhism itself, or, as the reformers conceive it, a return to the original spirit of the founder. As Mr. Dhammapala expressed it to me twenty years ago, the purpose of the Maha Bodhi Society—and this would hold for most of the reform movement—is to restore the original active and unselfish nature of Buddhism. This means (1) “unremitting alertness against the innumerable and subtle temptations of sloth, ignorance, lust, anger, envy, avarice, pride and the rest; and (2) constant endeavor to help others into a knowledge of the truth with its resulting peace and joy.” The emphasis upon unselfishness and activity which characterize the reform movement is in part an intentional comment upon the inactivity and self-centeredness of the monastic life. The monks of both Ceylon and Burma, with a few shining exceptions, have taken little part in the reform movement, and their indifference and disapproval, especially in the earlier days, has been returned with interest. Certainly no Christian missionary could be more unsparing in invectives against Buddhist monasticism than was Dhammapala at the time of my last interview with him; and it was against them that a large part of his earlier preaching was directed. The leadership of active and living Buddhism in Ceylon and to a considerable extent in Burma is rapidly passing to the laymen.

Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, like the Hinayana of the southern lands, has, apparently, been but slightly affected, so far as its ideology is concerned, by world-movements in science and philosophy, in democracy and internationalism. But in China, as in the southern lands, there is a

movement toward greater activity, a more efficient expression of the love and pity which Gotama taught, and toward a more enlightened faith among Buddhists and an extension of it to non-Buddhists. Chinese Buddhism has always exercised a certain amount of helpfulness; but, largely as a response to the example of a new and rival religion, it is taking of late a slightly more social and philanthropic attitude. As in the southern lands, the reform movement is largely (though not so exclusively) in the hands of the laymen.

The reform seems to have originated as an incident in the new sense of nationalism that began to be felt by the Chinese in the Boxer times. The intolerable dominance of the European within their land brought with it new pride in various forms of Chinese culture, and new loyalty to all three of the religions of China. Even Taoism had something of a revival, but the two more intellectual religions—Confucianism and Buddhism—naturally appealed most to the leaders of the new nationalistic movement. Various societies for the defense, purification, and propaganda of Buddhism have been founded during the present century, and though many of them have been short-lived, some of them persist.

This Chinese movement puts great emphasis upon scholarship and education. Several schools have been founded for the enlightened and careful study of the Mahayana Sutras and their philosophy, with the hope thereby both of raising the intellectual level of the monks and of training leaders, lay and clerical, for the spreading of a better knowledge of Buddhism among the masses. The movement stresses active service as well as quiet meditation. In the suffering and disillusion which the Chinese have had to face since the birth of the Republic, Buddhism has proved a solace to many.

It would be very easy, however, to overestimate the

strength of the revival of Buddhism in China, and the effect which Western thought and culture have had upon the development of the Mahayana. The Chinese are not a deeply religious or meditative people, and I cannot feel that Buddhism was ever very well adapted to them. The effects which intercultural contacts have had thus far upon Chinese Buddhism seem to me very slight when viewed upon the vast background of the Chinese masses.

The influence of the new cultures of the West upon Buddhism has been very much greater in Japan than in any other land. At the time of the "opening up of Japan" to the rest of the world, the downfall of the Shogun and the restoration of the emperor, Japanese Buddhism was in a moribund condition. It had become in part amalgamated with Shinto, it had been made in a sense the state religion, it was, on the one hand, pampered, on the other controlled by the Shogun's government. As a consequence, when the Shogunate was overthrown, government aid withdrawn, Shinto supported in its place, and a new and energetic religion, Christianity, admitted, things looked dark indeed for Buddhism. They looked still darker in the immediately subsequent years, when a large portion of the population, losing its regard for its own culture and filled with enormous enthusiasm for the new things of the West, began to spurn its ancient faiths and to accept the religion of the wonderful Westerners with gusto. Fortunately for the preservation of the ancient culture of Japan, this half-blind enthusiasm for the new lasted only a few years when a reaction set in; and with this reaction a chastened Buddhism, under the guidance of wise leaders, began its revival—a movement which has continued to this day.

The revival has been both intellectual and practical. The new knowledge of Western philosophy that streamed into Japan with other things Western had the double effect of enriching Buddhist thought for a few, and of in-

creasing respect for it on the part of many. Professor Anesaki tells us that

to their surprise and delight, the young Buddhists found the Buddhist conception of the world as a perpetually flowing process and the continuity of Karma had anticipated the Darwinian theory of evolution; that the dialectical method of Buddhist philosophy in analysing all conceptions and dispelling the idea of permanent entity was quite congenial to Spencerian agnosticism; that the Hegelian logic of reaching a higher synthesis over the concepts of being and non-being was exactly the kernel of the Tendai doctrine of the Middle Path. Whether correct or not, these ideas provided a strong incentive to a conviction that Buddhism was not a mere relic of the past but had a mission for the future.¹

Contact with Western philosophy contributed much more toward increasing the confidence of Buddhist thinkers than toward stimulating and developing Buddhist thinking. Anesaki tells us, to be sure, that some members of the Shin sect have been influenced by contemporary ideas about the glory of instinct to develop some very un-Buddhistic views in favor of carnal love. But this is hardly to the point. As we saw in my last lecture, a few members of Kegon, Shingon, and Zen seem to have been influenced by Western naturalism, but the group is small and thus far negligible. There has been an effort on the part of a few Japanese to reinterpret the Mahayana philosophy in the light of Western idealistic concepts, especially of Hegelianism; but this effort has been isolated and very limited. At least so far as my information goes, the great majority of Japanese thinkers who keep in touch with the development of contemporary European and American philosophy have cut themselves loose from Buddhism, and in their philosophic writing base themselves entirely on Western sources. In this the contrast between the Buddhist and Hindu thinkers of our day is notable; for there is a large and energetic movement in India to develop the Vedanta philosophy in relation to contemporary Western move-

¹ *History of Japanese Religion*, pp. 261-62.

ments, both idealistic and realistic. Such a thing as this is extremely rare among Japanese thinkers—at any rate among those who write in English or whose books have been translated. Buddhism, I should say, is today much less sensitive to new intellectual contacts than is Hinduism. The Japanese and Chinese thinkers who know the new usually discard the old; while those who still write and teach Buddhist philosophy either know little of Western thought, or believe that no detail, even in the exposition of Buddhism, could be improved by modification. Once more “we must understand that Buddhism speaks truth but by ancient method.”

Whether contemporary Japanese Buddhism has been influenced in any way by the modern ideas of democracy, pacifism, internationalism, I do not know. Buddhist teaching has always been on the side of peace and good will; but so far as I am aware no spokesman of Buddhism has protested against the recent belligerent encroachments of Japan upon a sister-Buddhist land. The Buddhists of Japan seem to be acting in about the same way as the Christians of Europe and America acted during the World War. Professor Suzuki writes me:

Buddhists do not seem to aspire for the abolishment of war. They teach loving kindness to all creatures. They even promise the attainment by inanimate objects of final Buddhahood. But this does not seem to prevent their taking part in the work of mutual destruction. Does this come from their teaching of rebirth, I wonder? At any rate, Buddhism grew up during the feudal period closely connected with imperialism, nationalism, capitalism, etc., and its followers are probably still dreaming of the old days.

It was contact with Christianity that stimulated the revival of loyalty to Buddhism. This contact had also much to do with the outburst of social and philanthropic activity which has characterized the revival of Buddhism. In religious education also Japanese Buddhism has recently taken great strides. Moreover, Buddhism has learned to

use the methods and technique of its rival. The more advanced sects send some of their promising young men to America to study methods of religious education, which, on their turn, they put into practice as directors of Buddhist Sunday schools and similar institutions. The Y.M.B.A. and the Y.W.B.A. in several of the cities are flourishing and active. Even the form of the ritual or cult, in some of the sects, has been notably modified in the direction of the Protestant Christian service. Especially is this so in the Shin temples in Hawaii—and for our purposes we may properly consider Hawaiian Buddhism a part of Japanese Buddhism. The Buddhism of the Hawaiian islands, though chiefly confined to the Japanese inhabitants, is in part the result of missionary activity; and before I close something must be said about Buddhist missions.

I suppose that if we were to single out one man as the originator of missionary activity, we should have to name not St. Paul, but Gotama, the Buddha. His memorable command to his disciples was for centuries their "marching orders":

Fare ye forth, brethren, on the mission that is for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, to take compassion on the world, to work profit and good and happiness to gods and men. Go not singly: go in pairs. Teach ye the Truth, lovely in its origin, lovely in its progress, lovely in its consummation. Both in the spirit and in the letter proclaim ye the higher life in all its fulness, in all its purity. Beings there are whose eyes are hardly dimmed with dust perishing because they hear not the Truth.

The orders were obeyed for a thousand years. But during the last 1,500 years, up to less than a generation ago, they have been a dead letter. They are a dead letter still in all Buddhist lands save two, Ceylon and Japan. In Ceylon missionary enthusiasm was resuscitated about forty years ago by Dhammapala and the Maha Bodhi Society. The aim of this movement is centered chiefly upon India. And in India they have had some success. A Buddhist temple

and center of activity was established several years back in Calcutta, and about two years ago the Maha Bodhi Society realized the dream of many years, by completing and dedicating a rather fine Buddhist temple at Sarnath, on the spot where the Buddha preached his first sermon.

It is perhaps unfortunately significant that this achievement was principally the work of two individuals—Mr. Dhammapala, who contributed the enthusiasm and the brains, and an American lady, Mrs. Foster, who contributed a large share of the funds. Mrs. Foster died before the temple was completed, and Mr. Dhammapala followed her in April of this year; and though the Maha Bodhi Society is in a fairly flourishing condition, one can but wonder whether anything can take the place of the courage and enthusiasm of the lost leader.

In addition to Calcutta and Sarnath there is a Buddhist center at Bombay. This is not a missionary establishment, but a society of scholars interested in Buddhism. The Buddhist centers in Germany—of which there are about a dozen—are of the same sort, as are also the French and the Swiss centers, and the branch of the Maha Bodhi Society in New York. The Buddhist centers in the Malay Peninsula and one of the three in London are of more truly missionary type, being in part financed by Ceylonese Buddhists and having occasionally Ceylonese or Indian monks to perform the ceremonies in the temples. These centers carry on classes for the study of Buddhism, have public lectures at stated intervals, and offer a hall of worship, with an attractive shrine, as a place of contemplation for those who wish it. The English and German centers also publish periodicals.

I cannot say that I am sanguine as to the success of Southern Buddhist missions in their attempts to convert India, England, and Germany. In the European countries they are an expression of a scholarly interest already pres-

ent and of a dissatisfaction with certain tendencies in Christianity, rather than a real stimulus to new thinking and fresh religious experience. And as to India, I doubt whether Southern Buddhism with its cosmic agnosticism and its no-self doctrine can ever make much of an appeal to a people so metaphysically minded and so confident of the reality of the soul as the Indians. Another reason for my doubt is my further skepticism (now that Mr. Dhammapala is gone) as to the lasting missionary enthusiasm of the Ceylonese and their few Burmese and Indian allies. The *Buddhist Annual* of Ceylon for 1931, in commenting on Buddhist missions, reluctantly admits that "the results do not come up to our expectations" and points out that this "has been due to the lack of men endued with the right spirit or qualifications to act as missionaries." It also states:

The greatest stumbling block in the way of Buddhist missions has been the meagre support and co-operation which the members of the Sangha have given. Except in connection with the mission to London in which three Bhikkhus took part, and the mission to the Straits Settlements in which half a dozen figured, the Sangha cannot be said to be doing any missionary work at all. . . . And the irony of it is that the Buddhist monks of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam never hesitate to emphasize the missionary aspects of the religion and to sing the praises of the work of Arahant Mahindra. . . . It is not words and sermons that we want today, not even books and magazines, but practice, life—the logical and the only conclusion to all the preachings of the world.

Nor are the laymen exempt from the same fault, if we may trust the report, in the same number, of the Annual Congress of Buddhist Associations: "Several resolutions as usual were passed and a programme of work outlined. The coming months will show whether this year is going to be as barren of achievement as the past so many years have been."

The missionary activity of the Japanese Buddhists has been much more effective and is much more promising than that of the southern Buddhists. There are two or three

rather obvious reasons for this. One is the fact that it is focused almost entirely upon Japanese (or Chinese) in Siberia, Saghalien, Korea, Manchuria, China, Formosa, Hawaii, the Malay Peninsula, the East Indies, and in California. It might well be argued, also, that the Mahayana, with its larger cosmic conceptions, its teaching of unselfish devotion, its mysticism, and its warm faith in the personal Amida, is adapted to make a much stronger appeal to non-Buddhists than the rather cold and agnostic teaching of the Hinayana. Finally it has the backing of a very intelligent and energetic people.

Various degrees of success are following the different Japanese missions, the least successful, perhaps, being those in the East Indies, and the most successful among the unchurched Japanese and Chinese on our Pacific coast (where there are today some 36 Buddhist temples) and especially among the Japanese of Hawaii. Except for Hawaii I have no recent statistics. A dozen years ago there were 45 missionary monks in China, 36 in America, and 5 in the "South Seas." In addition there seem to have been some lay missionaries in these lands, but how lay missionaries are supported and just how far they parallel Christian missionaries I do not know. In Hawaii the total number of Buddhists is about 123,000, including 85 American converts. In addition to the religious services and sermon which take place on Sunday mornings, in the various temples, the Buddhist missions conduct a forum, a Girl Scout group, and a Boy Scout group, a Y.M.B.A. and a Y.W.B.A., many Sunday Schools, regular service of visitation to the leper hospital, to the home for consumptives, and to the jail, and a class in Buddhism for the deaf and blind.

The remarkable spread of Buddhism during its first thousand years was due to the excellence of its teaching, to the devotion of its missionaries, and to the tolerance and

liberality with which they viewed the beliefs and customs of the new lands to which they came. Unlike so many Christian missionaries of the past, the Buddhist missionary came not to destroy but to fulfil. All forms of truth, in whatever garb, they welcomed. This open-minded tolerance still characterizes Buddhists the world over. More than once have I been told by Buddhist monks—and in more lands than one—that a good Christian is really a good Buddhist although unknowingly. This liberal attitude of mind should still serve the Buddhist well in his attempt to introduce his religion sympathetically to modern hearers. In the personality and life and in the more positive teachings of the founder, as well as in many of the profound philosophical conceptions of the Mahayana, Buddhism possesses treasures of eternal value and universal human appeal. And though in energy and devotion the modern Buddhist compares unfavorably with his predecessors and with most Christian missionaries, and while it is improbable that Buddhism will ever make any new sensational conquests, it may well feed many a hungry soul who temperamentally needs just the things that Buddhism can give, and may make its contribution to the progressive solution of the world's religious problems.

XV

CHRISTIANITY AND INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS

BY WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING

THE question before us is primarily a question of fact. It assumes that Christianity has changed and that it is continuing to change. It assumes that the intercultural contacts of Christianity are the causes of some of these changes. I believe that these assumptions are correct.

I am not at all sure that it is possible for me to disentangle the changes in Christianity which are due to intercultural contacts from the changes which are due to other causes. But I am very sure of this, that since intercultural contact is a form of conversation, and since conversation never leaves the two conversers just where they were before the conversation began, it is inconceivable that Christianity should not be changed by those contacts which, from the very beginning, it has sought.

Perhaps the first recorded instance of a change due to intercultural contact is the fact that Christianity received its name in an environment of other Asiatic religions; for "the disciples were called Christians first in Antioch." It is rather interesting to consider that Jesus never heard the name "Christian," and did not know the religion which he established was to be called "Christianity." It is rather important for us to remember, I think, that Jesus attached no "ism" to his own doctrine, and that he felt that he was talking, not about a particular variety of religion, but about religion, about the way in which men are to deal with God and with their neighbor.

Hard after this first intellectual effect comes the second, namely, the introduction of new ideas through the use of language. When a religion attempts to explain itself to people of other traditions it inevitably tries to find words in those other traditions which are equivalent to its own ideas, and it inevitably fails to find them. The consequence is that it adopts terms which are current, as near-by equivalents for its translations, and we find Christianity adopting the word "Logos" to explain what it means by Christ—"In the beginning was the Logos"—and this was a momentous change, introduced by Christianity in the attempt to explain itself to other people, a valuable development of its thought.

Then, when Christ was explained by Paul as the Lord, through union with whom we are to attain salvation, he again was introducing a change in Christianity through the very effort to tell what Christianity meant. The latest case of this that has come to my attention is the effort of Dr. Karl Reichelt, in a little rest-house near Hongkong which he has established for Buddhist pilgrims, to use the old Chinese conception of "Tao" as an equivalent of St. John's use of "Logos": "In the beginning was Tao"; "In the beginning was the Logos." Adoption of this usage would mean an actual change in the expression of Christianity for China, and probably some development in its content.

Generally speaking, this is true of the Christian attitude toward the world which it has encountered: "This religion is the answer to your questions." "Whom ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you," said Paul to the Athenians. And if it is true that Christianity is the answer to the religious questions of mankind, we may expect to find that wherever Christianity goes it has tried to find out what the questions of men are, in what ideas they have put those questions, and then to identify itself in some way with

their answer. But a circumstance which makes this process peculiarly liable to bring changes is the fact that religion is always an answer to *unexpressed* questions of the mind. Religion provides us, as it were, with an answer to our problems before those problems are completely formulated and we are always in the process of getting a better grasp of what religion is all about. We are not on the verge of a final answer to that, but I think we are on the verge of new answers to the question, "What does religion intend to do for mankind, anyway?" And, in proportion as we learn to express our own problems, just in that proportion we may expect the answer, Christianity itself, to become more pertinent and adequate in expression.

I want to speak now of four or five respects in which it seems to me Christianity is changing. It would be out of order for me to say that Christianity as a whole has changed in these respects, because Christendom is a composite body which like a glacier moves at very different rates in different parts of its substance, and there are parts in which no change at all in these directions can be predicated. But there are undoubted changes in what we may regard as the central current, the living and thoughtful current, of Christianity, and in these changes the eye can discern some future accomplishment.

Let me first speak of Christianity's wrestle with the idea of relativity. Relativity has been worked out in the field of culture long before it has been worked out in the field of physics. Intercultural contact has always the tendency to lead us to a feeling of cultural relativity, including religious relativity. You cannot begin to use the word "religion" in the plural without the suggestion to your own mind that religions are different simply because human beings are different, that religions fit the minds and the habits of the people who profess them, the differences being "relative"

to those peculiarities, that none of them is absolutely valid, and that all of them have some relative good in them. And when you begin to take that attitude, the attitude of universal relativity, you find that something serious has subtly happened to your religious convictions. Perhaps they begin to lag and fail, and you wake up some day with the question, "Have I any religion after all?"

It is all right for a person to think of the relativity of every religion except his own. When he begins to think of his own religion as relative then he has ceased to believe it. He has attained an attitude of scientific detachment which leaves him just a little bit away from that point of thorough conviction which is essential to religion itself. It is no accident that the science of religion has grown up in Christian lands, and it is also no accident that the science of religion has been held by many a Christian as the chief enemy of the Christian religion.

The reason is that the science of religion inevitably classifies. It determines the different kinds of religion. It puts them into serial order and it undertakes to understand them. Christianity fosters the attitude of appreciative understanding. Love, in the intellectual realm, is appreciation. And you cannot carry on a religion of love and appreciation without being led in time to look at the religion of your neighbor in that light. When you begin to assume of the religion of your neighbor that its essence is the good that is in it, you are beginning to take this attitude of generalization; you are beginning to think that the important parts of religion are the things which they all have in common, that they reinforce one another in the items in which they agree, and then the next step is that they cancel one another in the items in which they disagree.

You are now upon the exact position of Herbert Spencer, who announced at the opening of his *First Principles* as his criterion of judgment, as he looked over the great fact of

religion in the world, that these religions more or less canceled one another by their mutual differences, leaving at the base only one thing which is supremely certain, namely, that there is a mystery in the universe.

The scientific attitude toward religion, then, canceling competing claims, leaves the human mind immune to every religion's claim of supreme and final authority. We have a sacred book, the Moslems also have a sacred book, and the Hindus have a series of sacred books—and each of these books claims to be divinely inspired. From the scientific point of view, when you have listened to many of these claims the tendency is to become rather callous to all of them. One becomes immune to every claim for exclusiveness.

Thus we find ourselves on the ground of what has been called "the liberalism of the nineteenth century"—liberalism which in itself carries an end of missionary zeal, because it simply means that the religion of the other man is the proper religion for him, and that the real type of universality which we seek is the universality of thought, a sort of peace without victory, in which by finding what we already have in common we shall also find what is important to everybody and all that is important to anybody.

I say that Christianity has resisted this idea at the heart of liberalism. It has resisted it with this conviction in mind that, after all, it is the differences between religions which contain a great measure of their importance. It calls our attention to the fact that differences which to the eye are almost imperceptible and unimportant may make all the difference between the ripe fruit and the unripe, between living tissues and dying tissues, between a statement of an idea which is fertile and a statement which is barren; and that the points of difference among religions are the points at which religion is living and growing. So "liberalism" tends to be put aside in favor of another type of relativity which is called "modernism."

Modernism declares that there are important differences, namely, differences in religious growth; but that since all things grow and are involved in change, Christianity, with the rest of things, changes. This has seemed to many minds a real solution of this dilemma of universal relativity with its universal indifference in religion. But notice the immediate corollary, that if religion is growing and changing, as all things grow and change, then religion has nothing which it can offer by contrast with the changing world as final, nothing as absolute. And, since it is the essential profession of religion to put men's feet on a rock, to rescue them from the morass of change and relativity and flux by introducing them to the eternal, then if modernism is right, religion in its essential claim is fallacious, if not fraudulent.

Catholicism, therefore, has condemned modernism as containing a lethal principle for its own professions, and on this ground I believe that Catholicism is quite right.

In the struggle, then, with the principle of relativity, where are we today? We are on the point, I believe, of a discovery that both of these principles are right, that religion is involved in change, and that religion does deal with the final.

Einstein's success in the field of physics, if his success were complete, though his theory would continue to be known as the theory of relativity, would have succeeded in introducing us to a physical absolute. What Einstein is trying to do is to find the one formula which will cover the different realms of light, gravitation, and electromagnetism, in a single complete formula. This would be, then, the absolute truth about the physical world. Religion, in the same way, is a permanent relationship between man and the cosmos on which he lives, a right relationship which has unchanging laws. That relationship will have varying con-

ditions, just as health, which is the same thing everywhere, has varying requirements which are continually better understood; but if we can find what that relationship is, that will be the absolute truth about religion.

We have on our hands a perennial problem of what is universal and what is relative in the religions we profess, but unless we hold to the fact that there is an absolute and universal element in them, those religions have already ceased to be religions. The more we learn of the relative, the more we are conscious of that which is non-relative, to which the relative points.

Out of this general discussion of relativity, incited by intercultural contacts, at least one thing emerges as an achievement, namely, that the *fixed external authorities of religion have yielded*, much to the liberation of all phases of religious life. The element of absolute finality cannot be found incorporated in any written word external to the individual, in any institution external to him, in any person external to him. The word of God does come to mankind, but it does not take the form anywhere of an infallible and literally authoritative printed book. God does in truth speak to men through the Bible, but that speech must be heard by each individual for himself, as a response of his whole being to the living and present spirit beyond the printed word. The word of God is individually addressed.

This has *put an end to the cogency of all arguments and of all denominational differences based upon authoritative scripture*. It has not by any means put an end to the value of quoting scripture. If anything, it has lent to that practice a greater freedom and scope; but the value of the text is found not in its physical presence but in its power to illuminate the heart. Its authority is contemporary, even while the acceptance of its value continues to lie in the fact that it springs from the great well of vision from which that collection of writings came.

The second point at which intercultural contacts have had a profound effect on Christianity seems to be in respect to the criterion of naturalness. Naturalness in religion seems, like relativity, a matter which religion cannot admit; for it is the business of religion to contradict natural appearances, to indicate that the claim of the physical world to control human life is a false claim. And religion, therefore, since it deals with the supernatural, has brought about marvels of defiance of nature in the effort to overcome the physical gravitation of the human spirit.

Now, intercultural contact has shown Christianity that other religions have excelled in all of these practices of austerity. A prodigious saintliness is much more visible in Hinduism than it is in Christianity, and Christianity has by this very fact, I think, been more ready to acknowledge that prodigious saintliness lies very close to prodigious waste, and has come rather more to favor the suggestion that human nature must not be distorted by religion, not even by professional amiability, but that it must find its seat in human nature naturally. If "holiness" is a demand upon human nature, holiness must somehow be a natural holiness.

Christianity is more emphatically impelled in this direction at present by the fact that it is in contact not only with the definite ancient cultures, but with a new type of culture which tries to get along without religion and which has condemned all religion as a costly encumbrance. What this effort to get on without religion is leading to, I think, is a new understanding of what religion might mean to humanity. It is beginning to be discovered in Russia, and also in those parts of Turkey and of China which have turned their backs upon all religion, that there is something missing which religion somehow must fulfil. Let us see if we can indicate what this is.

You cannot get social solidarity without a unit of society

that is ready to sacrifice itself. You can have willing sacrifice or unwilling sacrifice. You can have enthusiastic sacrifice or compulsory sacrifice. But compulsory sacrifice imposed upon human units will not be to the permanent aid of society. You must have in a live state something which will maintain a *willing, persistent self-sustaining desire* to put one's self at the command of the whole, and that means that you have to have something like a religion to make a society work.

The modern man is reaching out for a religion, but it must be simple and it must be natural. What do we mean by naturalness in this case? It means that religion must present itself as an outgrowth of human nature. If you have a genuine psychology, if you have a genuine history of the will, a genuine theory of the instincts, you will find that there is a need somewhere which we call a need for religion as the objective condition for normal human development.

This does not mean that religion is satisfied with a natural object. We have got to overcome the psychological fallacy that because a state of mind is observable its object must be observable also. What we have in religion is a *natural need for a supernatural object*, and conversely, the supernatural object satisfies a natural need. Thus, Christianity has to reckon with this demand for a psychological basis of religion.

This will mean a reportioning of its entire doctrinal structure, in order to meet what it can show to be the deepest demands of human nature which religion has to satisfy. The question in regard to any doctrine will not be, in the future, "Can you believe it?" but this: "If that doctrine were absent, would anything in me demand its rebuilding?" And only those doctrines are going to survive in religion which in some way respond to this inherent and universal question of the human heart.

There is one definitive result which comes from this new vision of naturalness as a necessary aspect of religion: The criterion of naturalness assumes the health, not of human nature as it is, but of human aspirations. There is that in man which knows what is good and reaches out to it, even to the correction of its own habits. And this means in spite of various reactions within Christianity toward a Calvinistic conception of human depravity, that Christianity will turn its back forever upon the suggestion that human nature is inherently evil, and that there is an impassable gulf between the will of man and the will of God.

The third change which seems to me quite clearly traceable to intercultural contacts is a change in the conception of salvation, the central business of religion, which lies very close to this problem of naturalness. Salvation has been assumed, in Christianity, to be a supernatural transaction, but Christianity has never taken the negative view that the supernatural transaction has nothing to do with the laws of human nature. The change which is coming about in our conception of salvation, it seems to me, is this—we are beginning to see that salvation means the discovery of that way of life which makes it possible for us to realize the potentialities of human nature.

I would like to develop this. There are two laws in the world. There is the law of healthful personal growth and there is the law governing external circumstance, the law of nature. Each of these laws is as lawful as the other, but the curious thing about the world is that they seem in their operations to be irrelevant each to the other. We talk about the experiences of life as "accidental" circumstances. On the other hand, from the standpoint of natural law, the behavior of human beings seems to be "accidental" and sporadic. And, as a consequence of this misfit, human beings find that they are adopting toward their own lives an

attitude of coping with the outwardly accidental, trying to outwit it, and in so doing forgetting the laws of the health of personality. What are the results? Three things: idleness, greed, savagery. In these three forms we find the accidental element of life infecting the laws of the spirit and keeping us on the animal plane.

The problem of today is to find how we are going to adjust ourselves to this ill-adjusted set of laws. "Renounce," is one answer: renounce the accidental goods of the natural order. But renunciation, which means "let us cease to desire what we naturally do desire," has always seemed extremely unreal. "Love" is another, and apparently a better answer, for love carries with it a kind of spontaneous and natural renunciation, inasmuch as we care more for the person we love than for the things which might come from his service. Love lifts us away from the demands of our own selfishness and makes it possible for us to suffer happily.

Christianity says love is the answer. But where shall we find the answer to this other question: "How is it possible to love men? How is it possible to love God?" It seems to me that Christianity is trembling at the present moment on the brink of a new answer to the question of how love is possible, because the Christian world is suffering from a newly realistic apprehension of the fact that we do not love our fellow-men spontaneously and with feeling and that we cannot at will churn up this requisite affection. We love them theoretically, perhaps, but not enough to make the solution of these social problems something which we can unanimously attempt with good prospects of success.

How is it possible to love mankind? It seems to me that we can look once more to Jesus for aid in this matter, because the peculiarity of Jesus as he walked around through the world is not that he had a sentimental affection for his fellow-beings, but that he had a tremendous interest in them, which came from understanding them. The love

which Jesus had for his neighbor was a consequence of understanding his neighbor. His interest is the result of a penetration of human life; and mentally he comes as it were from a great distance to focus on the individual. It is through his unremitting consciousness of the cosmic frame of human destiny that he takes his unique and characteristic satisfaction in the child, in the individual, in the detail. Sometimes that suggests to me that Jesus is looking at life as with the eyes of God; and that the infinite majesty of God would render him not less capable, but more capable, of appreciating the detail; for, after all, it is the privilege of greatness to be interested in the minute things of the world.

If this is the case, it will indicate the way in which we also, not by an unnatural emotional effort, but by a deepening perception and understanding of human destiny, may find it possible to love human nature, with that positive, steady, intelligent regard necessary for the life of the world. If through such ways of growth we can perceive Christianity coming to a new conception of what love is, and especially of what the conditions of love are, we shall be reaching toward a new conception of what salvation is—attaining the power of a divinely unsentimental love of men, in terms of their personal destinies.

There are two other points of change which I will just mention as promoted by intercultural contact, namely, that Christianity is acquiring a new sense of the necessity of the historic root in religion everywhere—the necessity for every man of that which is historical for him; and that it is also coming to a sense of shame with regard to its own dividedness and incapacity for co-operation—so that I can see coming at any rate the beginnings of this change, that the church of Christ shall correspond more genuinely with that invisible community of all the faithful which is the real kingdom of God on earth.

XVI

HINDUISM AND INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS

BY S. L. JOSHI

THE subject with which I propose to deal is the influence of foreign cultures on Hinduism. The influence of Hindu thought on the cultural traditions of Islam, China, and Japan, as well as on the West, is necessarily omitted from this paper for want of time, however fascinating such a task would be.

In attempting to make an appraisal of the effects of foreign cultures on Hinduism, I should like to endeavor to show that the distinctive foundations of Hindu culture have not been seriously affected by Western influences; that, under the stress of modern science, changes of an abiding nature have occurred in the outward expression of the spirit of Hindu culture; that these changes are not hostile to the basic structure of Hinduism; that some Western scholars and Christian missionaries in India have often been misled into giving erroneous interpretations of at least three of the strands out of which Hindu culture has been built up; the doctrines of Maya and Karma and the institution of caste; and, lastly, that the outlook for the future of Hinduism will be brightened in proportion as India assimilates the scientific spirit, eliminates the evils associated with the caste system, discards the ascetic ideal, and faces the future as far as climatic difficulties and a prolonged period of political emasculation will permit, by rapid adaptation of her social movements to the exigencies of modern progress, without the sacrifice of spiritual values which have sustained her through the centuries of change.

Whatever the nature of Absolute Reality may be, the Hindu has always held, for sound logical reasons, that it cannot be imprisoned in the verbal forms of a creed, conformity to which is regarded as the essential condition of orthodoxy in Semitic religions. Hinduism is mainly a culture which has gradually been evolved around a spiritual conception of man and the universe, through an unbroken tradition covering not less than thirty centuries of time. It has left the individual perfectly free to change his opinions and to adopt any method to reach the goal of self-realization, provided he does not in any way bring disaster on the social organization of the caste system, which is the backbone of communal life.

There have been many periods in India's past history when Hinduism as a culture was brought into close contact with foreign cultures. The contact with Hellenic culture reached its interesting phase under Alexander the Great and continued for a long time through the Greek kingdoms which were scattered around the northwestern borders of Hindustan. There was hardly any permanent impression made by Greek culture on India, owing, probably, to the fact that the Greek and Hindu outlook on life had many things in common.

The second important period of foreign contact began when the Arabs invaded India in the eighth century. For nearly twelve hundred years Moslem and Hindu have mingled with each other on the plains of India, and there has been continually an exchange of cultural ideals between the two communities. The stern monotheism of Islam was calculated to produce a serious conflict with the polytheistic cults which grew up under the shelter of Hinduism. It is, however, not true that Hinduism imported the idea of monotheism from Semitic religions like Islam and Christianity. The theistic tradition began in the Vedic period with the worship of Varuna. The Upanishads de-

veloped a double tradition of pantheism on the one hand and theism on the other.

The later religious writings of men like Kabir and Nanak demonstrate the tremendous emphasis on monotheism which was brought about in Hindu society largely through the influence of Islam. The metaphysical trend in Hinduism emphasized the association of timelessness with reality and necessarily subordinated the importance of history to the larger significance of the philosophical interpretation of human activity. The Moslem, on the other hand, attached more importance to the things of time and did not neglect the development of the historic sense as the Hindu did. Hence there is a close analogy between the early chroniclers of Islam in India and the writings of Herodotus in ancient Greece. The creative genius of a polytheistic people revels in the production of rich and varied imaginative material which can be painted with the brush or carved on stone with the chisel. History has again and again proved that polytheisms can contribute a much larger share in the production of the finest works of art than rigidly theistic religions. This will explain why it is that the Hindu has to his credit a much larger achievement in artistic culture than the Moslem.

Another point of importance in a comparison of the two cultures is furnished by the comparative position of woman in both communities. It is very often forgotten that polygamous practices prevailed among the Christian communities of the Roman empire just as much as among the Moslems in Arabia and the Hindus in India. The ideal of monogamy, however, was the central theme of the epic of the Ramayana, and polygamy was regarded as a social lapse from the norm of the ideal monogamous marriage. The rise and growth of the custom of the seclusion of women among the Hindu aristocratic families was largely bor-

rowed from the Moslems and their tradition of imposing rigid restrictions on the liberty of women.

The ancient system of Hindu music was freely adopted by the Moslems and to this day Moslem artists have preserved and enriched the technique and art of Hindu music in India in close rivalry with the Hindus themselves.

The efforts of the Emperor Akbar to build a bridge between Islam and Hinduism proved futile, but the two communities have lived side by side in India practicing mutual adaptation and tolerance until the present time, when under the unfortunate stress of communal political representation in the proposed scheme of self-government for India, the ashes of extinct religious antagonisms are again beginning to flare up in new flames.

The third period of the contact of Hinduism with foreign cultures is the most important, that is, the contact with modern European civilization, which has lasted for over three centuries. Indo-British relations are a part of the larger relations between western nations and Asia, only in a limited sense, for it must be remembered that psychologically and culturally the Hindu is as different from the Chinese and the Japanese as from the modern European. These relations have produced important consequences along political, socio-economic, scientific, philosophical, and religious lines. But the main citadel of Hindu thought in regard to ultimate reality, which alone gives meaning to man and the universe, still remains unshaken. The idealism of India has been combined with the realism of the modern West in various ways by several Indian scholars in recent times.

Before contrasting the Western modes of thought and those of India, I should like to say a word with regard to a point which has not been especially emphasized during the recent lectures on Hinduism, namely that, while India did devote a considerable attention to philosophical specula-

tion, she had not neglected the development of what we may call the scientific side of culture. It is true that the achievements of the Hindu sciences cannot be evaluated from the standards of the Western science of today, but, if we were to judge the achievements of the positive sciences of the Hindus in terms of contemporary human progress, there is a great deal that could be said regarding their early achievement in favor of the Hindu civilization, and the fact that such subjects as mathematics, medicine, and astronomy formed an important part of the curriculum of studies in ancient universities in India is in itself an indication that philosophy and poetry were not the only subjects in which the Hindu intellect delighted to revel.

I should like to just say a few words by way of contrast between the East and the West, especially between India and the West. The West lays an exaggerated stress on individualism. The importance of the totality is often lost in the overstress of the part. It is forgotten that the intellect is merely a stepping stone and should be evaluated as such in the approach to the theme of reality. Mysticism, therefore, is inevitable when the intellect breaks down and intuition begins to function.

Rationalism and the stiffness of logical regulations lead to a complete absence of plasticity. Reality can neither be convincingly defined nor definitely proved through the instrument of the intellect alone. The true test of a philosophy of religion, according to the Hindu viewpoint, is the actual living of it. A merely theoretical interest in philosophy is not enough. Analysis has its merits when it is not converted into a fetish.

The Hindu emphasizes the nature of philosophy on the side of spiritual insight, and dialectic is secondary; hence the fact that the Sanskrit word for the different schools of Hindu philosophy is the word "Darshana," which means "a vision of reality."

Renunciation is to be viewed primarily as a cleansing, the crucifixion of selfish desire. There is the embodiment of a challenge in such a life of renunciation. Introversion involves a greater strenuousness than extroversion. The introspective mental attitude of the Hindu may not appear suited to grapple manfully with the problems of this life, but the Gita contains a twofold conception of religious duty: the idea of world-renunciation is not for all, whereas it is obligatory on all human beings to perform effectually those duties which are connected with their accepted position in society.

The Hindu is aware of the shortcomings of the intellect; the significance of intuition is, therefore, emphasized. Knowledge, after all, cannot transcend experience. The higher ranges of truth are understood in the light of feeling or seeing and not by any process of logic. Scientific truth is valid within its own domain of the relative and visible aspects of reality.

The doctrine of Karma explains life in terms of the past, the present, and the future. The absence of such an explanation cuts adrift the present from the past, and we are led to the interpretation of the present in terms of no continuity whatsoever. Karma makes possible explanation of both evolution and involution. It is the prime key to the explanation of social inequality. It leads to the betterment of life, and the element of detachment cultivates a necessary objectivity for a balanced life.

It may be pointed out, incidentally, that the freedom of the will which is essential for all ethical values is not denied by the Karma doctrine, and that the fatalistic attitude to life generally ascribed to that doctrine by foreign critics is a mistaken interpretation and corruption of its true meaning. The question as to how one's caste standing comes to be determined by one's Karma in previous existences is shrouded in mystery, and presents difficulties with some of

which at least Plato was familiar. As regards the doctrine of Maya, Shankara in his exposition of the Vedanta doctrine has clearly emphasized the view that until the moment of emancipation arrives in a man's life with the dawning of God-consciousness man is bound to recognize the reality of the affairs of this life as set in the framework of time; and the Gita emphatically proclaims the gospel of duty here and now.

The Upanishads do not commit the mistake of making God and the world synonymous terms and definitely oppose the kind of pantheism which some Western critics imagine is implied in the idealistic monism of the Vedanta. The metaphysics of the Vedanta, far from being opposed to the idea of progress, is primarily interested in producing the ideally perfect man. Plato gave a definitely political turn to the European tradition of progress, with its ideal of human perfection to be achieved in a perfectly organized state. The recent discovery of the Sanskrit original of Kautiliya's Artha Shastra, however, proves that India did not neglect either the theory or the practice of political science.

From the Vedanist viewpoint, says Professor K. Shastri, social evils in a community offer a training ground to the individual for the performance of unselfish and disinterested works, so that our mind may become free from selfish desires and passions. These unselfish deeds for the community are to be done not as ends in themselves but as a means toward the realization of the Self, which is the supreme object of our desire. The Vedanta condemns only selfish works, but recognizes the value and utility of disinterested works in the services of others, as a means toward the realization of the Self. It aims to establish a divine kingdom on earth by enabling men to become possessors of divine qualities and to fulfil their transcendental destiny.

The doctrine of Maya does not direct its aims toward the

actual abolition of the objects and affairs of the world as totally devoid of reality. They are unreal only from the viewpoint of Absolute Reality, but on the empirical level they have a relative reality which is compelling in its recognition as such. At the recent meeting here in Chicago of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Professor Pieront, of France, brought out some interesting and convincing psychological arguments to show that our life here is such stuff as dreams are made of. Individuality, while it lasts, has a meaning and value, but it is human ignorance which induces us to regard it as ultimate.

The conception of God as essentially personal was emphasized in all Semitic religions. On the other hand, the Hindu conception of God tended to be impersonal in the higher ranges of philosophic thought, while man, as an individual was to be valued because he was potentially divine. But individuality as such was a passing phase, finally to be terminated by the submergence of the individual in the universal.

It is often remarked by modern writers that the foundations of democracy rest essentially upon the individual and that, in countries like India, where the individual is valued merely because he is a part of the joint family, democracy as a form of government is hardly to be recommended. But, as a matter of fact, it must not be forgotten that the essentially industrial nature of Western civilization has continually shown a tendency to discount personal values where the individual man is subordinated to the machine, and the welfare of the working classes is sacrificed for swelling the dividends of the capitalist. With the increasing complexity of modern civilization, whether in its homelands or in its effects upon countries like India, the tendency has been quite pronounced toward discounting personal values and regarding the individual as merely a part of a system, whether in education, in public welfare, in philan-

thropy, or in the actual working out of the machinery of democracy.

"The way in which a man must earn his living was determined by the wider interests of the entire social group, and the essential nature of the caste system was brought under the sanction of religion in the Gita, and man's daily task came to be regarded as a religious duty he owed to the community as a whole and as a part of his duty to God."

In the solution of the interracial and international problems and the problems relating to conflicts between opposing economic classes, Western civilization has given no evidence so far of successful achievement. India feels that, if she eliminates from the caste system its rigidity and all those evils which deny equality of opportunity for self-realization of all human beings alike, she may yet retain the original spirit of the caste system and utilize it to work out a more efficient scheme of national welfare on the basis of reciprocal relations between fitness and duty in the case of each individual.

The two main prohibitions of caste are directed against interdining and intermarriage. The introduction of the railway train and the electric street car, also coeducation in universities and colleges, as well as the necessity for persons of different castes to work side by side in the modern factory, have created new democratic influences which are already relaxing the separatist tendencies of the caste tradition. Intercaste marriages and intercaste dinners are no longer uncommon. How far the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi to hasten the working of social evolution by admitting the untouchables to a status of social equality with the caste Hindus will be successful still remains to be seen.

Turning once again to a historic perspective of the influence of Western culture on India: At the beginning of the nineteenth century England found that India was without a responsible central government. The Mogul Empire

was in ruins, and the Hindu confederacy of the Maratha rulers was in the last stage of disintegration. The creation and maintenance of peace and order were accepted by England as a task created by the circumstances of the times. The introduction of the English language, the study of English literature at the new universities which were founded by the middle of the century, modernized India's educational system. Western scientific methods were gradually introduced into all fields of knowledge. These methods produced far-reaching results in public sanitation and improved transportation. The modern triumphs in the uses of electric power are being gradually ushered into India. Irrigation systems of the most modern type have already brought under cultivation millions of acres of arid land, increasing the food supply. The study of Western political philosophy, coupled with an increasing knowledge of Western civilization gathered by Indian students in Europe and America, has steadily stimulated a passion for social justice and kindled a growing ambition toward self-government on a democratic basis. The problem, however, of increasing the machinery of primary education through all the provinces, so as to wipe out the stigma of illiteracy among nearly ninety per cent of the population, still remains unsolved.

India was dazzled by the meteoric display of the achievements of Western science. Throughout the last century the tendency in India was to neglect her own cultures as treasured in her literatures and in her arts of life and imitate the West in as many ways as the poverty of the land could permit. The industrial revolution from the West helped further to destroy the arts and crafts of India and converted the whole land from being a producer to being merely a consumer. India was used on one hand as a storehouse of nature from which raw materials could be sent to

Europe and on the other hand as a vast market for the consumption of European manufactures.

By the end of the century the feeling began to rise in India that the British bureaucratic control of the Indian administrative machine tended to be autocratic and gave very few opportunities to the people to develop a capacity for political responsibility and to create a healthy public opinion, which always acts as a check on the extravagances of the government in power in all civilized countries. A common opposition, which is not always intelligently directed, to all alien organizations in commerce, in religion, in politics, has supplied the main incentive to modern types of patriotism in India. The development of the press as an important factor in educating public opinion has been hindered sometimes by the incompetency of editors in modern journalism and sometimes by the arbitrary restrictions placed by a government controlled from London. The impact of Western democratic ideals has produced a new zeal for diffusing the benefits of culture among all classes of society.

The tremendous momentum given to Western progress and the acceleration of the process of social evolution with the aid of modern scientific movements, with greater efficiency in organization and enlarged capacity for achievement, are being gradually reproduced in the large cities of India, which have always been centers where Hindu culture has generally gravitated. The open participation by modernized Indian women in municipal self-government and in championing political and social causes and their gradual emergence into the learned professions of medicine, law, and others, are undoubtedly a direct product of the contact of India with Western culture. Western Christianity has doubtless contributed a great deal to the solution of some of the social problems of India, through educational institutions, hospitals for the relief of suffering,

et cetera. But Western Christianity after more than two centuries of organized missionary activity, with all the backing of the money power of Western nations, still appears in India as a hothouse plant which has not found its roots in Indian soil. The paganisms of pre-Christian Europe did not offer such a stubborn resistance to Christianity as has been offered by the vital forces of Hinduism since the beginnings of Christian propaganda in India. The reaction produced by the earnest-minded, pietistic elements of Western Christianity in India resulted in the introduction of congregational worship in theistic groups and also of reforms directed toward the elimination of social evils. There is no question of the value of missionary effort in opening the doors of educational opportunity to two unprivileged classes: the untouchables and the women of India.

The dawn of the twentieth century witnessed a definite change in India's appraisal of Western culture. The diffusion of Western culture and the adoption of English as the medium of communication between radically different communal and racial groups had already supplied the backbone to Indian nationalism. A strange feeling of distrust in Western nations began to take possession of the soul of India. The disillusionment of the Hindu estimate of Western civilization was completed by the great World War. The prestige of Western superiority collapsed almost over night all over Asia. The hour had come for the revival of Hindu culture in all its bearings at all costs. India was convinced, first, that Christianity apparently was not a vital part of Western civilization; second, that, whereas Western nations deserved full credit for the marvelous growth of scientific knowledge, the wisdom needed to use this knowledge toward the increase of human happiness had not kept pace with scientific progress; third, that, whether in war or in peace, Western civilization has been

dominated by selfish desire, with greed as its driving power and physical prowess as its ultimate sanction; and fourth, that the assumption of Western democracy upholding the equality of all men in the capacity to understand and use aright all political rights and duties was a delusion not supported by the ascertained facts of political life, East or West.

It has been customary, in the Occident, to describe the civilizations of the Orient as static and stagnant. The dynamic forces that are transforming the races of the East today are operating on such a colossal scale and moving with such swiftness that it is seasonable to inquire whether the charge of stagnation should not be now leveled by the East toward certain cross-sections of the Western world. The modern leaders of India have noticed with great amazement the hostile attitude taken by certain American Christian denominations toward that epoch-making report of the Hocking Commission in regard to the need of change in the principles and methods of Christian propaganda. Human nature being what it is, it is not surprising that the forces of conservatism in America are just as blind to the significance of that report as corresponding forces in India are blind to the need of modifying tradition to match the spirit of the times in which we live.

The most conspicuous contribution of the West to all Eastern lands lies in the growing recognition of the importance of building up the scientific type of mind in the leadership of the future. How to combine the scientific spirit with the wisdom of the East in the solution of some of the vexing problems of civilization and progress is being demonstrated by men like Sir J. C. Bose, Sir Radhakrishnan, and Sir C. V. Raman, the recent Nobel prize winner in physics. The recent revival of indigenous letters, the rise of new universities like the Usmania University, where instruction is given in the Hindustani language, and other

institutions like it, where the teaching work is carried on in the languages of the country, the resuscitation of the Hindu art traditions in the Tagore family and elsewhere in India, the renewed interest in the study of Indian philosophy in the light of Western philosophy and science, the attempt to reconstruct existing gaps in India's checkered history with the aid of modern archaeological researches, the splendid work of editing a new text of the great epic, the Mahabharata, carried on at a high level of modern scholarship by Indian scholars like Dr. Sukhtankar through the laborious process of a skilful comparison of several ancient Sanskrit texts—all of these and allied movements are having their repercussion on Hinduism and creating, often in a silent way, reactions which are calculated to leave permanent marks on Hindu thought and culture of the coming decades.

Meanwhile, the average Hindu is still handicapped by lingering superstitions, by continued belief in astrology in determining the auspicious moment for the tying of the marriage knot, by the expenditure of his intellectual ammunition on subjects like the right of temple entry, the marriageable age for girls, and the conservation of the rights of the twice-born as against all other classes—not to say anything about the conservation of the rights of the mother-in-law as against those of the daughter-in-law!

It is argued by the critics of Hinduism that its foundations are primarily metaphysical and that the ethical elements in a "pantheistic" scheme of thought are weakened by being subordinated to the metaphysical. The claim is, therefore, seriously made that the process of moralizing modern Hinduism is being carried on with the aid of the moral dualism imported from Christianity; also, that India knew nothing about the doctrines of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man before she came into contact with the Western world. The Hindu meets the

argument by saying that morality is only a means to a higher end and not an end in itself: that when the end is reached, morality ceases to have any meaning; that every human being is potentially divine; that the aim of the discipline of religion is to make actual that which is potential; that the relation of man to God and to his fellow-men is, therefore, infinitely closer than that implied by the terms "fatherhood" and "brotherhood."

The task of remolding Hinduism as an ideal scheme of the good life on the basis of modern scientific humanism and social ethics is understood and is being carried on by some of those who have an adequate appreciation of what is valuable in Hindu tradition and who recognize the importance of a scientific background in social progress. The tendency to assimilate values from extraneous sources, and to adopt the principle of adaptation to the new environment created by the scientific age, represents the dynamic elements of modern thought which are leavening in various degrees all great religions that have withstood the test of time, and the traditional flexibility of Hinduism in this respect is as great as that shown by Pauline Christianity in adapting itself to the peculiar environment of the Graeco-Roman Empire.

It is in no spirit of cheap self-complacency or blind vanity, but for sound logical reasons confirmed by long experience in psychological insight, that India holds her ground and will never accept the exclusive claim of any religion to be the absolute religion. Nor will she ever admit that the morality of the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita is in any way inferior to that of Christianity. The claim of Christianity or of Islam to be the final revelation of God to man is regarded by the progressive elements in India, just as much as in the West, as wholly unphilosophical, since men cannot set limits in time to such a process of divine revelation.

The surest test of progress among all races is the steady growth of capacity in the human mind to weigh with exactness the evidence in favor of and against a given situation, to reduce to a minimum the difficulties in the ascertainment of facts and their appropriate evaluation, and thus to arrive at sound interpretations of the universe and of human experience in all its phases. Modern education is fast increasing the number of individuals with the scientific habit of mind, and, when to this we add the priceless spiritual treasures of religion to be found in all the cultural traditions of the world, knowledge will be happily wedded to wisdom in the increase of ethical values and the enrichment of character among Western and Eastern nations alike. We need, then, have no anxiety about the future of civilization.

XVII

CONFUCIANISM AND INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS

BY LEWIS HODOUS

THERE are two streams in the thought and religious life of the Chinese. On the one hand the Chinese responded to the universe as though it were psychical. They started from man and proceeded to discarnate spirits. There was a strong tendency to ignore any dividing line between men and spirits. Out of this grew the elaborate ancestor worship, the worship of heroes, and of Shang-ti, the God of Heaven.

The second stream starts from the physical universe. The Chinese were interested in the dynamic aspect of nature rather than the chemical. They have the five dynamic forces and the *yin*, the negative influence, and *yang*, the positive influence.

Both these streams are found in the Confucian tradition. For example, in the Analects, which was arranged by the disciples of Confucius and their pupils we have the following statements attributed to the master:

He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray.

If I have in any way done wrong, may Heaven reject me!

Heaven produced the virtue that is in me. What harm can Huan T'ui do to me? Since the death of King Wen was not the cause of truth lodged here in me? If Heaven should let this cause of truth perish, then I should not have got such a relation to that cause. While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what harm can the people of Huan do unto me?

Heaven has deserted me! Heaven has deserted me!
My prayer has been for a long time.

Now it is interesting to note that the naturalistic trend also finds support in the sayings of Confucius in the *Analects*:

Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses and things are being produced, but does Heaven say anything?

May not Shun be instanced as one who made no effort, yet the Empire was well governed? For what effort did he make? Ordering himself in all seriousness he did nothing but maintain the correct imperial attitude.

Now, the Chinese do not seem to be troubled by these two divergent trends. In fact, they have united these two streams by the concept *te*. This concept, usually translated virtue, means power. In man it means personality, psychic power, whether good or bad. In nature *te* is the distinctive influence of each of the five dynamic forces. In other words, man and nature were interpenetrating parts of one cosmos. In the cosmos there are laws effective in every sphere without distinction and yet they produce results peculiar to each sphere.

These two streams have been present in Chinese thought from early times. At some periods one was emphasized; at other times the other was uppermost, but both were always present. For example, during the Han dynasty, which ruled during the two hundred years preceding and following the Christian era, the government adopted the God of Heaven of ancient China and regarded him as a personal being. A great offering at the winter solstice was instituted. This was continued by succeeding dynasties until the abortive attempt to found a new dynasty by Yuan Shih-kai.

The idea of God was intimately connected with a principle already well known to the Chinese, namely, the equivalence of action and award. In China this principle was applied to the actions of the emperor by the literati and was

employed in order to curb autocratic power. God revealed his displeasure at the tyranny of emperors by signs and portents such as earthquakes and eclipses and strange phenomena among animals and men.

Another development in the Han dynasty had to do with Confucius. During the fourth and third centuries B.C. Confucius was considered the teacher by various groups in China. In the second century B.C. he was regarded as more than teacher. He was thought to be appointed by heaven to start a new dynasty to succeed the *Chou*. In the first century B.C. he was more than king. He was a god among men. In the first century A.D. he was again the teacher. An offering was instituted to him which almost equaled that to heaven. Grand titles were conferred upon him. During the Han dynasty God was regarded as personal. Confucius was the prophet of God.

In the first century of our era Buddhism entered China and for a period of eight hundred years dominated the thinking of China. During this long period there were no first-rate Confucian scholars. The Confucianists confined themselves to ruling the country. Buddhism brought an other-worldly religion. This world was illusion; it was to be escaped. The other world is the real world. The means of escape were asceticism, meditation, insight, and merit. The Sung philosophers revived Confucianism, but they placed the emphasis upon the naturalistic aspect. *Li* was the spiritual principle pervading the universe. *Ch'i* was the material principle. It was intimately connected with the spiritual principle, but was the principle of resistance and of individuation. The *ch'i* was connected with desire and so personal freedom was preserved.

Now this emphasis on the naturalistic trend seems to have stressed law over against freedom. The Sung scholars strengthened the autocratic power of the rulers and of all those in authority. One illustration will make this clear.

In a work edited by Chu-hsi (1130-1200) the question is asked, "May a widow who is poor and has no one to depend on marry?"

"Answer (by Ch'eng I): In such a case starvation is the only justification, but compared with loss of chastity starvation is merely a small matter."

On the other hand the presence of the *li* or universal principle in all men promoted equality. Every man had it in him to become a sage. It should be noted, however, that the sage ideal was so exalted that no ordinary man dared to aspire to it.

The scholars of the last dynasty were not interested in theology and metaphysics. Their criticism of the Sung philosophers did touch this naturalistic trend. They subjected the classics to a rigorous criticism and proved that a part of them were forgeries. They made it possible to discuss not only the text of a passage in the classics but the meaning of the passage. It is difficult for us to appreciate the boldness of this step. Han Yü said, "The classics were by the hands of former saints. How can discussion come up to them?" The classics could be cited as evidence, or by way of illustration, but they could not be discussed. Any suspicion of the content of the classics put one into the class opposed to the saints and in favor of lawlessness. Whatever had to do with the traditional values of religion was not brought into discussion. If it was discussed the spirits were maligned.

These scholars of the last dynasty did more. They made it possible to compare Confucius with the philosophers of China and of other lands. They brought him from his high pedestal among the great men of the world. The scholarly work of these men has made possible the intellectual and religious renaissance of present-day China and led both to an emphasis on the religious aspect of Confucianism and to the naturalistic aspect.

Now let us look for a moment at the reaction of modern Confucianism to the impact of Western culture. This reaction has proceeded along these two lines: On the one hand the line that we may call religious, spiritual; and on the other hand the line that may be called naturalistic. One of the exponents of this religious view was K'ang Yu-wei. K'ang Yu-wei, a great scholar of the last dynasty, examined the Spring and Autumn Classic and came to the conclusion that Confucius was a great religious reformer, like Buddha, Jesus, and Mohammed. K'ang Yu-wei had visions of spreading Confucianism over the world. In 1895 he said:

The heterodox teachings of the West have established themselves here and have aroused and misled our people. In the provinces the mission stations stand close to one another, while in each district there is one lonely temple of Confucius. Should not one be grieved at this? If outstanding men desire to spread Confucianism in foreign lands encouragement should be given them by edict, distinction, and official title. The state should help them financially and ambassadors and consuls should give them protection. When a man imparts the holy doctrine to the wild barbarian tribes so may it be truly said in the words of old: "To civilize the barbarians with the holy culture of China."

In 1898 K'ang Yu-wei said, "The day will come when all living will share the wisdom of Confucius. Everywhere its mighty echoes will resound. Men will strive to proclaim the teaching of Confucius about world peace and unity in all lands of the earth. For that is the completion of wisdom."

On the basis of this vision of world-wide Confucianism K'ang Yu-wei developed a plan for a Confucian world-state, Ta T'ung Shih, enlarging world-harmony. He anticipated the League of Nations by over two decades and a half. In this new era national boundaries were to be razed. There was to be one central group of officials in the world with regional administrative areas. All the officials, both central and regional, were to be elected by the people. The family was to be abolished. The children would be brought up and educated by the state.

The state attempted to promote the religious trend of Confucianism.

The highest honors were heaped upon Confucius. In 1906 he was made an Assessor of Heaven and Earth by imperial decree. After the republic was established an attempt was made to make Confucianism a state religion. Under the régime of Yuan Shi-kai this was actually done. In 1914 Yuan made an offering to Confucius. In 1915 Kuan Ti and Yo-Fei were added to the pantheon. The crowning event was the worship of heaven, to which Yuan went in an armored car!

During the years 1915-17 Ch'en Tu-hsiu published a number of articles attacking Confucianism. He stated that Confucianism developed in a feudal society and hence was not suited to democracy. It was a fossil of a bygone age. The ritual of the state should be abolished. Another writer, Wu Yü, pointed out that the doctrine of filial piety was not only at the basis of the family system of China, but also the foundation of the monarchy. He asserted that the concept *li*, the spiritual principle of neo-Confucianism, was the buttress of autocratic power and that the legal code of the Manchu dynasty was the product of a barbarian caste system.

On the other hand Dr. Sun Yat-sen believed that Confucian ethics could be adapted to modern conditions. In his lecture on democracy and nationalism he says that the system which gives absolute authority to the ruler, the father and the husband, is unjust and expresses inequality, and must be changed. But such moral values as filial piety, loyalty, altruism, sincerity, justice, and love of peace may be so interpreted as to promote world-civilization.

After the attack of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Wu Yü this religious aspect of Confucianism ceased to be a question of debate. Living issues and new objectives occupied the center of the stage. In 1928 the ministry of education ordered

the cessation of the annual offering to Confucius. Today in the temple of Confucius at Nanking the tablet of Confucius still occupies the place of honor. Before it is a small marble bust of Sun Yat-sen. On the pillars in the large hall are hung the portraits of Lord Kelvin, Galileo, Pasteur, James Watt, Newton, Lavoisier, John Dalton, and Benjamin Franklin. Thus Confucius and modern science are reconciled and enthroned in the life of the Chinese!

We have traced the fate of neo-Confucianism as a state religious system. The dethronement of Confucianism as a state system by no means spells the end of this old institution. Several attempts were made to revive it in another form. One is the attempt to make it a cult. This was established by Dr. Ch'en Huan-chang in 1911. The classics were published in a book resembling the Bible. A catechism was produced. A form of worship in harmony with modern views was organized. A new calendar was adopted, the first year beginning with the birth of Confucius. The metaphysical element was not overlooked. Confucius was represented as teaching the belief in God, the immortality of the soul, and punishment for sin. In Shansi Governor Yen established cleansing mind societies for the purpose of cultivating the personal life for the service of the state. At present this movement to establish Confucianism as a cult is fading out. In Peiping the Confucian University is struggling against an age which no longer knows Confucius.

Several other attempts to conserve the religious values of Confucianism have been made by various sects. The core of their teachings is Confucian; various ritual elements from the other religions are introduced. Some of these sects have a leaning to conservative politics. They are established by conservative scholars and business men.

Thus far I have discussed movements to conserve the religious element in Confucianism. There are many movements which are trying to develop the naturalistic element.

As early as 1912 Ts'ai Yuan-Pei proposed that Confucianism as a state system be abolished and that aesthetics be substituted for the superstitious rites of religion. According to Ts'ai, religion was built up through intellect, will, and feeling. In primitive times men's spiritual activity was chaotic. Men needed security and wanted to control nature. For this purpose they banded themselves and instituted what we call religion. Religion gained prestige because it had no competition.

In modern times science supplies all that religion gave to mankind and something more. It gives security. It enables man to control nature. Now all that is left to religion is the harmonizing of the emotions. This can be done more effectively by art. Pure art cultivates the emotions and enables us to form noble and pure habits. Through the universalizing aspect of art we are able to benefit ourselves without injuring others. Aesthetic feelings are universal. They remove the distinctions between ourselves and others. The future religion will be the harmonizing of emotions through aesthetics.

Dr. Ts'ai has seized upon an important strain in Confucianism. Confucius employed the rites and music to harmonize the individual and relate him to his environment. Many of the ceremonies were not directed toward getting things. They expressed the attitude and called attention to the relation of the individual in the scheme of things.

An attempt to continue and supplement Confucianism is the development of humanism. A number of men trained in Harvard and in Oxford have started a humanistic movement. This also continues an important element in Confucianism.

Another reaction is that which is attempting to organize the naturalistic trend of Confucianism. One of the outstanding leaders of this movement has been here before

you, and I am sure that you have all been charmed by his personality and interested in his message, so I shall not dwell extensively upon this very important aspect of what I dare to call modern Confucianism, but I shall do one thing. I shall read a quotation from a gentleman who was born in 1864. It shows you how modern some of the old men of China are. This particular essay was written in connection with a very important debate in China some years ago. On the one side was metaphysics and on the other side science. The attempt was made to destroy the metaphysical ghosts, and this gentleman represents the point of view of naturalism. He says:

The ultimate reality, if there is such a thing, is one. Even the so-called inorganic matter has feeling, as chemistry shows; so it is living. If that is granted, then we admit there is no qualitative difference between a stone, a rose, a fly, and a man. Our metaphysical creed will be: All things have life, for all have substance and force. The cosmological view can best be characterized as the view of the Dark Abyss. The Trinity of Darkness seems to have quarreled among themselves. One person says, This darkness is getting intolerable and I must change, for change may bring about the ideal state of affairs. The second says: No, I shall not change, for life is misery and existence is evil. The third says: I prefer the middle road. I will hope for the ideal, though I know the ideal is never realizable.

This conversation among the Trinity of Darkness has its corresponding types in the life of man. The first is optimism, and the second is pessimism. The third has several varieties. One of them compares the universe to a moving picture show. The film starts again when the first show is over. Another compares the universe to a kaleidoscope which, though interesting, should not be taken too seriously.

Putting aside these conflicting views of life, we say that the basic factors of life are hunger, sex, and friendship, and that any philosophy of life is to be judged by the fact whether it can adequately meet these needs. Take eating, for instance. Four principles should govern this factor of living. First, eat what you have earned by labor; second, eat your own food, but do not prevent others from eating theirs; third, create abundance of food for others to eat; fourth, even though you may fail to earn enough food for yourself, still you should refrain from robbing others.¹

¹ P. C. Hsü, *Ethical Realism in Neo-Confucian Thought*.

Thus we see that this exponent of a modern positivistic religion, while stressing the naturalistic aspect, begins with a subtle metaphysics and ends with an idealistic philosophy.

We have then today these two great streams of Confucianism. One is represented in a weak attempt to make a cult of Confucianism and also in the rapidly changing ancestor worship. The nationalistic cult, which is growing, is exalting Sun Yat-sen and the heroes of the revolution. On the other hand there is an overwhelming emphasis upon naturalism.

Confucianism has passed through many vicissitudes. At one period it stressed the personal aspect of the universe. At another period it emphasized the naturalistic aspect. At all times there was present an idealistic element. This idealistic element will humanize and spiritualize the impact of modern science and give rise to a great civilization in China. We may say, "Confucianism is dead. Long live Confucianism!"

XVIII

JUDAISM AND INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS

BY MORDECAI M. KAPLAN

THE impact of modernism as an ideological force has shaken the Jew's faith in his two-thousand-year-old tradition. The impact of modernism as a sociological force has wrought havoc in Judaism as a way of life. Remembering that modernism spells the assumption that man's salvation can be achieved only in this world through the exercise of intelligence and initiative, we have the key to the various aspects of the modern man's way of life, whether he be Jew or Gentile.

The new conception of salvation has removed the chief obstacle to cultural contact between Jews and the rest of the world, the obstacle inherent in the doctrine that only those who are eligible to salvation in the hereafter are eligible to citizenship in the state. With that fell the walls which had isolated the Jews from the Western nations. By being integrated into the life of those nations, the Jews are exposed to all the social and cultural forces which operate in their environment. But in the same way as the enlightenment, in the very process of destroying the traditional Jewish ideology, has been supplying the principles on which the new Jewish ideology is being built up, so has the emancipation, in the very process of rendering obsolete the traditional Jewish way of life, been providing the means of achieving a new Jewish way of life for the future.

The forces which the emancipation has released have not been uniform in their destructive effect on Judaism. Some of them have rendered superfluous, some have undermined, and some have actually disrupted the Jewish way

of life as lived hitherto. The forces which have rendered the Jewish way of life superfluous have emanated from the cultural, social, and recreational activities of the modern world. Humanism, or the substitution of the anthropocentric for the theocentric interest in the sciences and creative arts, has so widened the horizon of man's intellectual and artistic activities that the very preoccupation with religion, except for the few who specialize in it, seems abnormal. How the Jews responded to this humanism is only too well attested by the fact that although they number only four-fifths of one per cent of the world's population, they have furnished almost ten per cent of the Nobel prize winners, and that in our day the greatest physicist, the most outstanding psychologist, the most influential philosopher, and the greatest musical prodigy in the world are Jews. But, except for the fact that as Jews they reflect honor upon their people, Judaism as a way of life has been deprived of their abilities, some part of which would undoubtedly have gone toward developing its possibilities, had the collective life of the Jews functioned normally. This applies not only to the extraordinary genius of the few but also to the ordinary talent of the many Jewish scientists, thinkers, artists, playwrights, and men of letters who manage to live full and fruitful lives without ever bothering about Judaism.

It is not only men of creative ability who are diverted from Judaism. That is equally true of the average man. The opportunities which even he has for self-expression in his own humble way have rendered religious organization and institutionalism no longer indispensable to him. In social life, for example, the desire to achieve status as a person among persons has hitherto made the individual affiliate himself with some religious group. One can nowadays meet that desire more adequately by becoming associated with all kinds of societies, clubs, fraternal orders. This has

made religious affiliation for the majority of those who no longer view religion in the traditional theurgic fashion not only secondary but superfluous. Hence, the decline in the number of Jews affiliated with the synagogue corresponds proportionately with the decline in the number of non-Jews affiliated with the church.

An important and oft-overlooked factor in crowding Judaism out from the lives of the Jews is the enormous increase in opportunities for recreation. Until not so long ago, recreation was generally regarded as a distraction from the aim of self-fulfilment, or at best as a necessary evil to be kept within bounds. It is now treated as indispensable to health and to the healthful attitude toward life. The old adage, *mens sana in corpore sano*, is one of the living doctrines of modern civilization. Sports, gaming, dancing, and outings have become essential as a means of recuperating from the increasing wear and tear of the workaday existence. All this has made inroads into the Jewish life of the average Jew who will not be outdone by his neighbor in finding enjoyment in play and recreation.

If Judaism is being superseded by the cultural, social, and recreational interests, it is being undermined by the economic aspect of present-day civilization. The increase in available goods and services, unaccompanied as it has been by a corresponding improvement in the art of just distribution, the increased opportunities of self-enrichment for the few, the added facilities for exploiting the many, the general growth of instability and insecurity, have focused men's attention upon their economic interests. The "economic man" has become the ultimate unit of all human activity. To be self-conscious nowadays is to be money-conscious, conscious of either having it or wanting it.

How has that affected Judaism as a way of life? The handful of well-to-do Jewish bankers and merchant princes,

with very rare exceptions, are too preoccupied with their own affairs to give any thought to Jews and Judaism, and in the end find it to their financial and social advantage to join the church. The middle-class Jews have to engage in the general competitive struggle which is made all the keener for them because they seldom find their way into the basic industrial enterprises and are systematically excluded from the large business mergers. To exist at all they must give up the idea of not doing business or suspending work on their Sabbaths and festivals. With the elimination of these periodic occasions for recovering their Jewish self-awareness and practicing Jewish ways of life, it is all too evident that the middle-class Jews must grow up in total ignorance of why and unto what purpose they are Jews.

The economic aspect of modern civilization is undermining Judaism as a way of life among Jewish manual laborers to an even greater degree than it does among the middle-class Jews. But the factors at work in that process are of an altogether different character. Machine industry has forced the Jewish as well as the non-Jewish laborer to surrender whatever freedom he formerly enjoyed as an artisan in possession of his own tools, and has rendered him dependent upon solidarity with his fellow-workers. It is the only way he can escape being completely at the mercy of those who own the machines. Before long it became evident that any organization of the working classes to be effective could not afford to be limited to one industry or locality, but had to be all-inclusive, transcending even national lines. This has given rise to Marxist Socialism with its revolutionary ideology, with its emphasis upon class consciousness and class struggle. It has set itself up as the rival not only of the traditional universe of discourse, but also of the one which rationalist enlightenment has sought to build up. Into this vortex of economic conflict the Jew-

ish workingman has been drawn. Any associations that he might have with Judaism are completely eliminated from his life.

Paradoxical as it may seem, Judaism as a way of life has been hit hardest by the political emancipation which has changed the status of the Jew from that of alien to that of citizen. With the acceptance of civic rights, the Jews had to surrender their group autonomy which they had possessed during all the centuries of their existence wherever they had any kind of domicile. Although they constituted a subject or vassal group wherever they lived, they were free to carry on their cultural and religious activities in accordance with their own ways of living. They had their own educational system, their own courts of law, their own system of social controls. The Jewish religion was not merely a matter of theological creeds and ritualistic practices; it was the particular quality of the social organization and cultural activities of the Jews. But when the Jews became citizens of the state, they also became part of the social organization and entered unreservedly into the cultural activities of the general population. Consequently, they have been confronted with the problem: how to be spiritually satisfied with a Judaism which is reduced to a Barmecide feast by being deprived of the Jewish social and cultural content, with a Judaism minus the educational process which was coterminous with life, minus the administration of justice which pulsated with the love of the right, and minus the restraints and the stimuli which can be sustained only through social interaction. The only ones who, like the beggar in the Arabian nights, seem to enjoy the illusory feast are the Reformists.

This tale of the breakdown of Judaism as a way of life, however, is only half the story of what has been actually happening to it under the impact of the present-day environment. The other half unfolds a tale of a miracle of

resurrection. Out of the very forces that threaten dissolution Judaism is somehow managing to draw renewed vitality. It is the old riddle over again, how "out of the eater comes forth meat."

No sooner did the Jews avail themselves of the civic rights and seek a share in the worldly goods and opportunities by joining the general scramble, than the old prejudice and hatred against them were reawakened and acquired a venom and ferocity unknown before. It was in Germany that Jew hatred took on a new form entirely and developed a rationale which has made it more deadly than ever. Writhing under the blows inflicted upon it by Napoleon, weakened and divided by inner strife, and wanting in colonies as an outlet for its surplus population and goods, Germany has utilized the growing democratic spirit to foster a nationalism which for ruthlessness has surpassed any organized group hostility that the world has known. As a corollary of this rabid nationalism, it has developed Anti-Semitism as a phase of its life and state policy. Anti-Semitism is a brand new kind of Jew hatred. Formerly the Jew was persecuted for refusing to be like his neighbors. Anti-Semitism persecutes the Jew for insisting upon being so like his neighbors as to be almost indistinguishable. From Germany Anti-Semitism has spread to all the world, for everywhere nationalism is on the ascendant, and everywhere it has more or less nullified the political and civic rights accorded to the Jews.

Some time in the eighties of the last century, it began to be apparent that the social and spiritual adjustment which Jews had worked out on the basis of the Emancipation as an established fact had proved bankrupt. The question then arose where to find another way out. That way was found through a new movement which arose in Europe and grew simultaneously with the growth of Anti-Semitism. At the very time that the social structure of the Jewish

people, with all of its mores, customs, and institutions, was being undermined by democratic nationalism which deprived the Jews of all group autonomy, there began to assert itself the ultra-modern ideal of cultural self-determination. This democratic nationalism ethically interpreted could not but lead to cultural self-determination. With the growing recognition of the right of the individual to realize himself in accordance with his own conception of salvation, there has dawned the conviction that to deprive any group of the right to foster its own language and civilization was equally a form of despotism incompatible with the ideal of freedom. This conviction became rife among the minority peoples of central and eastern Europe whom the fortunes of war and political intrigue had left totally prostrate at the feet of the three empires, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Russia.

Thus impelled by Anti-Semitism, and directed by cultural self-determination, the Jewish people has been in search of a method of *self-emancipation*, a method of ordering its life in accordance with its own inner necessity instead of being guided by the unstable tendencies of the environment. So far as the Jews can be said to have arrived at a formula for reconstructing their corporate framework, that formula may be stated as follows: (1) the establishment of a national homeland in Palestine for the free and unhampered development of Jewish life and culture, (2) the acquisition of minority group rights in central and eastern Europe where other minority groups enjoy such rights, and (3) the establishment of communities to carry on both cultural and social endeavor in countries like America and France. While this formula is not expected to solve the problem of Anti-Semitism, it will help the Jews maintain their self-respect and moral stamina without which life can hardly be worth while.

A polarity analogous to that of the political set up of

modern civilization the Jew discovers also in the economic phase. The most serious threat to Judaism is implied in the undue sharpening of the economic consciousness and in the fact that for the disinherited of the world, including the Jewish workers, that consciousness has developed an idealism and religion of its own which may prove to be a formidable rival to the historical religions and cultures. On the other hand, it is that very rivalry which is forcing Jewish religion to abandon the other-worldliness in terms of which it was wont to articulate its aims during the last two thousand years, and to reinstate the prophetic message of social righteousness as the soul and essence of all civilization. There is enough truth in the economic interpretation of human life and history to invalidate the illusion of individualistic and theurgic schemes of salvation, the kind of schemes that have made of religion an opiate. But there is not enough truth in that interpretation for the individual or society to live by. That supplementary truth is to be found in the prophetic version of the world's meaning and man's place in it, a version according to which any form of oppression or exploitation is an attempt to subvert the law which God has implanted into man's world. All such attempts must in the end defeat themselves. Wars, revolutions, national and world catastrophes, are the penalty men pay for the violation of God's law. They are the *reductio ad absurdum* of the denial of God. They point to the time when the sovereignty of God will be made manifest through the universal and whole-hearted allegiance which men will give to His Law of righteousness. It is in the spirit of this religious socialism that the foundation of the Jewish national homeland is being laid by the young pioneers in Palestine. They refuse to profit by the labor of others. No work is too hard, no undertaking too dangerous, in their zeal and determination to have their national homeland built on the lines laid

down by Isaiah when he said, "Zion shall be redeemed through justice, and they that return to her through righteousness."

No less two-sided than the effect of the political and economic elements in the contemporary scene upon Judaism is the effect of the cultural, social, and recreational elements. At the very time that the Western culture preempted the powers of Jewish creativity, it has fertilized those which have remained with the Jewish people. If it were not for the enlightenment which shook the Jews out of their medievalism, Judaism would have been confined to those who by some chance drifted into some backwater of civilization, and managed to escape the vast currents of present-day thought and life. Profiting by modern rationalism and science, Judaism has achieved a new lease on life. It not only finds itself at home in the contemporary universe of discourse; it hopes to be soon in a position to add an idiom of its own, thereby contributing to that discourse instead of merely benefiting by it.

Symbolic of the fact that Judaism will be able to contribute to the cultural values of the world is the almost incredible rapidity with which it has retrieved the ancient tongue through which it has articulated its most cherished ideas and intuitions. The renaissance of the Hebrew language which had been embalmed into a language of theology and limited to about one thousand word roots, and the expansion of it to vernacular usage sufficiently flexible and concrete for the most specific and technical purposes, are a guarantee of the inexhaustible cultural energy which inheres in the Jewish people. That guarantee has to some extent been made good by the large output of a new creative writing in poetry and prose which can hold its own by the side of the best in modern literature.

The arts of form and music have as yet not made such rapid strides. They depend much more than language and

literature upon the existence of a stabilized mode of life. But there can be no doubt that they too will come to their own in Jewish life before long. Enough has already been produced in the plastic arts, in drama, and in music, to indicate that Jewish life will in time possess a wide range of esthetic values which will help to humanize and spiritualize life for Jew and non-Jew alike. The German repudiation of the great gifts which the Jews placed at the disposal of German culture will undoubtedly have the effect of transferring such gifts to productivity in terms of Jewish culture. Thus as a result of contact and intercourse with the complex and variegated cultural life of our day, Judaism as a way of life is certain to evolve sufficient of its own cultural content to help its own adherents live abundantly.

Even this brief survey of what is taking place in Jewish life must lead one to conclude that Judaism is on the threshold of a new stage in its career. The Judaism of tomorrow will be as unlike the Judaism of yesterday as the world of tomorrow will be unlike the world of yesterday. May that tomorrow be a day of universal freedom, justice, and peace.

IV. THE TASK OF MODERN RELIGION

XIX

THE TASK OF MODERN ISLAM

BY MARTIN SPRENGLING

WE HAVE now arrived at the eschatological and apocalyptic sections of these discussions. Eschatology and apocalypics have been a *bête noire* in my life—ever since in my early youth I received a severely fundamentalist training in theology. To do any justice to my audience and my subject I feel that I must first make this confession.

There have been many times in my moderately long life when I felt myself in the position of a David placed over against a Goliath, and I did not always have even a sling and a stone handy. But no task has ever seemed quite so stupendous to me as the task of defining or saying anything worth while about the task of modern religion. I am by trade an Arabist, with a number of more or less closely related sidelines. The university has officially designated me Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures, editor of the *Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, and now Head of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures. In all this I can find no qualification for any pronouncement on the task of modern religion.

The days when I was an active, orthodox preacher are too far back in an ever more swiftly receding past. The only consolation I have to fall back on is the fact that a president of this university, by the authority in him vested, granted me the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. If, therefore, as a Ph.D. I make some D.Ph. statements that disagree with your thinking, for the most part far better

trained than mine for such a venture, you must not be surprised. I have duly forewarned you.

But my task is far worse than the one set forth in the general title for the talks of this last day of the Haskell Institute round table. To define a task, to lay out a program for a group, small or large, to which I belong, on lines so broad, is in all conscience a task to tax the abilities of a Titan. But to define the task, in this modern world, of Islam, a religion far flung, variegated as the rainbow in races (at least nine distinct ones), feelings, ideas, practices, institutions—changeable as a chameleon—that is a job before which most thoughtful Moslem doctors of divinity would quail.

That, in fact, is my greatest difficulty. I am, indeed, foreign to Islam, but I am no stranger to it; I have lived with it long, in close and arduous study, and have looked upon it with alternate love and irritation, so that it has left something of its color on me. Perhaps that difficulty might in a measure be overcome, but the real difficulty is to define Islam and its task as one.

For Islam is far less unified and uniform than most people of the West commonly think. It does not surprise me in the least to hear that Islam is divided, disintegrated by divisions, falling apart under the impact of foreign cultures, ideas, philosophies, institutions, inventions. What does surprise me intensely is to find that this is supposed to be something new, of the last century, since the war. Why, this has been its very life from the very beginning. It would not be truly Arabic in origin if it were not so. The brief glamor of the early Moslem-Arabic conquests merely disguised the fact for a moment. There, in less than ten years, we have the Arabic word for "temptation," "sore trial," *fitnah*, coming to mean "civil discord" chiefly for religious reasons. That was the Moslems' pet lament; it recurred so constantly. And their word for heresy is

bid'ah, "innovation," introduced by the impact of foreign culture. They had plenty of *bid'ahs*. Their historians of religion—and the Moslems were the first to develop this branch of science—rather enjoy the game of counting up to ninety-nine heresies within Islam, and find difficulty in cramming them into this number.

The impact of Semitic and Iranian sister-religions, Judaism, Christianity, both in half-a-dozen forms, Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, and other religions which may be grouped together as Gnostic, all influenced Islam in various ways and times and places and created *fitnahs*—troubles—by their *bid'ah* heresies. New races and new places—Greek, Aramaean, Copt, Persian, Hindu, Berber, Latin, Goth, Turk, Mongol—all entered to pull the fabric of Islamic Empire and culture apart. If this modern European onslaught seems to the superior Western mind to be disintegrating the essence of an aging Islam, just read sometime the words with which the great thirteenth-century historian Ibn Athir introduces his woeful tale of the impact of Mongol culture on Islam from the East while European culture in the persons of the sainted Louis and other sainted crusaders were gnawing at its vitals in the West. Islam is not, and never has been, one sheet of deadly uniformity. It is now, and always has been, many and manifold forms, each seeking or being given its task or tasks and performing them as best it can in its own time and place.

And yet there is in the lay brotherhood of Islam, never effectually fettered by priestly master or council, a broad-bosomed catholicity that has been able somehow to absorb within its texture the dreamy pantheistic mystic and the enthusiastic dancing dervish, the luxurious prince and the poverty-stricken peasant, the high thinking philosopher and the hardshell theologian. And it has colored them all, from inner China to Morocco and from Mada-

gascar to the Russian steppes, with a unity as subtle at least, and fully as effective, as any which binds together Christendom or Judaism. In fact, the pressure of the West, cultural, political, economically exploiting or educationally helpful in intention, has begun to create new harmonies of Eastern Christian and Moslem, of orthodox Sunnite and heterodox Shiite, and even close-knit separatist sects like the Druzes feel themselves once more pridefully and beligerently of the Moslem world against the West.

And the task of all these and of this elusive unity? We have become reasonably broad in the last paragraph. I must become broader still if I am to find the task of modern religion. Let me fall back on a word of my first statement here: Religion is, to my mind, an attitude toward life. Now if we can, as William James bids us, distinguish and differentiate the religious from other attitudes, then perhaps we shall be able to discern a little of its task or tasks.

So then, as science seeks, sometimes quite ruthlessly, the truth of things, as politics seeks order (or, with misplaced zeal, disorder), and art, beauty (believe it or not), as trade and industry seek daily bread and still too much one's own profit, so religion seems to me to be the urge to happiness. Whether crude and selfish or less or more intelligently wide and altruistic, I can find no better task for religion than the search for happiness. Whether it promises hours in heaven or intimate spiritual communion with God, whether in harsh asceticism or in gentler improvement of *mores*, whether by hard-and-fast formulated doctrines or in a finespun web of intricate rites, the essential thing seems to me to be that it all waits or strives for happiness.

If this be so, how shall we get a reasonable idea of what is going on in this search—I hesitate to say what should go on—in the Moslem world? Shall we take it by sections, beginning, let us say, with best-publicized Turkey? What is happening there? The church side of Islam is disestab-

lished, degraded to the position of a handmaid or tool. The Ghazi, Mustapha Kemal, uses it for the ruthless advertising methods of our big business and high finance, learned in part from ourselves, from German salesmanship, from French and British colonial administration, but most of all from the successful efforts of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, which we persist in calling Russia. The church in the Ghazi's new Turkey is indeed an advertising medium through which he seeks to push his nationalistic improvement program. Very realistic all this, and largely materialistic. But with all due respect to the Ghazi's extraordinary abilities, we wonder whether he is not in no small measure deceiving himself. He may be deceiving himself as to the strength and pervasiveness of the Islamic subsoil of modern Anatolia into which his simple and direct soldierly agnosticism scarcely reaches. He may be fooling himself as to the extent of his realistic materialism. His utter lack of any intention of dynastic perpetuation gives evidence, through all of the haze of debauchery and self-aggrandizement cast about his person, of a large modicum of selfless, altruistic idealism. What is all his improvement program for? For the happiness of his people. And what sort of task is that if not religious? And as for the modernity of its method, what can be more modern than Mussolini and Hitler?

But we cannot go on like this from section to section. We must seek a simpler division of the Moslem world. Many might be found. We might divide it into the various agencies by which it seeks its people's happiness. Take its dervish orders and their mystic dances, weavings, and incantations. What do they seek? Ecstasy, a moment or an eternity of ecstatic union with God. And is not that happiness? And do they not provide as good a show for the money for the dwellers in Eastern mud-hut villages as did the revival meeting for the farmers of our former back-

woods? Or perhaps nearly as good even as the Hall of Religion and other sideshows of our present Century of Progress? But enough of this! This division, too, of the world of Islam would demand too much detailed explanation.

There is, perhaps, an angle from which we may reach a simpler and more easily intelligible division of the whole. Following the lead of several previous speakers, let us divide the whole great block of the Moslem world into three great sections everywhere found in varying measures and degrees. There are conservatives (including reactionaries); there are moderates, some quite liberal; and there are radical progressives, some split into dual personalities.

Reactionaries and conservatives are, despite the picturesqueness of some of their aspects, for the man of ultra-modern urge, an irritating lot. Yet how serious and how sincere most of them are! And how concerned for the happiness—of themselves and others! Let them impede progress. They are still serving their people's happiness and welfare as well and as effectively as the most impatient reformer. They are tremendously useful in the process of modernizing backward sections. They represent in the Near East as in this prevalently Christian land an overwhelming majority. That is, perhaps, as it should be.

It has been well said that in a moving, rotating body the centripetal forces must outweigh the centrifugal, else it will fly apart. Much may be said for their obstinate resistance to the too great pressure of Western domination and exploitation. They are preventing much unhappiness from the maladjustment of too rapid and too one-sided progress. They are carrying the happiness of great multitudes on powerful shoulders through difficult times. And, as my friend Taha Husain and I have pointed out in the December, 1932, *Open Court* New Orient monograph, they are not blocking completely the wheels of progress.

In Arabia the Imam Yahya took Charles R. Crane and his party to sacred Sana^ca in a motor car and allowed them to establish a model farm with American windmills for irrigation and cradles for reaping, as witness Twitchell's articles in several numbers of *Asia* early in 1933. In Arabia, with the consent of his theologians, Ibn Saoud maintains a fleet of motor cars, military, police, and civil; establishes a network of powerful wireless stations; lays down for pilgrim hosts of Mecca and Medina a sanitary code (briefly summed up by the American Medical Association from a translation made by Mrs. Florence Lowden Miller of the Oriental Institute), a sanitary code with teeth in it, and by latest reliable reports effectively managed. Another element that enters more subtly into the picture is the apologetic endeavor of the orthodox Moslem, who tries to prove that Mohammed and the church fathers anticipated modern scientific attitudes and improvements and thus adopts them. So much for the forces of conservatism.

The moderates we may sum up shortly. Theirs is the task of moderating and forming a bond of union between the too impatient climbers up the new Sinai's thunderous slopes and the mob reluctantly lingering with the fleshpots and golden calves in the darkening, desiccating depths. Curious figures, some of them, like the Agha Khan, a costly demigod to his little Asiatic group and a *roué* of the race courses in Paris and London. But aside from some such contribution to the gaiety of the nations, do not these men, too, in their own for the most part serious and sober way seek and find happiness for many? Many such figures may be found in the book of my friend and former student, C. C. Adams, on *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*.

And now, finally, the little group of impatient radicals. Trouble-makers these; wild petrels. Our police name for them is "bolsheviks." But what excellent, keen-eyed, tender-hearted, hard-working men! If you would meet a few,

read the last pages of Adams on Taha Husain and 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq. Read Taha Husain himself, in the *Open Court* for December, 1932, or in his excellently translated autobiographic book, *An Egyptian Childhood*. These are radicals out of power, deposed from official positions. The one is now a columnist in a Cairo daily, the other the editor of a magazine read as far as the Arabic language reaches, and that is still much farther in original or in translation than most of us in the West even remotely suspect. And both maintain stoutly that they are Moslems.

At least one of the radicals in a position of power, Mustapha Kemal, certainly does not make much of the profession of Islam and is perhaps even working as hard as he can for its speedy change out of all recognition. And perhaps there may be some truth in the wishful thinking of Frenchmen, even great French scholars, that North Africa is being weaned from Islam to Gallicism, though that may be doubted. In any case, what matters it if the name does fall? A very great, though little-known world-religion, to which once Augustine himself belonged, was Manicheism. It is named after Mani, a wonderful artist, the most cultured and canny, in many ways the most remarkable, of all the founders of great religions. It has disappeared, after a long, stormy, and difficult career, entirely in name. But its lifeblood flows on and works on in the great religious task of creating happiness in the very veins of Catholicism, Protestantism, and even in Soviet Russia and into the confines of China, as well as in much of both orthodox and heretical Islam.

Why, then, should we gloat with narrow, old-time missionaries, and no less narrow Western nationalists or scientific thinkers, over the possible, though not very probable, prospect that the name of Islam may be on the way to extinction? And if we do so rejoice, then why not do for ourselves what we want done unto others? So if we

think we foresee this result, why should we cling with such tragic insistence on invidious, divisive, medieval names like Christianity and Judaism?

In so doing we are perhaps conservatively preserving, for the many who are slow, antiquated but still useful conventions, as, indeed, the Old World nationalistic construction of a Mustapha Kemal, a Mussolini, and a Hitler may be providing narrow but well-charted channels of passing national cohesions, easily grasped and surveyed, as a passage for their people to a greater international or world organization that lies beyond.

But is not the working *out of* the old and *into* the coming new day at least as great a task? If we see Islam, and perhaps Confucianism and Buddhism, waning, may not our greatest painful happiness, the most important task of our modern religiousness, be the abandonment of old battle-scarred names, the envisaging of a day when there shall be neither Moslem nor Jew nor Christian, therefore also none stigmatized as non-Moslem, non-Jew, non-Christian—a twilight of the gods dawning in a new, gloriously laughing day?

XX

THE TASK OF BUDDHISM

By HIDEO KISHIMOTO

I THINK it better to explain my situation in a few words before presenting this paper. The study of comparative religion in Japan very naturally lays emphasis on Buddhism, and, as a student of comparative religion, my own interest is more in Buddhism than in any other religion; but what I am going to do here is to take an objective and critical attitude and to describe the situation and the task of Buddhism in the modern age in Japan, rather than in the world in general. I am going to confine myself to Japan, not only because I am a Japanese, but also because Japan is almost the leading Buddhistic country in the modern world.

Buddhism is said to be vitally alive in Japan. Buddhism went through its hardest time and was at its lowest tide in the middle of the last century, when the anti-Buddhistic sentiment prevailed all over Japan, accompanied by the nationalistic spirit of the Meiji restoration and the separation movement of the Shintoists. But it has been reviving with great speed during the last twenty-five years. And perhaps a later historian may describe the present condition as one of the most prosperous periods of Buddhism in our history. There are twelve denominations, which include fifty-six minor sects, over one hundred thousand temples, almost a hundred and fifty thousand priests and monks, over twenty Buddhistic universities and colleges, and schools, hospitals, and settlements, as well as a huge amount of land and property belonging to each temple. Such numbers may give some notion of the prosperous condition of Buddhism in Japan today, but not exactly.

Often statistics and outside aspects show only the vestiges of past periods. The spirit of a new age is quite slow in coming to the surface of mass consciousness. We must look into the inside of Buddhism to judge its real potential activity. Though there is no clear distinction in it, we may be able to distinguish two different currents: an ecclesiastical Buddhism, on the one hand, and new Buddhist movements, if one may call them so, on the other.

Ecclesiastical Buddhism still retains much of the indolence it acquired during the past three centuries. It is too much divided into minor sects. Each branch is too preoccupied with the subtleties of its own ancient teaching to have a truly wide view and to feel the delicate problems of the modern age. The same defects have been very apparent in the Christian sects in Japan.

And so the present flourishing condition does not necessarily promise the future prosperity of Buddhism. However, when we shift our eyes to the fresh spirit of the rising new movements, we can feel a bright hope for its future. As a Japanese thinker said, "Buddhism as an aggregate of church organizations is hopelessly degenerated, yet not without signs of spiritual vitality."

The new movements started from two different grounds. One is the new development in the direction of social work. In social work, modern Japanese Buddhism derived much stimulus from Christianity, which it has taken as a model. But it must be remembered that the deeper motives come from the original soul of the religion and the model of the past ages. It is a natural outcome of the ideal of the Buddhahood in Mahayana Buddhism, which is the universal salvation of the people. ✓

The other source from which the new movement started is the recent academic studies. The recent critical study in the languages which, for Buddhism, are classical, leads the student's interest toward the doctrine of the early Bud-

dhism, Buddha's own Buddhism, before the development of the sectarian doctrines. On the other side, extensive study in the higher criticism of the Buddhistic texts helps the student to break through the walls of the sectarian dogmas, and to focus people's interest on the fundamental point of the Buddhistic doctrine in the light of modern philosophy. As a result of this, Buddhism seems to be gaining more ground in the minds of intellectuals as a living religious philosophy.

The common aspect of these social and academic movements is that both are seriously trying to ignore the traditional sectarian differences and to proceed on the basis of the fundamental principles of Buddhism, to face directly the problems of the modern world. And, these two movements are supported chiefly by those who are outside of the organized bodies and who have more or less revolted against them.

When we come, however, to the problem of the tasks of Buddhism in the modern world, we must frankly admit that we do not know whether to be sufficiently optimistic to discuss how Buddhism is to lead this civilization; or to be sufficiently pessimistic to worry about the fate of the desperate struggles of Buddhism to accommodate itself to the modern world. Certainly, with all the other established religions, Buddhism is seriously on trial with regard to its ability to solve the problems cast by the modern age. How should Buddhism answer the problem of the recent social uneasiness? Can Buddhistic doctrine go hand in hand with scientific theory and the modern critical philosophy? Should the sphere of Buddhism be confined to the Asiatic countries? Answers to these questions are rather slow in coming out and indefinite in developing. Thus there is reason for the existence of criticism against the future potential power of Buddhism.

However, if I describe a few points involved in some re-

cent phases of Buddhism I may clarify the position of this religion in the modern world.

First, during the last decade the prevailing thought among Japanese, especially among the younger generation, as in other nations, was the rising doubt concerning the present social system of capitalism. No period before had witnessed in Japan so many publications on labor movements, Marxism, syndicalism, social reconstruction, and so on. The mind of the younger generation seemed to have been seized by the sweeping flame of communistic thought and Marxian theory. One spear-head of attack was turned toward positive religion; in Japan, naturally toward Buddhism. Religion, according to such theories, is nothing but opium. It is simply a disguised means of exploitation by capitalists. Many warm arguments were engaged in between Marxian thinkers and Buddhistic scholars. Various discussions and debates were carried on until the contestants reached a certain point, and apparently the arguments are all over at present. That is, both sides reached the point of realizing that they were arguing at cross-purposes. The Marxians were attacking religion as an established institution while Buddhists were defending religion as a spiritual principle.

The established Buddhistic institutions and system of today may, to be sure, have various defects in common with those of the capitalistic system, because the former was under the influence of the latter for several generations. Even from inside of this religion we can hear abundant cries to abandon such established institutions with empty prosperity and to return to the pure spiritual Buddhism. But this capitalistic tinge of it is simply additional and is not fundamental to Buddhism as a religion at all. Even if every existing Buddhistic institution and temple be destroyed Buddhism itself will not perish. It existed long before the capitalistic system was established. There

comes to be a clearer realization that Buddhism is fundamentally a principle of spiritual life and not a principle of sociology.

This plain consequence seems to be rather significant. It not only throws light on the future aspect of Buddhism but also suggests the realm where Buddhism is to work. It would, of course, be commendable for Buddhism to extend its field to social work and to the problem of the social system, because it is a natural outcome of the ideal of Buddhahood in the universal salvation of mankind. But social work itself is not a fundamental part of Buddhism. It may be that in future days, as the modern tendency already has revealed it, all such work will be taken over by the government and carried on without the idea of charity. The major realm of Buddhism will be, thus, in the cultivation of spiritual happiness through religious enlightenment, as it has been since the time of Buddha. I hope this will also throw light on a similar problem in Christianity: that is, the so-often-uttered complaint that, while Marxian teaching has a social theory, Christian teaching has not.

Second, let us consider the problem of the foreign missions. It is a strange historical fact that the development of Christianity was West-bound, and that Christianity hardly touched the soil of the Far East until the sixteenth century, while the development of Buddhism was East-bound, and Buddhism has never gone beyond the Asiatic countries. Recently the value of the Christian missionary work in the Orient has been questioned, and with good reason. Investigation of the work of the missionary has been summarized in the report "Re-Thinking Missions." In this excellent book, naturally, the value of missionary work is weighed exclusively from the viewpoint of Christianity, though careful study of the relation of Christianity to other oriental religions is involved. A student of comparative religion, as a third person, might have a word to add from the

point of view of religion in general. The best result that Christian missionary work has had, in Japan at least, has been to give a new inspiration and stimulation to Buddhism and to revive it. The arrival of the ardent Christian missionaries naturally urged the Buddhistic priests to awaken their own religious vigor.

This situation might be advantageously reversed. If the Buddhistic missionary could come in an adequate way to the Christian countries it would be good not only for the minority of the occidental people who are essentially interested in Buddhism but also for Christianity in general. It would exert various indirect influences on Christianity.

The "foreign mission" seems to be a new ideal for the Japanese Buddhist. As a Japanese Buddhistic leader stated, "The message of the new Buddhism must proceed to face the problem of whether it can be the motive of the new inspiration and spiritual progress not only of one nation, Japan, but of the modern world civilization." The growing resemblances of the types of the civilization of East and West and the increasing similarities of social problems help the progressive Buddhist to entertain this new ideal. The recent rise in the evaluation of the oriental cultures must also be taken into account.

This Buddhistic foreign-mission movement is already taking place. For example, the Pan-Pacific Young Men's Buddhist Association movement covers the west coast of the American continent as well as the oriental countries. Though it is yet mostly limited to the Japanese, its influence is extending. There has been a plan going on to build a Buddhistic temple in Paris to make it the center of the Buddhistic teaching and studies in Europe. In Japan a special seminary has been established for the occidentals, and we find there occasionally occidental converts.

But then, on what point may Buddhism appeal to the modern mind, to the occidental as well as to the oriental?

This is the final subject to me and the most important question of all. The unique characteristic of Buddhism in comparison with other religions is the fact that it is fundamentally atheistic: religion without the idea of God.

In later Buddhism the doctrinal divergence is quite wide. One can find almost every type of religious doctrine in the different sects of Buddhism. This is because, in the course of history, Buddhism did not have the chance to pass through a political system such as the Roman Empire and to learn for centuries to establish a monopolistic hierarchy like the Roman church. This was a disadvantage to Buddhism from a practical point of view, but was fortunate from the point of view of doctrinal development. There was neither orthodoxy nor heterodoxy; each sect was allowed to maintain and cultivate its own independent character. So the Pure-Land sect (Shin-shu) has the appearance of being as monotheistic as Christianity, and the True-Word sect (Shingon-shu) contains a tinge of polytheism. However, fundamentally, Buddhism remained atheistic. Buddha's own doctrine was decidedly atheistic.

The historical Buddha showed by his own personal experience the way to enlightenment. Enlightenment means the high stage of religious experience where the insight to the truth of the universe develops in one's mind. So, what his follower should do is simply to follow his personal example and have the experience of enlightenment as Buddha had. By attaining enlightenment one can get rid of the misguided attachment to worldly things so that one can see things as they are and be freed of self-suffering from prejudice.

Then, to reach enlightenment by religious exercise is the central aim of Buddhism. Buddhism is not originally a religion which makes the relation between deity and man its principal theme. This aspect of Buddhism is typically represented by the Zen sect, a sect of atheistic speculative

mysticism. Even in the theistic appearance of some other sects it is not difficult to detect an atheistic undercurrent.

All through the course of history, not only in the Orient but also in the Occident, there has been a certain type of person whose mentality tended toward pantheism or atheism. The history of the mystics in Christian countries is an actual chronicle of such people. But, because of the long monopolization of orthodox doctrine by monotheism, there was little chance for the atheistic religious philosophy to develop. Furthermore, the Christian people's minds were so well accustomed to the theistic idea that the atheistic Buddhistic doctrine, although suggestion of it appeared now and then, was hardly to be accepted.

But recently, since the conflict between science and theistic religion has become keen, the circumstances seem to be changing. Most of the difficulty between the modern scientific view and the religious idea from this point of view results from the notion of the existence of God and his nature. If this notion is taken out, and religion without the idea of God, but with religious experience, is established, then religion and science can go together with fair smoothness. Apparently in the Occident there is some tendency moving in this direction. Some aspects of the recent humanistic movement in this country may be taken as the guiding light of the pioneers in this direction. The increasing academic interest, in Europe and the United States, in Buddhism also represents such a tendency.

A people's culture, psychological inclination, and mental capacity differ a great deal geographically, socially, and intellectually. So here is the reason for the existence of varieties of religious types such as polytheism, monotheism, pantheism, and atheism. Each type of doctrine should develop according to the interest of the people, to increase their happiness. But to a certain group of the people who have the atheistic tendency, this philosophy of Buddhism,

which is the crystallization of the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese philosophy during the course of twenty-five hundred years, will have something to contribute. This will be the most important task of Buddhism for the coming age. Naturally, the atheistic doctrine of oriental Buddhism may need some modification, if it is to be adaptable to the occidental mind. That is the work which remains for the occidental people.

XXI

THE TASK OF JUDAISM

BY SOLOMON GOLDMAN

IN SPEAKING of the Judaism of the future, I concern myself, of course, with the social message of Judaism; and the social message of Judaism of the future will, perhaps, not be different from the social message of other religions. And, therefore, I shall speak in a general way of the religion of the future, with special reference from time to time to Judaism.

The task of modern religion, it seems to me, is to secure for man the values promised by the old religions. Thus, the task of modern religion is not altogether different from the task of religion in the ancient world. In recorded history, environment has changed for a large part of the world's population. But the human factor has not suffered perceptible metamorphosis. Abraham and his contemporaries in Ur would probably have agreed that what they wanted to wrest from life was security, truth, goodness, and beauty. Abraham, even though not an Athenian, was not indifferent to the comely Sarah. There is, perhaps, sufficient evidence to assume that the patriarch was not averse to goodness or truth.

Most normal men in our own day are in search of happiness. A little probing would reveal that what they understand by happiness is the fusion of security, goodness, truth, and beauty. Those who possessed the intelligence to formulate their desires in logical statement have as a rule quested for little more. Scores of articles and numerous books entitled "What I Believe," "My Utopia," "The Next Step in Religion," "Religion Coming of Age," "The

Future of Society," "The Future of Man," "Churches New and Old"—all written but yesterday—as well as whole systems of religion and philosophy, can be summarized in these four words. Professor Haldane, certainly a man of today, writes, "I believe that the scientist is trying to express absolute truth and the artist absolute beauty. So that I find in them, and in an attempt to lead a good life, all the religion that I need."

What, then, do we mean when we speak of a new religion, or the religion of tomorrow, or modern religion? Do we have in mind a new set of values, a goal our fathers knew not of? Evidently not. Modern religion does not set up for itself a new goal. It is seeking to develop a new technique based on more recent knowledge and experience, by means of which to harvest the time-honored human values. The farmer today, even as the farmer of yore, wants to produce bread, but the modern farmer does not, like the moujik of Czarist Russia, invite the priest to sprinkle his horses before plowing, or, like the Roman *Agricola*, invoke ten deities before sowing. The modern farmer, still wanting bread, relies on implements, tools, and methods, knowledge and experience have procured for him. I believe, therefore, that I have said at least all that I have to say on the subject of modern religion. Briefly, it is the task of modern religion to forge the tools, to develop the social control, wherewith society can win the good life.

Why, then, does history record such hostile clashes between religion and reason, religion and science? It is because the emotions of man seem to have ripened almost with the dawn of self-consciousness. Reason and science, on the other hand, have been maturing only by slow degrees, in painful protraction. The awe-inspiring fiat, "Let there be light," thrilled man generations before he could penetrate the quality or measure the speed of light, even as the urge to speak agitated the human brain, for chiliads

before Demosthenes pronounced his oration "On the Crown." Our ancestors had to live and find security with their limited knowledge. It is sad that all of us are heirs to beliefs that are the outcome of hit-and-miss, blundering fear, hysteria, and insanity, but it is, nevertheless, the fact. Sadder still is it that we endowed these erring creeds with the dignity of dogmatic truth. Emerson somewhere remarks that, "That is ever the difference between the wise and unwise: the latter wonders at what is unusual, the wise man wonders at the usual." Our uninformed fathers speculated about the ideal, the transmundane, and the noumenal long before they were ready to understand the real, the mundane, or phenomenal. Thus they bequeathed unto us a heavy legacy of superstition and dogma.

Modern religion must remove this obstacle from the road of progress. It is its task to unravel the skein of superstition and expose the meager substance of dogma. Like ancient religion, modern religion is to seek truth and, *ipso facto*, must challenge the truth of the fathers. Judaism, since I am to speak for my own heritage, must free itself from a world view based on vague speculations and day-dreaming. Official Judaism, that is, the Synagogue, if it is to share in the upbuilding of a new social order, will have to abandon the miraculous accounts of the revelation of a mythological deity. As long as pulpit and pew—Orthodox, Reformed, or Conservative—will indulge themselves in liturgic formulas that reflect a philosophy subversive of science and reason, so long will Judaism be denied the privilege of sharing in the reshaping of man's world. Tying with phrases from Eddington and Whitehead and apotheosizing electrons and photons may momentarily bring larger crowds, but it will fail to pour into the veins of Judaism the boiling vitality of ancient prophecy.

It ought not to be difficult to make the adjustment and

jettison the superstitions. For Judaism, from the time it emerged from the crucible of prophecy, concerned itself with conduct rather than with creed, with ethical precepts rather than with theological formulations. The ancient Rabbis argued to hair-splitting concerning our duties to the widow, the orphan, the child, and the community. Every law of conduct they submitted to the sharp edge of a faultless logic. Their cosmic views, however, they gave but the barest and vaguest generalization. Modern Judaism can readily leave cosmic views to individual preference and substitute for rigid dogmas workable hypotheses.

Judaism, together with the other religions, will have to be cautious and sparing in the use of capitals, whether it be of reality, absolute, or God. Much has been said, even at these sessions, about the cosmic yearnings of man and his clinging to the absolute. Now, this so-called cosmic urge may be the yearning of life to be more than it is; it may be purely suggestive and not natural or instinctive. In our childhood we were fed on big words and phrases such as the "totality of experience," the "totality of the universe," the "soul of the universe." These suggestions have become deeply imbedded in the emotions. How far these childhood suggestions are responsible for what we call the cosmic urge, or the need of the absolute, I do not know. Students of religious cultures, as well as psychologists, have not been altogether unsuccessful in the digging up of the origins of the absolute. We have every reason to believe that they will learn more. After all, friends, but yesterday the fear of the devil was as real as the love for the absolute, and the devil, too, was capitalized.

Objective study cannot help but reveal that absolute idealism no less than medieval scholasticism reared a structure of logic on the foundations of inherited blunders and superstitions. Leibnitz and Josiah Royce are not very far removed from Maimonides and Aquinas.

But, whatever the faith and destiny of the absolute, modern religion would do well to pay attention to concrete human situations, to social interactions. This cosmic urge is altogether too vague and, like love, it is private and personal. To formulate uniformity of belief and worship is to indulge in the collectivization of that which is purely personal. They learned in Russia recently that you cannot collectivize literature and the fine arts. The communists have had the good sense to abandon the attempt, whereas the church or religion concentrated on that which it should have left to the individual, namely, the articles of belief and the form of worship, and relegated into the background those elements of life which are in need of, and respond to, social control. It has been the folly and crime of religion to hound the heretic and tolerate the exploiter.

Modern Judaism must give man the position of paramountcy in its world's scheme. I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not suggesting a new cult dedicated to the worship of *homo sapiens*. I make this stricture because it has become fashionable in certain quarters to ridicule the humanist by dwelling on the weakness of man. I presume it is partly in retaliation for the humanist's uncovering of the clay feet of the gods. No, I do not want altars erected to man—not even to the blonde beast of a superman. I suggest only that if the historic religions are to help us build the Great Society there will have to be a shift in emphasis. Historic religions see man only as the tool, the toy, the servant, and, but rarely, as the partner and co-worker of his creator. It is true that an inspired Psalmist occasionally hailed man as little less than a God, but in the workaday assumptions man lived only for the glory of God. All that happened to man was the work of God. No man hurt his little finger below, the rabbis assured us, unless it was decreed from above. There was no room for cause and

effect, for a series of consequences, for consistency in human life.

It was difficult to make man assume responsibility for his acts. God willed it thus and so, how could man be blamed? When he came to a city and destroyed its men, women, and children at the edge of a sword it was not prompted by his own bestiality, for the expression of which there might have been found a moral equivalent. No; it was the will and commandment of God. If his neighbor was forced into poverty by the cruelty, greed, and exploitation of the mighty, there was an alibi, for had not God declared that the poor man shall not cease in the land. If conscience did prick the sinner he could, of course, repent. Prayers and sacrifice were always sure to make peace with God. Thus, man prayed—and preyed with impunity.

The rabbis were indeed anxious to safeguard freedom of the will and moral responsibility. We sympathize with their efforts, but what meaning can the declaration have for us that everything that man is to be in this world is predestined, except whether he is to be good or bad. Whether man was to be tall or short, beautiful or ugly, strong or weak, rich or poor, wise or foolish, heaven decreed for him; but, whatever the endowments and circumstances of men, the ancients assumed their chances of being good or bad were the same. Grant this assumption and this University might as well economize by the elimination of the departments of history, sociology, psychology, and economics.

Ladies and gentlemen, the will of God, I say with all due reverence, was responsible for much of man's misery. The diplomats who hurled Europe into the World War saved their conscience with the will of God, and I should not be surprised to learn that Adolf Hitler is convinced that he is carrying out a divine commandment.

The task rests upon modern religion to impress man with

his responsibility for the social order under which he lives. War, poverty, crime, political corruption, gangdom, and religious bigotry are not the will or acts of God. They are not inevitable. They are the doings of man. It is he who wrought this complex civilization, his the blame for its failures. "It may be," remarks Bertrand Russell, "that God made the world; but that is no reason why we should not make it over."

Up to a short time ago, man lived in God's world; that is, close to nature. For his livelihood he depended completely upon the work of his hands. The cave or hut he inhabited, the field he sowed, the rain for which he prayed, the lightning he feared, the horse he rode, the cow he milked—all came from God. He had little or no hand in their making. *Per contra*, man today, at least the city-dweller, lives, in the main, in a world of his own making. A cave is God's world, but speeding up in an elevator to the fiftieth story of a skyscraper is to enter man's world. Riding on horseback is to move in God's world; dashing through space in a Boeing is man's world.

Man is not God, but neither is he dust and ashes. The Great Society will not be bestowed upon him as a gift for piety; neither is the devil to be blamed for slums. Whatever world man wants to live in, let him gird up his loins: the burden is upon his shoulders. The Great Society dare not depend on the whim and caprice of a power, even though infinite and omnipotent. It must be built by the intelligence and collective will of the human race. Synagogue Judaism still speaks in terms of a miraculous Messiah, even though the reformists have depersonalized him. Judaism has not yet made clear that the "end of days" envisaged by Isaiah will not leap into sudden existence at the end of this or that millennium.

With the shift in emphasis from God to man there will necessarily follow the shift from other-worldliness to this

world. Religion must abandon the technique of escape and the mood of defeatism. It is the task of modern religion to redirect the gaze of man from heaven to earth. It is one of the sad errors of religion that instead of bringing God down to earth it taught man to labor for a permanent and blissful abode in the unknown beckoning yonder.¹ The earth and the fulness thereof either completely vanished from under man's feet, or he thought of it as a quagmire of depravity and wickedness. Man, religion taught, was not of this earth, and the old religious technique, magic, ritual, prayer, was most suited and amenable to an inspired pilgrim bent upon an alluring destination. Frustrated and thwarted by his own stupidity and the machinations of his leaders, man hoped and prayed for a share of life's goods in paradise. It is the solemn obligation of Judaism and all modern religion to undo this mischief. If security, truth, goodness, and beauty are to be found here, religion will have to teach its followers that man is not merely a pilgrim upon this earth. Life's goods, human values, he must be made to seek here and now.

Concentrating on this world, religion will help bridge the chasm between the sacred and secular, the holy and the profane—a chasm largely of its own making. Time will not allow me to discuss the evil wrought by this distinction, both in the perversion of practice and in the confusion of thought. It is one of the many blunders of our ancient heritage. Certain things were *taboo*, *herem*, *kadosh*, *sacer*—sacred and accursed and withheld from common use. But since the realm of taboo came to include many things vital to life a compromise was effected. Some human beings were vested with the privilege of being sacerdotal. From that moment on, the blunder became a dogma. Life was bisected and body and soul have been at war ever since.

¹ The author has expressed similar ideas in an article in the *Journal of Religious Education*, April, 1931.

This distinction has encouraged hypocrisy, has kept the psychiatrist busy, and has interfered with man's living a normal, natural life.

Modern religion must recognize once for all that there are no two regions of reality, and the dualism between mind and matter are out of date, even if we make allowances for the Heisenberg-Compton principle of uncertainty. To employ secular as a term of reproach, or at least as describing a world of secondary importance, is to belie our civilization. "To say that secular means irreligious," already John Stuart Mill argued, "implies that all the arts and sciences are irreligious." It is the task of modern religion to unify man's world: bravely to declare that there are no things secular and things sacred. There are only facts and conditions which make for security, truth, goodness, and beauty, and there are others that hinder their attainment. There is nothing mysterious or sanctimonious about either set of facts and conditions. The "holier-than-thou" attitude of religion has made our youth skeptical and defiant of the church. A recent contributor to the Forum relates the following incident: A clergyman at church was lecturing a young girl for powdering her nose. "My dear young lady," he expostulated from the height of his authority, "do you think it is quite fitting to carry a compact to church? Don't you know that the blessed Virgin Mary never used a compact?" "Yes," returned the girl, "and Jesus Christ never rode around in a Packard." Spokesmen of religion will do well to abandon a terminology that is foreign to the spirit of the age and often sounds as so much claptrap.

Judaism need experience no concern or difficulty in making the necessary adjustments, for throughout the centuries it ever placed more emphasis on the tangible, namely the people, on Jewry, than on an abstract "ism." Judaism, as Dr. Kaplan has taught us, was a civilization,

a life pattern, as Professor Haydon puts it, not merely an ideology or creed. In the Jew's world view the concept "people" or "nation" was central. "Even God was absorbed in the nationality of Israel. He became the national ethos. He served as a symbol for Israel's loftiest ideals and noblest aspirations."²

The prophets and the Rabbis were always vitally concerned with the preservation of the national personality. Hence, Judaism is characterized by its democratic spirit and by its appreciation of the common man. Every member of the community was regarded an essential factor in the preservation of the nation. Hence, all members of the community were equal. It was not rare to find the president of the Jewish Senate, a prince, and his vice-president, a smith.

If we understand the democratic spirit of Judaism we will understand why, whereas the learned and wise Aesop was destined to remain a slave, Jesus, the carpenter, and Peter, the fisherman, could become the founders of a great religion.

It is this democratic spirit, with its appreciation of every man, that has idealized and ethicized the Jewish concept of nationality. It has always been the ambition of the Jew to mold a perfect nation. Whatever may have been its tribal limitations in nomadic times, the prophets cleansed and purified it. Judaism has not been the antithesis to universalism; rather has it been universalism experimenting with one people. Jewish nationalism is not fed by racial arrogance; it is inspired by the desire to continue the historic life process.

The difference between Naziism and Zionism is the difference between anatomy and personality. The religion of the Jew or Jewry is not national in the sense that it seeks

² From the author's *A Rabbi Takes Stock*, p. 40.

the well-being of but one people and is indifferent to the rest of humanity. Quite the contrary is true. Judaism is profoundly concerned with the progress of all peoples. All human beings, it teaches, are the children of Adam; and Adam, let us remember, was created creedless, raceless, and colorless—at any rate, not white. No prophet envisaged the Messianic era as affecting the Jew alone. The whole of nature, it was hoped, would be regenerated in the “end of days.” All that the people of Israel claimed to be was the laboratory where the great human values were submitted to experimentation. Jews assumed, we hope not too naïvely, that beginning with a family of common origin, common memories, and common loyalties, its experiments had a better chance.³

Throughout the European world, and, for that matter, in America as well, the concept “nationality” is beginning to be degraded. Hitlerism is making of national consciousness a byword and a reproach. The Church everywhere is unfortunately following rather than leading the politicians. It is the task of modern religion to think out the problem and to declare itself either for or against nationality. It is particularly the task of Judaism to emphasize the value of nationality. For Judaism lives and falls with the Jew. When Jewish personality and nationality disintegrate, Jewish ideologies and the Jewish religion cease. In the modern world, the important elements of Judaism can and have in many instances become the mental equipment of many peoples. If Judaism is a civilization of a particular people, Palestine is the effort not only to preserve it but to implement its noblest aspects.

I began with the statement that modern and old religion are not so very far apart. May I, in closing, underscore the most essential difference. It is the attitude toward science and knowledge. The attitude of religion toward science has

³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

been somewhat as follows: When a new point of view or hypothesis was projected, religion anathematized it. After the lapse of a decade the hypothesis was misinterpreted and incorporated into religion. Still later, by the time science had abandoned the hypothesis, it became authorized religious doctrine. It is the task of modern religion not to lag behind science, but to be its goad.

Modern religion dare not assume that the security of man depends upon the rock of permanence. Modern religion must have the courage to face and grapple with change and to find security in a dynamic world. It must regard science as the tool. The ancient techniques of prayer and ritual need be retained only in so far as they are aesthetically appealing. Modern religion must become the friend and not the enemy of science. It must have the courage to proclaim that it is the men of affairs who are responsible for the ills of society, for the disharmony and distemper of the age. It is the men of affairs who have vulgarized the great gifts of nature and commercialized man's wonderful achievements. The sweat and toil of humanity have been directed into the channel of business. Production and consumption have become the order of the day. Men have thrown themselves with Dionysiac frenzy into the piling up of fortunes. Stocks and bonds have distorted all sense of value; it is the encroachment of business that constitutes, in the words of a shrewd observer, "the most sinister threat against the interests of mankind." The old religions busied themselves with the world to come. Business men monopolized this world and have claimed all the sciences. It is the task of modern religion to come back to earth, to throw down the gauntlet to business, to clip its arrogance, and to persuade it that business is only the handmaid of life, and not living.⁴

⁴ *Journal of Religious Education*, April, 1931.

XXII

THE TASK OF HINDUISM

By K. NATARAJAN

THE task of religion in all ages has been, I believe, to assert the supremacy of the moral law over the lives of individuals and nations. Unfortunately most religions—I might almost say all religions—have in large measure disqualified themselves for performing this task. They have fallen to this unfortunate condition by allowing the secular world to dominate them. In other words, the great religions of the world have become corrupt and have lost the power of infusing the lives of men with moral enthusiasm.

It is said in one of our Hindu religious books that whenever the world deteriorates in this respect the Lord himself appears on earth to restore religion to its purity and power. The Hindu believes it. The Christian Bible also says that God has not left any nation without a witness. You may take this to mean that in times of need great prophets appear to restore religion to its purity and effectiveness. Therefore the first task of all religions in modern times seems to be to rehabilitate themselves, to regain the power of controlling men's actions and thoughts.

In this general statement of the task of modern religion I include the specific religion for which I speak. Hinduism is no exception to the rule. I firmly believe that the teachings of the Hindu religion are of the highest and purest kind. But the corruption of the best is sometimes the worst, and the Hindu religion has, in the course of centuries, become more corrupt than any other religion.

There is no time to enter into the causes which have led

to this result. However, one fact of great importance was that the Hindu religion had to assimilate a very large population of the original inhabitants of India, both civilized and primitive. There were many civilizations of India before what has been called the Aryan civilization, and some of them were really of a very splendid character. This is proved by excavations in India, by inscriptions in Asia Minor, by the evidence of trade routes which link India with Babylonia and the rest of Asia. These facts have brought into view an Indian culture of a very high excellence long preceding the coming of the Aryans. But there were also areas in the peninsula which had scarcely attained a pre-cultural level. It was the process of assimilation of these complex elements, not by force, but under the Hindu principle of universal tolerance, which in practice altered the character of the pure idealism of the Hindu thinkers. But our immediate interest is to discover not how Hinduism came to be what it is but how it is qualified in this age to fulfil the task of asserting the supremacy of the moral law over modern India.

Hinduism is of two kinds. There is the popular Hinduism of the temples and there is the religious philosophic Hinduism of the Shastras which is also the Hinduism which regulates family life and status. The former phase, the popular religion of the temples, has come into very great prominence of late in India owing to the endeavor of Mahatma Gandhi to have the untouchables admitted into the Hindu temples. Admission to the temples is only a symbol of the larger ideal of social reform which has as its goal the elevation of the depressed classes to a position of racial equality and cultural opportunity. The segregation of the untouchables is a modern evil which may have had a healthy historic root. For many centuries the untouchables have been denied association with the four recognized castes of Hinduism. They are called untouchables

because to touch them is regarded as causing pollution to members of the recognized four castes. The exclusion of these people probably originated in a form of social boycott directed against undesirable patterns of behavior. It could not have been based on difference of race or physical inferiority, because anthropometrical measurements have shown that some of these untouchables have the same kind of facial measurements as have the highest castes. Moreover, they are very handsome people in some respects; in some places they are more handsome than the higher caste people. With no racial difference between the higher castes and the untouchables, their present segregation can only be explained on the assumption that at some time these people refused to conform to some practice or custom which was considered vital by the higher castes.

It is a tempting hypothesis that some classes refused to give up the eating of beef and the drinking of liquor when the dominant groups were converted to the creed of Ahimsa, non-killing and total abstinence. The ancestors of the Hindus and those who wrote the early sacred hymns of our scriptures were eaters of beef and drinkers of wine. But more than two thousand years ago the higher castes abandoned these practices. This is one of the triumphs of Hinduism as a religion. The cow became a sacred animal. To eat its flesh became a racial crime and to drink liquor a heinous sin. But the untouchables are both eaters of beef and drinkers of liquor. In fact, most of the liquor in India is consumed by untouchables. It seems probable, then, that it was found necessary, in the interests of the whole community, to segregate these people who are so addicted to beef and liquor that they could not give them up, and to treat them as beyond the pale. That, of course, is a very ancient manner of dealing with the question, and it seems to have been a very effective method, more effective than prohibition in America.

If I may digress for a moment, may I express to you the great disappointment felt in India because America has abandoned its prohibition policy. I am not at all prepared to judge the merits of your action. From what I have said regarding the attitude of our higher castes you will understand that the Indian question is entirely different from the American question. We are struggling to get prohibition established in law as a step toward the ultimate removal of this great evil of untouchability. Unlike America, India does not need to worry about any opposition from the higher castes to prohibition. Eighty or ninety per cent of the people are, by religion and by conviction, prohibitionists, and public opinion is entirely for prohibition. The balance of forces is different in America. You have here a civilization in which liquor is not regarded in the same light as in our civilization, and I can very well understand that the premature introduction of a prohibition law could not be maintained. It would have been far better if America had waited to educate its public before launching this great reform. All peoples are members one of another. When we undertake any reforms we should consider not only what the effect will be on ourselves, but what its repercussions will be on other parts of the world. Now unfortunately the American policy is being thrown against us in India as proof of the failure of any prohibition policy anywhere in the world, irrespective of the fact that your situation is so entirely different from ours.

Before I was tempted into this digression I was speaking of the religion of the temples. Let me tell you briefly what we have done and what we are doing to purify temple worship. There were no temples in India before Buddhism. Most of them came into existence in imitation of the Buddhistic temples. Some of them are very large and very wealthy. For a long time there was absolutely no control over the income and property of these temples, but within

the last twenty or twenty-five years the educated men of India have formed an association in different parts of the country to get control over the funds in order to utilize them for modern educational purposes. Several temples as a result are now maintaining high schools; some of them have established Sanskrit colleges in which teaching is carried on according to the modern as well as the ancient method. Orphanages and other social welfare programs find support in these revenues. Thus direction is now being given to the large sums of money which are paid into these temples.

A second reform, now almost realized, is the removal from the temples of the women who are dedicated to the gods. Their name, *devadasis*, shows that they are servants of the gods. The institution probably originated in attitudes similar to those which produced the vestal virgins in ancient Rome. Their duties in the temple were to sing and dance before the gods. Unlike the vestal virgins Hindu women who are dedicated to the gods do not generally lead a pure life. In modern times it has become a scandal that these servants of the gods should live a life of infamy.

In the year 1894 the *Indian Social Reformer* began the agitation against this perverse education of girls and against the entertainment of these girls in private homes on festival and religious occasions. We were very violently assailed by orthodox people; and not only by the orthodox but also by people who called themselves champions of aestheticism. We were denounced as Puritans and kill-joys. They said, "These girls are singers and dancers: Music and dancing are the oldest arts in the country." Our answer was that unless this institution was suppressed it was simply impossible to develop the arts of music and dancing in modern India. Girls of good families would not dare to perform in public for fear of being classed with the dancers of the temples. After forty years, during which

the leaders of the reform were compelled to face ridicule and ostracism, the Hindu community has been won over, the reforms have been accepted, today music is being taught in all the schools of India, and is a subject for taking degrees in our universities. This phase of temple reform is already yielding social fruit in the advance of Indian art. I should not give you the impression that this dedication of the girls in the temples has died out; it still exists, but in the face of public disapproval, Provincial laws, and active social reform it can have no future. Recently the Legislative Council of Madras, the province in which the problem is most acute, unanimously passed a resolution making the dedication of girls an offense. At the same time the women of this community are forming associations to help the temple girls to find a new way of life, usually through marriage. These are the two great reforms which we have effected so far in temple worship.

The third reform, the admission of the untouchables into the temples, is now in course of prosecution. Perhaps I should remind you that our temple worship is not like church worship. The temple is open day and night. Anybody can go there at any time. There is no congregational worship; there are no sermons and, as a man who belongs to a reformed sect of Hindus in which there are sermons, I think their absence in the Indian temples is not altogether regrettable. In the Hindu temples five or six times every day lights are waved before the gods. There are special occasions when people go to the temples. But at any time people may go there and worship. The officials in these temples are not called priests. In the south of India, especially, they are not held in high esteem. They are tolerated, but they are not very much respected. The people who worship in the temples are not numerous today. The admission of the untouchables would be rather a victory for social solidarity than a religious advance.

Some of these temples are monuments of architecture,

and we should be sorry to see them fall into decay. We should very much like them to become the seats of our colleges and universities and museums where the old gods and goddesses might be preserved for the benefit of posterity.

I now come to the real Hindu religion which molds the life of the people. It is a family religion. Every man has his initiation into religion and every family has its ritual. This form of religion is as important in Indian as in China. The ancestors, the present generation, and posterity form one community. We do not think our forefathers are dead. Every year on the anniversary day we celebrate their names. Into this compact society of a continuing family group the individual is born and with birth comes responsibility for embodying the *dharma*. Man is weighted with duty. So far as I know Hinduism has no word for "rights." Every one is born with obligations—to gods, to society, to his children, to posterity—which he must fulfil.

The family heritage enfolding the individual includes a philosophy. Just as you are born Republicans or Democrats, every man in India is born a monist or dualist. There is a philosophy as well as a practice attaching to every family. This religion has been the subject of great reformers for over a hundred years.

The first of those men, called father of modern India because he forecast the reforms, social, political, and religious, which we are now carrying out, was the Rajah Ram Mohan Ray. He was a profound scholar of Islamic culture, a learned Hindu and a master of English. The Brahma Samaj which has been very effective in leadership of modern India was founded by him.

Other reformers followed in steady succession, a brilliant galaxy of devoted men. Beginning with the attack upon Sati and idolatry the reforms spread like a banyan tree until the roots ramified into every phase of the Hindu social life. Hinduism has been awakened into dynamic activity. In this line of great leaders is Mahatma Gandhi,

whose success in arousing Indian religions to new ideals and hopes all the world knows. He is an orthodox Hindu who finds satisfaction for all his religious needs in a purified Hinduism. Thus Hinduism has been endeavoring for a hundred years to free itself of the accretions of the ages and to fit itself to make moral and spiritual values supreme in the life of India.

Before I close I must mention another characteristic of Hindu reformers. They have not been content to reform old abuses only, but have been anxious also to assimilate whatever is good in the religions that have come into India. Almost all religions of the world are there. If a universal synthesis of religions ever is made India will produce it. From Christianity the Hinduism of today has taken a good many ideas of the teachings of Christ Jesus. Mahatma Gandhi is not the only Hindu leader to be profoundly influenced by those teachings.

In a recent life of Swami Vivekananda, who was here forty years ago, a remarkable incident is recorded. The Swami knew he was going to die. It is our belief in India that a yogi can, within limits, determine the hour of his death. This man determined that he would die on a particular day. On the previous day he felt a little better, as people often do before the end. He came out of his room, from which he had not emerged for some time, went to his fellow monks, served them with food and washed their hands. When they expressed their surprise, he answered—"Jesus washed the feet of his disciples." This would indicate that the life and teachings of Jesus have influenced not only political and social leaders but even men like the Swami, whose dominant ideal was to create a dynamic Hinduism.

Perhaps I have said enough to demonstrate that Hinduism is not only striving to purify itself but to join hands with other religions in asserting the supremacy of the moral law over the lives of men and nations.

XXIII

THE TASK OF CHRISTIANITY

BY FRANCIS J. McCONNELL

IT IS noteworthy that in dealing with world-wide tendencies bearing upon its own success or failure, Christianity is today willing to face these tendencies. There have been periods in the history of the church when religious leaders have not been quite willing to look at movements in the intellectual and social and practical realms which have seemed to carry any implication of change in Christianity. Just at present it is fair to say that the fullest statement of tendencies significant for Christianity comes from within the camp of Christianity itself, even when these tendencies seem to threaten something essential to Christianity. This has resulted, too, not from the primary aim of defending the Christian world-view, but with the fundamental purpose of getting at the truth. There has been within Christian circles an increasing friendliness to the full utterance of whatever view from any quarter seems likely to help us on toward a more adequate view of man and the universe.

To begin with, we glance at that change in philosophical theorizing, especially that which relies most upon modern physics, which has been proclaimed as making theistic belief easier. Physical metaphysics, so to speak, is today virtually everywhere telling us that the old so-called lump theory of matter is dead—that we no longer conceive of atoms as little bits of stuff existing on their own account but as centers of force, negatively charged electrons moving as in miniature solar systems around the positively charged proton—the activities capable of being intel-

lectually stated by us in mathematical formulas of great power indeed but of thorough intelligibility. A distinguished thinker has informed us that all this points to a mathematical mind as the ground of the universe.

I greatly fear that theistic thinkers have taken, if anything, too much comfort from this statement. It is a gain for theism to replace atoms as stuff, or stuffs, by atoms as forces. Even, however, when we load this statement with all the weight its intellectual traffic will bear, we are far away from any indication of the moral quality of the Mind which thus acts in these mathematical forms. The moral quality has to be seized by faith. If it were possible to find a scientific demonstration of the existence of God so clear that even the man of ordinary eyesight could no longer doubt that existence—if, to make a grotesque imagining, we could see a god revealing himself unmistakably in some indubitably convincing form—it would still be possible to doubt the moral purpose of that god. Faith would be necessary even in such a revelation. It is not possible to make moral revelations which cannot be doubted. Mathematical revelations render it easy to believe in a mathematically creative mind—but that does not bring us to the end of our theistic journey, or even give us much of a start on it. Still there is advantage in making the utmost possible of the newer physical studies. The more completely we master them the more clearly we discern the room they leave for religious faith.

Relativity is another term which brings joy to some theological thinkers and sorrow to others. Any close discussion of such a theme as this is far beyond my powers, but some considerations about relativity are now so common as to be commonplace. Certainly the theory has been enough talked about the world over to have attained some measure even of popular understanding. One thinker hails it as making mind the measure of all things—as doing

away with a cramping and barren absolutism—as rendering mind free to set its own standards and make its own scales. Another sees nothing but an anarchic universe as the outcome of relativity.

It is interesting to note that many who cry out against the abstruse and unpicturable character of philosophical thinking seem to welcome such an expression as space-time-event. A term like this gets no help from the picturing imagination. Space we know, or we think we do; time we know; events we know; but we can seize space-time-events only by a stern thinking which has no imagination in it. All this by the way, however. The truth seems to be that the closer we get to relativity the less relativity there is in it. That is to say, Einstein at least has been searching for the unity of an all-inclusive formula. Even in the phrasings of the special theory he has something which he calls the “interval”—the something in the space-time-event which is the same for all observers. This, he declares, to be objective truth—or as close an approximation to objective truth as the mind of man can reach. The general theory brings gravitation within the grasp of the Einstein formulas and the later efforts aim at the intellectual capture of electro-magnetic phenomena. This is not relativity strictly speaking. The great service of the theory is in the inclusiveness of the formula. The sally has now and again been made at relativity that it teaches that there is no absolute except the relative. This is not fair. The avowed search at least is for an absolute mathematical formula, absolutely binding upon all physical facts.

By making the most of the relative, then, we come upon an absolute. We must concede, however, that this is a somewhat barren outcome for religious purposes, except as providing for a base in a unity for the universe. If relativity is true, there is not much ground for calling the universe anarchic. It is, of course, sheerest tautology to say that, if

one formula can grasp all the space-time-events of the universe, all those factors must be graspable by the formula. A universe with every physical fact within it graspable by formula cannot lightly be called anarchic.

This reference to relativity supplies a bridge over from these more abstract reflections to the more vital questions with which religion deals. Relativity is a charmed word to-day and reaches into realms far beyond the abstractly philosophical. In the midst of rejoicing over the movement away from absolutes of all sorts, many students of Christianity seem to be taking back with one hand what they gave away with the other. After telling us of the uselessness of absolutes in religion and everywhere else, they now tell us that the relative vitiates everything human. That would seem to call for renewed search for something absolute. We seem, however, estopped from going back and renewing our allegiance to the absolutes of the old style. Perhaps the difficulty with the absolutes, especially in the religious sphere, was that they were of an old style and perhaps everything that was worth while in the absolute can be regained through a deeper search for the relative. Some things, of course, we do not longer care for. The conception of an absolute omnipotence in the Creator of the Universe which makes impossible genuine freedom for men, or that merges together all things good and bad for the preservation of the sanctity of an abstract term is no longer helpful.

By the way, we have to make some place for the legitimate play of fashions in thought and feeling and activity in the religious world as elsewhere. Religious fashions change. It will not do to dismiss such change as if it were wholly irrational. Fashions, even in externals as raiment and food and shelter, are not irrational in the full sense. They may mean the insistent demand of an organism for attention to a neglected need. The organism is protesting against wrong

food or clothing. Likewise the weariness of the mind at the absolutes may mean the demand for something more satisfying. It may indeed be that all views of truth are relative—that, because of this relativity, all possibility of the discovery of an absolute is out of the question but life and its centers may abide in the relative. Religions, philosophies, moral codes, rituals may all have on them the marks which date them at times and places, but stripped of these localizing and dating peculiarities they may have left nothing which ministers to life. So that it is wisdom for the religious teachers to make the most of the relative in study and use for the sake of finding, not an absolute of the older stamp, but something common-to-all, or common-to-some, in that which may have at first seemed wholly particular and personal.

For illustration, we may think of that former method of regarding the Old Testament prophets as voicing truth in a fashion valid for all ages. The prophets were looked upon as miraculously foreseeing all the course of the ages after their own time. They were supposed to be dowered with a power to utter exactly wisdom for crises thousands of years after their day. Now the corrective to all this came with developing the relative features of prophecy to the utmost—the dependence of the prophets on their own circumstances, their acceptance of mistaken and crude views of the world—the incompleteness of their knowledge of much that we had thought final in their grasp. The result has been not the better understanding of the prophets through debunking them but through uncovering situations which recur in human history, through showing that while they did not have final truth they were moving in the right direction—through revealing the entire humanness of their lives and times. They have been taken out of the eternal realm and made perennially contemporaneous with the successive generations.

Or we may think for a moment of the interest we take in the diaries of men who have "written themselves out," confiding their inmost secrets to pages supposedly never to be seen by any eyes except their own. Sometimes our delight may be merely idle curiosity, or worse, but it is more likely to be the thrill of discovering that when the writer—assuming him to be a mind of consequence—sets down what appears to him to be most intimately his own, he is touching the chords which vibrate most deeply in our hearts as our own. This discovery of channels of communion, of like-mindedness in men through working upon the material which some pronounce the "merely relative," is a splendid gain. In this day which insists that all is relative, and then insists further that the relative is not absolute, we may well be content with any relative in religion, that is crammed and packed with life.

Something of the same consideration may be urged in regard to another world-wide emphasis today—the approach to what we call the significance of the "human values" for religion—a significance which issues in an avowed humanism with at least an outline of formal creed. Here the important work is being done by those who are searching for concrete determination of the content of human values. Human values is a general term. Our chief difficulty is to determine what can properly be called human and what can be called a value. Here religion is being served with increasing effectiveness by two types of servants—the expert in actual study of human conditions, and the expert in religious education. Let the investigations of the former be excessively material, capable of being expressed in terms of pounds of food, and of floor- and window-space in houses, and of playgrounds and wages and hours and all such statistically seizable data—let the technique of religious education be overelaborate and artificial, nevertheless the activities of such dealers in the

actual help us along. The bare term "human value" can be made to apply to anything. Probably no selfish exploiter has ever failed altogether in attempts to show that his activities have had some advantages for men. Every oppressive system has probably done some human groups some good. The relative comes in there again. The question is as to what activities and institutions are best for men here and now—or rather what are better for men than those which may have been good up to now. What can we do next, or here and now?

The church has always shown almost incredible slowness in getting into the light the actual detailed content of what a human value calls for. This has often been admittedly due to lack of material ability to discover such content, but the excuse can hardly hold good today. The older order of appeals to men for self-sacrifice, for example, has so completely lost its force that ordinary good sense calls for change. When I was a small boy I heard a Memorial-Day orator tell of the vision which floated before the minds of the Union soldiers who died at Gettysburg. This vision, according to the orator, was of their country fifty years after Gettysburg. Well, we have traveled seventy years from Gettysburg. If the dying soldiers could have been vouchsafed a vision of what their country was to be a half-century after their death, possibly the picture of the actual reality would not have prompted to self-sacrificing death! Just this sort of appeal, however, has been resorted to as incentive to self-sacrifice. Why not, then, rely on something closer at hand—the needs of persons on earth here and now? If we are to deal realistically, we would best deal with problems we can know most about.

In spite of all the fault we can find with the current methods of investigation and education in religious work, the fact remains that such activity has an immense volume

of assured data now at hand which can be of help in our discussion of human values. We know human beings better than ever before, for one thing, and that for the reason that human minds have in the last twenty-five years been subjected to more widespread and searching scientific scrutiny than ever before. We are arriving at a better understanding of what the word "human" means, or ought to mean.

By thus dealing at first hand with human data we stand a chance of finding what part in human experience such terms as "God" and "immortality" and "prayer" and "mysticism" actually play. The tendency of the expert investigator is to make his standards and tests material. It is not by denouncing such tendencies but by using them as fully as we can that we discover what else beyond the forces which produce a physical result we must take account of in our setting forth of human values. If man does not live by bread alone, we can study his higher desires best after we have given him what bread he craves, rather than by rationing his bread too closely. If, now, there are imponderables in human values, we can best get at them by generous dealing with the ponderables. We shall have to make more than we have done with the so-called humanistic elements before we see what is needed beyond these elements. We are rather fond of saying that these or those material goods are not enough—that the strictly human values are not enough. It is not altogether fitting to say that these so-called lower goods are not enough until we have seen that men have had enough of them.

Out of this honest attempt to see that men get enough of the material instruments of living we are indeed discovering anew that men crave those higher values which cannot be statistically or mechanically measured or set forth. The best way to see whether making man himself the chief object of human contemplation satisfies the human life is to let men make the most they can of such con-

templation. It has been observed by more than one thinker that just as the individual needs an object of his thought and endeavor outside of and beyond himself, so groups of men, especially those seeking for the high goods of religion likewise need an object beyond the human. Some, therefore, turn their gaze to those phases of the cosmos or universe which would seem to have in them the least of human reference. Some turn their meditation upon the vast impersonalities of the universe as gratifying the expansion of that which is most distinctively personal in themselves. We even hear of cosmic emotion, of cosmic worship. We are told of the human enlargement which comes from reflection upon those distances of the stellar spaces which can be reckoned in measures of light-years. Referring again to Albert Einstein, I suppose it would be permissible to classify Einstein as a humanist because of the larger place his system gives to distinctively human intellectual powers and because of his putting mind so near the center of all things. Nevertheless, Einstein's search is for those elements of the universe in which human thought counts for least—elements which stand in their own objective non-human right. If it be averred that this objective "interval" is a fact worthy of absorbed contemplation because of its freedom from admixture of human thinking, we are saying that the most satisfying object of human thinking about the cosmos is non-human.

The closer we get to human thinking as we see it in human beings, the more we at least suspect the presence of tendencies to range out beyond the human. The only reasonable way to be humanist is to keep to the facts of human tendencies, at least for our starting-point. In all the rare, fine ideals which modern humanism exalts—ideals which seek to get along without any notions of God or human destiny at all similar to those familiar to the plain man, we have to remember that the more humanly created

the older conceptions are the more of a problem they are for the humanist because of their naturally human impulse to get beyond the human.

We shall never reach the bottom of this question till we get more light on what we may call the prevalence of "secret beliefs." There is reason to suspect that many a careful thinker is averse to stating beliefs before he can give what seems to him rational grounds for them. A scientist might believe that an undiscovered star was making disturbance in a given set of sidereal movements, but he would not be likely to announce his belief as long as it remained merely in the realm of personal conviction. Of beliefs which must always remain beliefs because there is no way of getting proof for them at all, of course, many thinkers will say nothing at all. Even a skeptic as thoroughgoing as Bertrand Russell, in a recent review of a philosophical work, has referred to these secret beliefs which even the most competent thinkers cherish. Now an immense mass of the most human type of thinking, if we are to judge by private conversations and other privileged communications, consists in the cherishing of these secret beliefs or disbeliefs. The tendency is real enough and, as far as we can judge, the secret beliefs are thoroughly human products of human beings. It is odd that human beings so persistently turn their thoughts toward non-human or super-human conceptions. God and immortality may be nothing but the outcome and expression of human desires, but we cannot help asking what there is in the human that so craves the divine. If such conceptions are revealed by external authority, we may more readily dismiss them than if they come as the expression of human appetite and longing. Moreover, if we come to the plain man who is so important a factor in religious thinking, we have to note that the value of the ideas of God and immortality consists for him in the possibility of his thinking of them as essentially

true—or as in some objective manner real. Let him once come to suspect that these ideas are merely projections outward of his own subjective interests and he is likely to cease to take them seriously—or to look to them for any form of help.

Nevertheless, we must be on our guard against overstating the necessity of a given set of views concerning the universe for human conduct—or human devotion to moral ideals. Kant declared that God, freedom, and immortality are indispensable at least in the Kantian “regulative” sense. Still we do find men who, in no inconsiderable numbers, conform to lofty moral ideals without accepting any of these postulates of Kant. Perhaps these persons live in the atmosphere created by mankind’s wide acceptance of such beliefs, but there is something to be said in favor of, for example, the view that hosts of men are showing themselves worthy of immortality by the extent to which they give themselves to the pursuit of moral ideals for the worth of the ideals themselves, without any particular regard to immortality. Here again, though, we confront the problem as to how much a moral ideal is just moral ideal, and how much is assumption and implication as to the nature of the universe. We may begin our inquiry into human values, as I said above, on a material and statistical plane, only to discover that the most accurate of our investigations put us on the path to human cravings for values which cannot be caught by scales and charts at all.

Again, the present day is one that makes, indeed demands, large place for organized Christianity, especially as one among the world-wide social forces. It does not make much difference whether we approve of actions and attitudes by churches on the larger social issues or not. Out of their own realization of themselves as corporate entities—out of their consciousness that as groups they attain to insights and powers not often attainable by their members

acting separately, they give themselves to a collective self-expression which is inevitable, just as self-expression if for no other reason. The limits which this self-expression will set for itself are, of course, an important problem, but those limits are never likely to involve repression of utterance altogether. We may be sure that on the broad human aspects of any large-scale social issue organized Christianity will more and more speak forth—aiming at least at the creation of a humane public opinion.

Indeed social thinkers like Principal A. D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol, are pointing out that the larger democracies have now become so huge that they cannot longer depend as of old on individual leaders, unless those leaders have back of them the support of groups of like-minded followers. Doctor Lindsay insists that these groups of like-minded members of voluntary associations are the key to the control of democracies. Among such associations he lists educational groups for their indispensability in standing for scientific method, labor groups for their protection of workers, and churches for putting a massive strength into the public opinion supporting the higher human ideals. For the possible importance of such organized church action we have only to think of the arousing of public sentiment against war. It may be true that wars, in the deeper analysis, arise out of obscure economic and psychological pressures, but it is clearly true that a war never takes on its full deadliness until a nation's will-to-fight comes out into the light of deliberate intention. Hence such utterance as that of a distinguished militarist who declared—and this since the close of the World War—that we must have churches in order that they may bless war. I suppose there can be little doubt that in times of war the churches have usually blessed whatever wars their nations have been engaged in. If there has ever been an instance of a church's refusing to glorify a war in which

the nation to which it belonged was involved, I feel confident that most of us have never heard of it. If a church has in war time ever denounced any barbarous war practices, except those of the enemy, it would be interesting to know when. In war time militarists count on and receive the support of the churches, and reckon that support among their positive military resources.

The truth seems to be that the masses of a nation-at-war are not willing to risk death for economic motives baldly stated. The soldier who does the dying obviously does not benefit by the triumph of one economic system over another. The mass of the public opinion which puts the war through rests down upon the conviction of the sacredness of the national cause. Churches have always been willing to preach the sacredness of such a cause—always willing to put the flag by the side of, and sometimes above, the Cross.

I may seem to be arguing that in war questions the organizations of Christianity are usually wrong. I am admitting that. All I am now interested to maintain is the effectiveness of ecclesiastical organization in molding public opinion. The church may have been utterly wrong in any one of its larger social pronouncements up to date, but by the law of its being it will continue to seek such social self-expression. That ideal of utter silence on the part of the church on social questions which seems to many to be so desirable is not attainable—society being what it is and voluntary associations being what they are. There remains then the duty of the church—or the churches—to do what we expect an individual citizen to do—not to neglect public duty but to discharge it aright by bringing to bear upon it an informed moral sense.

I wish to repeat here what I have already said in other sections of this paper—that making the most of a world-wide tendency is the quickest way to correct the faults of

that tendency, to discover its limitations, and to fit it into the round of activities where it can best serve. Pronouncements beforehand as to what cannot and can be done in social spheres do not now command the attention they once did. The social realm is today that of experimentation and adventure, where we have to find our way along by the method of trial-and-error, seeking for what is largest and best for men.

By making the most of the social emphasis in present-day Christianity we stand the best chance of arriving at a higher and better individualism than any we have hitherto known. Social progress is marked through the centuries by at least three stages of rhythm which tend to recur. There are times when men conceive of society—or preferably the state—as an end in itself. Citizens are cannon-fodder to be offered up to national victory—or are so much stuff of which an empire of industry is to be built—the individual counting for just as little as can be left to him in harmony with the needs of the empire. Then there have been periods in which individualism has been sought through such exclusively individualistic methods that social organization as such has fallen far toward anarchy. The third aspect is that in which the social aim has been to give the individual the best chance of elevating the general level into a plateau from which the individual takes a higher start toward the upper skies, by relieving the individuals from the waste effort of trying to do separately what they can do better through social co-operative agency, by leaving them completely free to think and do as they please in the fields where social consequences are not closely relevant. It may be urged that no one of these phases of the relation of society to the individual has pre-eminent value for any and all conditions. One emphasis may possibly be best at one time and another at another. Just at the moment it would seem the dictate of practical good sense for organized

Christianity to make the most of the view which regards social institutions and social contacts for their worth for individual lives, those lives being estimated as ends in themselves, with everything institutional looked upon as instrumental. Out of the emphasis on the social may come a fresh discovery of the individual.

A final glance in this admittedly sketchy survey must look toward that question as to the friendliness or unfriendliness or indifference of the universe which lies close to the heart of religious thinking the world over. The problem is made all the more pressing and poignant just by a world-wide consciousness of misery altogether unusual in the history of the race. It would be too much to say that there is more human distress the world over now than ever before. Probably the part of human society which we call Christendom, or Western civilization, is suffering more acutely than ever, but take all men everywhere, hunger and disease and all the woes that come with poverty are very likely no worse now than they have ever been. An acute crisis has indeed thrust unprecedented misery upon the West and the West is crying out at pain which the Orient has for centuries taken as a matter of course. Again, the problem of pain as it involves the vast masses of mankind is likely to become more serious with the progress of what we call civilization. Not only because of the increase of means of communication which supply the physical basis for world-wide sharing of sympathy, but because of the increase of sympathy itself, if human development means anything, the problem of the world's pain will become increasingly serious and more and more baffling.

If anything is clear as to the problem of physical evil in the universe, it is that that problem is not soluble by any knowledge or methods at our disposal. The question becomes that of making a practical situation more and more tolerable. We can ask three fundamental questions as to

the universe. Is it hostile to us? or indifferent? or friendly? In some ways it is manifestly hostile—as to those who break its laws, for example. In some ways it is indifferent—as to those who use its powers now in one direction and now in another. Yet it is at least permissible to raise the query as to whether even the hostility and indifference may not be at bottom friendly.

XXIV

THE TASK OF CONFUCIANISM

BY HU SHIH

I BEGAN my part in this series by announcing that I was not a Confucianist. After that I sat here and listened to Dr. Hodous' lecture, in which he purposely or unconsciously referred to me as a part of that Confucianist movement belonging to the naturalistic section of Confucianism. I was wondering whether I should stick to my original announcement, or should accept the new attribution of faith? But at the end of Dr. Hodous' address he said, "Confucianism is dead. Long live Confucianism!" When I heard those two announcements I began to realize that probably I am a Confucianist—now that Confucianism is dead.

Confucianism is not a religion in the Western sense. As I tried to show in one of my lectures at the University and in some of the talks here, there have been times when Confucianism was a religion—sometimes a theistic religion. But as a whole, Confucianism never proposes to be a religion of the theistic type, never a religion of the missionary type. It never poses to believe in its own infallibility. It never had the courage to go out to preach its gospel to the non-believers. In that way the Chairman was quite right in changing the wording of the introduction in referring to my talk. He did not announce it as "The Task of Confucianism as a Modern Religion," but said simply that I was going to say a few words on the task of modern religion as viewed from the Confucianist standpoint.

I think that is quite right. Confucianism, as was announced by Dr. Hodous, is certainly dead. It has com-

mitted suicide, not by blundering, but by an attempt to expurgate itself of its excesses and also of its privileges, those forgeries and interpolations which had been added to the scripture of the founders.

I said in one of my University lectures that even the last advocate, the last reformer of Confucianism, was one who, in his own lifetime, saw the downfall of a major portion of the Confucianist scripture which had been the most popular, the most readable, and therefore the most influential, in controlling Chinese thought. In that way Confucius is justly dead.

Mencius, the greatest Confucianist philosopher, second only to Confucius in influence, once said, "Man's trouble lies in his desire to become a teacher of other men." And it is often said in Confucian literature that "Courtesy demands that the pupils come to their teachers; and no teacher should go out to his pupils." Confucianism never taught its followers to go out to preach to the people from house-tops and to bring the good tidings to the unbelieving heathen in all corners of the earth. For that reason Confucianism was never intended to be a world-religion. It was never a religion with missionaries.

This, however, does not mean that Confucius and Mencius and the Confucianist scholars desired to conceal their light under a bushel and not to place it on high so that all might see. It only means that these men had that intellectual humility which made them abhor the attitude of the dogmatic missionary and take the humble position of the seeker after truth. It means that these Chinese thinkers refused to believe that any man, however sagacious and far seeing, could claim infallibility in knowing all the intricacies of life and morals for all peoples and for all times. Indeed, Confucius frankly said, "I am fortunate in that whenever I make a mistake it is always detected by other people." It is this consciousness of the possibility

of error which leads the founders of the Confucianist school to disapprove of the human desire to teach others. The light which we wish to illuminate the world may after all be only a very dim torch speedily dwindling into darkness. And the truth with which we hope to leaven the whole of humanity may after all prove to be not entirely free from error; and any uncritical dogmatization of it may only kill its vitality and prevent it from being constantly rejuvenated and revalidated by the wisdom of later and newer ages.

The first task of a modern religion, therefore, is to undertake a thorough and severe process of self-examination. "Know thyself" is a commandment which should take precedence of all the great commandments of the religions of the world. Let us first satisfy ourselves that what we intend to give to men is bread, and not a stone. Let us first be sure that the truth we wish to share with the whole world is a truth that can stand the test of time and that can stand upon its own merit without having to rely upon the strong hand of the persecutor, or the subtle jugglings of the theologian and the philosopher of religion. Let us all take to heart that all those who pitted their dogmas against the Brunos, the Galileos, the Darwins of their times did no honor to their religion, but made it the laughingstock of the civilized world.

From this there follows the second task of a modern religion, which, I believe, consists in a willingness to carry out internal reforms in accordance with the results of self-examination—not only to revise or even to discard the untenable creeds and dogmas, but also to reorganize the institutionalized life of any particular religion, to diminish it or even to dissolve it altogether, if necessary. It is the spirit of all great religions to teach that life may be regained by losing it. And the reverse is true, that life continued under degrading conditions is worse than death.

This point is of special importance with regard to the highly organized and highly institutionalized religions in Europe, America, India, and Japan.

When we study the history of the Chinese religions we find the striking phenomenon that, because of the weakly institutionalized character of the religions, new sects or schools gradually and almost imperceptibly replaced the old ones. Thus the Ch'an or Zen sect slowly replaced all the older schools; and thus the Amida sect slowly worked its way into all Buddhist monasteries and homes. The same is true of Confucianism, where the Eastern Han school of commentators slowly overshadowed all the earlier schools and was in turn peacefully replaced by the modernist interpretations by Chu Hsi and his school; and where the transition from the Sung school to that of Wang Yang-ming, and later to the Critical school of the last three centuries, was achieved in the same gradual manner.

Not so in the other religions. There every new movement became institutionalized and resisted further change. So the Franciscans, instead of being a reform movement of the thirteenth century, remain a powerful sect in the twentieth. The Lutherans and the Calvinists, instead of being the historical initial stages of Protestant reforms, remain the reactionary churches of our own age. All those scores and scores of new sects, which should have been points or stages in a vertical historical development of a great religion, are today seen as horizontally co-existing rivals, each perpetuating itself by institutionalization and mission work, and each firmly believing in itself as the only channel to escape hell-fire and attain salvation. And the bad effect of such stubborn efforts to outlive historical usefulness is now being copied by all older religions, even by T'ai Shu and K'ang Yu-wei in China. Is it not high time to call a halt to all such blind rivalries and to declare a holiday for all religions, all churches, all missions, so that they

may have time to think over what all this is about and to work out some kind of "blanket code" for peace, economy, and rationalization in religion?

And, lastly, the great task of a modern religion is to expand and extend the meaning and scope of religion. After all, my people were right in calling a religion a *chiao*, a teaching. All religions began as great systems of moral and social teaching, and ended in becoming slavish defenders of creeds and rituals. The time has come for all thinking men and women to realize that religion is coextensive with education in its broadest sense, that all that teaches men to be better, wiser, and more moral has religious and spiritual value; and that science, art, and social life are the new instrumentalities of the new religion of the new age, and are properly the substitutes for the incantations, the rituals, the penances, the monasteries, and the churches of old.

And we must realize that, viewed in the light of history, religions were poor philosophies, and philosophies were but bad sciences. If the religions have failed to reach men it is not because men have become less religious but because religion, in its traditional sense, has failed to fulfil its primary function of teaching men to be better and wiser. That teaching has been more effectively undertaken by the non-religious instrumentalities. And religion itself is struggling to appropriate all these instrumentalities for the support of its institutional life. So we have the Y.M.C.A.'s and the Y.M.B.A.'s. But why not drop the third initials? Why not frankly recognize that all these movements are no longer religious in the old sense, and that they are religious only in so far as they are educational, in so far as they are teaching men to be more moral and social? And why not frankly transfer all our old loyalty to the new instrumentalities of education which are taking the place of the older religions as sources of instruction, inspiration, and consolation?

The task of a modern religion, therefore, seems to lie in the direction of greatly extending our conception of religion by reviving its original function as moral teaching. No religion can thrive when it is confined to one hour or two in the week; nor can it hope to survive when its narrow scope of teaching is confined to a few theological seminaries. The religion of the modern world must be the moral life that is taught by the combination of all the educational forces now at our command. Whatever ennobles man and lifts him above his little self, whatever leads him to seek truth and love men, that is religion in the oldest and best sense; that is all that the founders of the greatest religions of the world have struggled to find and bequeath to mankind.

INDEX

INDEX

- Agha Khan, 197
 Ahad Ha'am, 17-18
 Ahmad Kahn, Sir Syed, 12
 Al-Azhar University, 98
 Al-Ghazali, 8
 'Ali 'Abd al-Razik, 198
 Aligarh College, 12, 98
 Ali, Mehemet, 12
 Akamatsu Yoshimaru, 74
 Amanullah, 98
 Amida Buddhism, 38
 Anesaki, 134
 Buddhism, and intercultural contacts, 124-40; and scientific thinking, 34-45; and social-economic problems, 71-80; attitude toward capitalism, 203; attitude toward missions, 204-5; changes, in Chinese, 131-33; changes, in Japanese, 133-35; changes, in Southern, 128-31; Chinese, three movements in, 76-78; conception of the material world, 40-42; ecclesiastical form still dormant, 201; faces anti-religion movement, 73-74; factors reviving Japanese, 201-2; fundamentally atheistic, 206-7; its present flourishing condition in Japan, 200-201; Japanese and Chinese, three types of, 35; loss of missionary zeal after eighth century, 126; Mahayana, its philosophy, 35-36; modern missions of, 136-40; psychology of, 42-43; reasons for negative attitude toward science, 35; reformation of, in China, 75-76; reformation of, in Japan, 71-75; the task of, 200-208; tolerant and assimilative in contact with other cultures, 124-26
 Buddhist publications, 71, 74, 76, 138
 Central Conference of American Rabbi's, 88
 Ch'an, 36, 37, 248
 Ch'en Huan-Chang, 175
 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 174
 Chien Yui, 47
 Christian modernism, 30-32, 146
 Christianity, adjustment to the idea of relativity, 143-47; to the criterion of naturalness, 148-50; and intercultural contacts, 141-52; and scientific thinking, 25-33; and social-economic problems, 103-11; attitude toward human values, 234-36; change in conception of salvation, 150-52; contribution of, to social advance, 108-9; early Christian adjustments, 141-42; its modern task, 229-44; reaction of, to scientific method, 25-27; reaction of, to Darwinian evolution, 27; reaction of, to psychology of religion, 27; social precepts of Jesus summarized, 104-6; the modern need of the church, 239-41
 Cohen, Hermann, 16-17
 Colleges, Buddhist, in Japan, 72
 Confucian scriptures, two types, 51
 Confucianism, and intercultural contacts, 169-78; and scientific thinking, 46-51; and social-economic problems, 81-86; exaltation of farmer over the commercial class, 85-86; friendly to socialistic ideals, 85; its agnostic tendency, 46; its modern task, 245-50; its nature as a religion, 81; not a religion in the Western sense, 245; opposed to birth control, 84; reaction to Western culture, 173-78; teaches the attitude of doubt, 47; two attitudes toward political-social problems, 82-83; two streams of Confucian thought, 169-70; welcomes scientific thinking, 46
 Confucius, 46-47, 81, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176

Conservative Judaism, characterized, 20-21; attitude toward modernism, 21-22; idea of God, 23

Devadasis, 225

Dhammapala, 130, 131, 136, 137

Eu Yang Ching Wu, 77

Fundamentalists, Christian, 30

Gandhi, 67, 222, 227

God idea of Buddhism contrasted with those of Christianity and Judaism, 44

Higher criticism in Confucianism, 50-51

Hinduism, a family religion, 227; accepts reforms with care to preserve old values, 62-64; and intercultural contacts, 153-68; and scientific thinking, 52-58; and social-economic problems, 61-70; causes of its deterioration, 221-22; does not depend on conception of God, 53; effects of contact with Greek and Moslem, 154-56; factors of Westernization, 161-65; foundations of Hindu culture unchanged, 153; is an attitude of reverence, 53; its complete tolerance, 54-55; its modern task, 221-28; two types of, 222

Humanists, Christian, two types of, 32-33

Hu Shih, 78

Ibn Khaldun, 10

Ibn Saoud, 13, 197

Imam Yahya, 97, 197

Ing Kuang, 77

Institutionalists, Christian, 32

Islam, adjustment of Indian Moslems, 121; and intercultural contacts, 115-23; and scientific thinking, 3-14; and social-economic problems, 94-102; changes in family life, 101-2; characteristics of Moslem social system, 94-96; decrease of nomadism, 101; difficulty of defin-

ing task of Islam because of its multiformity, 191-94; early achievements in philology, philosophy, ethics, science, 7-10; elements in the problem of adjustment of northern Moslem states, 120; examples of loosening of religious controls, 98-100; factors of Westernization, 117-19; factors retarding Moslem adjustment to modern world, 97; its modern task, 191-99; reasons for anti-Moslem prejudice, 3-5; social reform in Turkey, 98-99; status of Moslem states centering about Arabia, 120-21; summary of status of modern Islam, 122-23; the attitudes of conservatives, moderates, and radicals, 196-98; the task in Turkey, 194-95

Íswar Chandra, 62

Jewish orthodoxy and modernism, 19-20

Judaism, a threefold destructive effect of participation in Western culture, 179-83; and intercultural contacts, 179-88; and scientific thinking, 15-24; and social-economic problems, 87-93; attitude of Conservative rabbinate, 92; attitude of Jewish laymen to reforms, 91-92; co-operation in social reform with Christian bodies, 89-90; definition of, 88; its democratic spirit, 218; modes of adjustment to modern culture, 184-88; presuppositions of world-view, 15; social ideals of Central Conference of American Rabbis, 88-89; the task of, 209-20

K'ang Yu-wei, 50-51, 83, 173, 248

Kegon, 36, 37, 137

Kishio Satomi, 75

Ledi Sadow, 130

Liang Chi Chiao, 78

Lybyer, A. H., 11

Maha Bodhi Society, 130, 136, 137

Mahmud, the reformer, 12

Marriage, Hindu idea of, 66

Mencius, 245

- Mohammed Abduh, 12
 Mustapha Kemal, 13, 195, 198
 Nanking Buddhist Institute, 77
 National Buddhist Federation, 76
 National Council of Jewish Women, 92
 Naturalism in China, 169-71
 Neo-Confucianism, 47-49
 Pan-Pacific Young Men's Buddhist Association, 205
 Prohibition, India's attitude toward, 224
 Rammohan Ray, 65, 227
 Reform Judaism and modernism, 20
 Religion, modern, its task, 210; Buddhism, 200-208; Christianity, 229-44; Confucianism, 245-50; Hinduism, 221-28; Islam, 191-99; Judaism 209-20; essential difference from old religion, 219-20
 Sankhya, atheistic yet orthodox, 53
 Sarton, George, 7
 Sasaki, Sokei-ann, 37
 Sayyid Jamal al-Din al Afghani, 12
 Secret beliefs, 238
 Shari'a, 116
 Shingon, 36, 37, 134
 Shulhan Aruk, 19
 Stcherbatsky, 40
 Sun Yat-sen, 174
 Suzuki, 38, 134
 Taha Husain, 13, 198
 T'ai Hsu, 36, 39, 50, 75-76, 78-79, 248
 Tomomatsu Entai, 75
 Ts'ai Yuan-pei, 176
 Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 91
 Untouchables, admission to temples, 226; theory of origins, 222-23
 Vivekananda, Swami, 228
 Wang An-Shih, 83
 Wang Mang, 83
 Wang Yang-ming, 47, 49
 West Hongwanji, 74
 Wu-Yü, 174
 Yemen, 97
 Yuan Shi-kai, 174
 Zen, 36, 37, 134, 248

1434441

BL

98

.H4

c.3

Hayden

Modern trends in world*
religiens

L. M. K. Kaganova

1968
Kaxermet Kunko

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
23 570 405

BL
98
.H4
Cop. 3.

143 4441

SWIFT HALL LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



23 570 405